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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This research aims to identify the legal theories developed and employed by the jurists of 
the Shāfi‘ī school of law for the purpose of issuing fatāwā.  It intends to shed light on 
how these jurists understand the term iftā’, and what are the elements in their view that 
constitute the legal framework that they utilize for iftā’.  This research also attempts to 
determine the differences between iftā’ and the general process of formulating legal 
rulings by way of ijtihād, and the factors of consideration that may result in the existence 
of such a differentiation.  This research argues that the existing legal discourse within the 
Shāfi‘ī madhhab has not rendered due attention to the significance of iftā’, and thus there 
exist a dearth of literature within the madhhab on the legal theories of iftā’ . 
 
This research also analyzes examples of fatāwā issued by the Singapore Fatwa 
Committee with the aim to comprehend how the legal theories of iftā’, lacking they may 
be within the legal deliberations of the Shāfi‘ī madhhab, have an influence on the iftā’ 
institution of the state and the fatāwā it issued.    
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The dynamism of Islamic law as a set of legal injunctions designed to not only sustain, 
but more significantly, to nourish the magnificence of man’s life in its totality, has 
notably been addressed for centuries.  Although a Muslim subscribes to an article of 
faith that dictates a conviction in the divine state of this law, hence its finality and 
intransience, the suppleness in its application and its level of practicality to achieve its 
goals of realizing general interests of its subjects, transcends beyond doubt of any 
enlightened researcher.   
 
This is evident in the evolution of  its legal theories throughout its extended history, 
originating from the days of Prophet Muhammad in Makkah and Madīnah, to its 
contemporary scholars and jurists of the present day.  Albeit the argument that Islamic 
law has long surpassed its glorious zenith in term of the ingenuity of its scholars’ 
intellectual contribution, they have never failed to develop means to ensure its 
applicability across different social and temporal spheres.  
 
This dynamic mutability of Islamic law has been significantly achieved, among others, 
through legal interpretations of muftūn, or jurisconsults, who “… were central to that 
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part of legal theory that dealt with modalities of transmitting the outcome of ijtihād 
from the domain of the legal profession down to the public.”1 
 
Iftā’ has been an important instrument throughout the Islamic legal tradition in 
providing Muslim societies with answers and solutions to their religious queries.  It acts 
as the medium used by jurists to interpret the legal injunctions as revealed by the texts 
into a practical language that can be readily comprehended and complied with by the 
masses.   
 
The legal theories on iftā’ has gone through various stages of development, where 
scholars of different schools of law exercised their ingenuity to formulate principles and 
methodologies that, according to their judgment, would best suit the needs of their 
respective societies and communities, while at the same time, preserve the sanctity of 
the sharī‘ah, or the divinely revealed law of Muslims.    
 
The Muslims in Singapore are one of such communities.  The issue of strictly adhering 
to the classical fiqh (Islamic positive law) by holding firmly to the products of ijtihād of 
early Muslim jurists while religiously making references to their classical writings, and 
whether such a practice could sufficiently address the challenges of the community, has 
always been a point of debate among Singaporean Muslims.   
                                                 
1 Hallaq, Wael, “Iftā’ and Ijtihād in Sunni Legal Theory : A Developmental Account”, in Islamic Legal 
Interpretation : Muftis and Their Fatwas, Masud, Muhammad Khalid, Messick, Brinkley & Powers, 
David S. (eds), Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 1996, p. 33.  
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The iftā’ institution in Singapore underwent a major transformation after the country’s 
independence in 1965 which resulted, among others, in a constitutional act, named the 
Administration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA), billed and approved by the Parliament in 
1966.  The old practices of fatāwā being issued unofficially by individual scholars was 
then transformed into a formalized and institutionalized structure, when in 1968, an 
official Fatwa Committee chaired by a muftī was appointed by the President of 
Singapore, as stipulated in AMLA.  The Fatwa Committee has since been dynamic and 
forward-looking in issuing fatāwā for the Singapore Muslims.  This is evident in their 
responses to questions and issues like human organ transplant, recycled water, cloning 
and genetic engineering, property ownership, marriage and divorce regulations, and 
development of waqf properties, to name a few.   
 
 
1.2 Research Problem 
Among the terms of reference of the Fatwa Committee as spelled out in AMLA is that 
the Committee shall “… follow the tenets of the Shafi‘ī school of law”.2  However, if 
the Committee “… considers that the following of the tenets of the Shafi‘ī school of law 
will be opposed to the public interest, the Majlis3 may follow the tenets of any of the 
other accepted schools of Muslim law as may be considered appropriate”.4 
 
                                                 
2 Subsection 33(1) of AMLA. 
3 The Majlis refers to Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura, or the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore. 
4 Subsection 33(2) of AMLA. 
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It seems that the Muslim community of Singapore, as adherers of the Shāfi‘ī school of 
law, have decided to constitutionalise the school’s tenets in order to systematically 
administer their religious life, especially in seeking legal interpretations of the divine 
injunctions of the sharī‘ah as revealed.  However, this leaves a fundamental issue worth 
investigating, and that is what are the legal theories developed by jurists of the Shāfi‘ī 
madhhab in the realm of iftā’ that the Singapore Fatwa Community needs to subscribe 
to, and how is the application of these legal theories and principles, which were 
classically formulated and evolved through history, onto the contemporary context of 
modern Singapore and its Muslim population?   
 
 
1.3 Specific Research Objectives 
This research aims to fulfill the following objectives: 
1 To identify the propositions suggested, and principles utilized, by the 
jurists of the Shāfi‘ī school of law in formulating their legal theories on 
iftā’. 
 
2 To understand the relevant theoretical evolutions that materialized within 
the madhhab, and factors that influenced or motivated such changes. 
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3 To determine the differences between iftā’ and the general process of 
formulating legal rulings by way of ijtihād, and the factors of 
consideration that may result in the existence of such a differentiation.   
 
4 To study examples of fatāwā issued by the iftā’ institution in modern 
Singapore and the juristic evidences that form their basis of argument, as 
well as the contextual and environmental factors that influence the 
fatāwā issued.  
 
5 To analyze the application of those legal theories of iftā’ in the issuance 
of fatāwā by the Singapore Fatwa Committee.  
 
 
1.4 Rationale of Study 
1 It is of utmost importance that fatāwā and religious guidance issued for 
Muslim communities are formulated with a conscious determination to 
fulfill the goals of sharī‘ah (maqās id al-sharī‘ah), which comprise of the 
protection of five necessities (al-darūriyyāt al-khams) of human life : 
religion, life, mind, property and progeny.5   
 
                                                 
5 ‘Atiyyah, Jamāl al-Dīn, Nahw Taf‘īl Maqāsid al-Sharī‘ah, Dār al-Fikr, Damascus, 2003, pp. 91-106. 
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In their effort to realize these goals, Muslim scholars have been known 
to be jealously preserving the sanctity of sharī‘ah by religiously 
upholding the divinity of its texts.  This is especially true when the 
principles of law and methodology of ijtihād that were formulated by al-
Shāfi‘ī are scrutinized, for they reflect his fundamental call for the 
superiority of the divine texts.6  Al-Shāfi‘ī’s propositions have paved 
ways towards a systematic approach in deducting religious rulings from 
the textual sources, which has its marked influence on the legal thoughts 
of his successors, from within his madhhab in particular, and on scholars 
of other affiliations in general. 
 
The scholars who succeeded al-Shāfi‘ī continued the initiative of further 
developing his principles and methodologies in legal deduction, either by 
elaborating on them with further details, or expanding them with 
innovative additions, each exercising his intellectual liberty of agreeing 
or rejecting the views of others.  Naturally, as a consequence of such a 
rich tradition in the realms of constructing Islamic legal theories, 
evolution of ideas unavoidably materialized.  The first significance of 
this study would then be in the researcher’s intention to identify the 
developmental accounts of these legal theories, and the contextual 
factors that both motivated and shaped their changes.    
                                                 
6 Abū Sulaimān, ‘Abd al-Wahhāb Ibrāhīm, Manhajiyyat al-Imām Muhammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfi‘ī fī al-
Fiqh wa Usūlih, Dār Ibn Hazm, Beirut, 1999, pp. 85-170.  
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2 It is also hoped that this study would be able to contribute towards the 
legal discourse on the compatibility between the classical theories of 
Islamic law and the possibility of its pragmatic application in the 
contemporary world, seeking at the same time to strike an informed 
balance between the calls of two distinct groups; one of whom propagate 
the notion of compulsory permanence in employing literal understanding 
of classical texts, and the other who insist that issues faced by modern 
and post-modern societies are too complex for the sharī‘ah to warrant a 
positive position in playing its role as the applicable set of law.  
 
3 As there is an immense dearth of literature as well as academic research 
on the fatwā institution in Singapore, most likely due to the lack of 
interest among researchers in the Islamic legal experience towards such a 
small island state, this study will contribute significantly as a pioneering 
academic exercise in this particular area.  The study will also provide an 
important share in the interest and trends shown in recent years towards 
the study of fiqh (Islamic positive law) for Muslim minorities.        
 
 
1.5 Research Questions 
In order to achieve the research objectives as stated earlier, this research will attempt to 
answer some questions as follows : 
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1 What constitutes iftā’ in the perception of the jurists of the Shāfi‘ī school 
of law? 
 
2 What are the legal foundations that the jurists of the Shāfi‘ī school of law 
base on in constructing their propositions on iftā’?  
 
3 What are the forms of developments and changes that occurred in the 
formative  stages of these legal theories of iftā’? 
 
4 What are the factors of consideration that may cause iftā’ to be different 
from the process of formulating general legal rulings by way of ijtihād as 
reflected in books on us ūl al-fiqh of the Shāfi‘ī school of law? 
 
5 How are these legal theories of iftā’ applied in the iftā’ institution in 
contemporary Singapore? 
 
These act as the guiding questions for the study that the researcher hopes would 
facilitate towards accomplishing its purpose and aims as mentioned above. 
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1.6 Scope and Limitation of Research 
1 This study will focus on theories that discuss the legal issues in relations 
to iftā’. 
 
2 The jurists of whose views will be investigated are of the Shāfi‘ī 
madhhab, selection of whom will be according to prominence and 
influence in the Islamic legal fraternity, starting from al-Shāfi‘ī himself 
as the founder of the school.  
 
3 Examples of contemporary fatāwā to be analyzed are those issued only 
by the Singapore Fatwa Committee, whose members are officially 
appointed by the President of the Republic of Singapore, as stipulated by 
the Administration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA).  Unofficial views on 
Islamic legal matters issued by individual scholars of the country will not 
be scrutinized in the study due to the following reasons : 
 
a) Lack of documentation of both their rulings and the arguments 
that constitute the basis of those rulings. 
 
b) Absence of constitutional legal standing allocated by AMLA to 
individual opinions, hence restrict their influence and effect on 
the government and the public. 
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1.7 Research Method 
The research approach for this study will be based on analytical methods, by 
investigating historical accounts of the developmental stages of the legal theories, 
primarily through library resources, especially in the initial stages of theoretical 
conceptualization and context setting.  The library-based qualitative method will be the 
primary method used, in sourcing for information and data relevant to the research, 
from books, articles, journals, newspapers, magazines, websites etc. 
 
In addition, an investigation of official documents of the Fatwa Committee, especially 
minutes of the Committee’s meetings which are kept in the Office of Mufti, Islamic 
Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS), will be conducted to further understand the 
arguments and basis behind those fatāwā issued. 
 
1.8  Literature Review 
As the institution of fatwā plays an important role in the sharī‘ah legislation of any 
country, subjects related to fatwā have been commonly discussed, including its strong 
reference to the context in which the fatwā is issued.  The writings by jurists of the 
Shāfi‘ī school of law are of no difference, in such that a researcher may easily find 
numerous discussions on fatāwā and muftūn within the writings on Islamic law in the 
madhhab.  The writings on iftā’ by jurists of this madhhab can be classified into two 
main categories, the first of which are dedicated books written specifically on the issues 
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of fatāwā and muftūn.  The second category comprises of writings on the topic that are 
incorporated as a section within larger books on Islamic law and its principles.   
 
The first category, where dedicated books are written to specifically discuss on issues of 
iftā’, can be further divided into two groups.  First are books on the etiquettes of muftūn 
in issuing fatāwā and the etiquettes of mustaftūn who request for the fatāwā.  One of 
such writings is Adab al-Muftī wa al-Mustaftī by Ibn al-Salāh,7 who discusses at length 
the required qualities of a muftī, both in term of his knowledge skills in Islamic law, as 
well as his moral standing and personal characteristics.  Subsequently Ibn al-Salāh 
discusses the etiquettes that a muftī is expected to observe in the process of issuing a 
fatwā.  This ranges from the need for him to consciously be humble when offering 
himself to assume the responsibility of iftā’, to the correct way of putting his answer, or 
fatwā, into writing.  Although Ibn al-Salāh’s Adab al-Muftī wa al-Mustaftī was 
generally perceived by proponents of the Shāfi‘ī school of law as the authority on issues 
of muftūn and fatāwā, as reflected by al-Nawawī’s adoption of it in almost its entirety 
for the introduction of his al-Majmū‘ Sharh  al-Muhadhdhab,8 Ibn al-S alāh does not 
elaborate on, or develop, the legal theories of iftā’ sufficiently to be considered as a 
consolidated legal framework for the purposes of iftā’. 
 
                                                 
7 Ibn al-Salāh , ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Shahrazūrī, Adab al-Muftī wa al-Mustaftī, Maktabah al-
‘Ulūm wa al-Hikam, Medina, 1986. 
8 Al-Nawawī, Abū Zakariyyā Muhyī al-Dīn ibn Sharaf, al-Majmū‘ Sharh al-Muhadhdhab, Dār al-Fikr, 
Beirut, 2000, pp. 68-91. 
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The second category of dedicated writings on iftā’ are the compilations of fatāwā 
written by jurists of the Shāfi‘ī school of law in the form of answers to questions asked 
by the  mustaftūn.  Two of such books are al-Hāwī lī al-Fatāwī by al-Suyūt ī,9 and al-
Fatāwā al-Kubrā al-Fiqhiyyah by al-Haytamī.10  These books are basically 
compilations of legal opinions and rulings on issues asked by members of the authors’ 
community, but do not delve specifically into the discussion of the legal theories that 
can act as a systematic and congruent framework for the purposes of iftā’ itself. 
 
As for writings on fatāwā and muftūn that are incorporated as part of larger books in 
Islamic law by jurists of the Shāfi‘ī madhhab, it is discovered that although such a 
discussion exists in almost all of the us ūl al-fiqh books, they are usually placed towards 
the final sections of these books.  This can be observed in al-Juwaynī’s Burhan,11 al-
Ghazzālī’s Mustasfā,12 al-Rāzī’s Mah s ūl,13 and al-Shīrāzī’s Luma‘,14 to name a few.  
Again, similar to the categories mentioned earlier, these writings do not offer detailed 
deliberations on the legal theories of iftā’, for they generally address the issue of ijtihād 
and the etiquettes of a muftī.  
                                                 
9 Al-Suyūtī, Jalāl al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Rahmān ibn Abī Bakr ibn Muhammad, al-Hāwī lī al-Fatāwī, al-
Maktabah al-‘Asriyyah, Beirut, 1990. 
10 Al-Haytamī, Shihāb al-Dīn Ahmad ibn Muhammd ibn Hajar, Al-Fatāwā al-Kubrā al-Fiqhiyyah ‘alā 
Madhhab al-Imām al-Shāfi‘ī, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 1997.  
11 Al-Juwaynī, Imām al-H aramayn ‘Abd al-Malik ibn ‘Abd Allāh, al-Burhān fī Usūl al-Fiqh, Matābi‘ al-
Dawhah al-Hadīthah, Doha, n.d. 
12 Al-Ghazzālī, Abū Hāmid Muhammad ibn Muhammad, al-Mustasfā min ‘Ilm al-Usūl, Mu’assasah al-
Risālah, Beirut, 1997. 
13 Al-Rāzī, Fakhr al-Dīn Muhammad ibn ‘Umar, al-Mahsūl fī ‘Ilm Usūl al-Fiqh, ed. Tāhā Jābir al-
‘Ulwānī, Mu’assasah al-Risālah, Beirut, 1997. 
14 Al-Shīrāzī, Ibn Ishāq Ibrāhīm ibn ‘Alī al-Shīrāzī, Kitāb al-Luma‘ fī Usūl al-Fiqh, Dār al-Nadwah al-
Islāmiyyah, Beirut, 1988 
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 With regards to the iftā’ institution in Singapore, a comprehensive and in-depth study of 
the fatāwā issued by the Singapore Fatwa Committee and the legal framework that 
these fatāwā are based on has never been produced.  The only literature available are 
papers written and presented by officers of the Office of the Muftī,15 Islamic Religious 
Council of Singapore (MUIS), that provide general overview and understanding of the 
Fatwa Committee, and its establishment and functions.  One of these writings is an 
article titled “Perkembangan dan peranan institusi fatwa di Singapura”16 (The 
development and function of the institution of fatwā in Singapore) where the history of 
the application of Islamic law in Singapore is highlighted, until the codification of the 
Administration of Muslim Law Act I 1966.  This Act governs, among others, the 
appointment of the Mufti of Singapore, the establishment of the Fatwa Committee and 
the appointment of its members.  The article further addresses the functions of a muftī 
and the ethics with which a muftī should adhere to in the process of iftā’.  It concludes 
by mentioning some of the methodologies applied by the Committee such as issuing the 
fatāwā based on the Shāfi‘ī school of law.  
 
                                                 
15 The Office of the Mufti was formed by the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore to provide 
secretariat support to both the Fatwā Committee and its chairman, the Muftī of Singapore.  
16 Semait, Syed Isa Mohamed, “Perkembangan dan peranan institusi Fatwa di Singapura” (The 
development and function of the fatwā institution in Singapore), Abdul Monir Yaacob & Wan Roslili 
Abd. Majid (eds.), Mufti dan fatwa di Negara-negara ASEAN (Muftī and fatwā in ASEAN countries), 
Institut Kemajuan Islam Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 1998.  
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Another paper focusing on the iftā’ institution in Singapore is titled “Pengurusan fatwa 
di Singapura”17 (The administration of fatwā in Singapore) by Mohd Murat Md Aris, 
Director of Islamic Affairs, Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS).  This 
paper focuses more on the function of a muftī as defined by the classical scholars and as 
governed by the Administration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA) mentioned earlier.  
  
In relation to the management of fatwā, this paper includes the basis on which the 
members of the Fatwa Committee are appointed.  It also mentions the establishment of 
the Office of Mufti as the supporting office of the Fatwa Committee, responsible to 
carry out research and produce research papers based on the problems and questions put 
forth to the Fatwa Committee.  At the end of the paper emphasis is given to the 
challenges faced by the institution of fatwā in Singapore, especially pertaining to the 
position of Muslims in the country as a religious minority group striving in a secular 
multi-racial society.  Therefore, regular discussions among the religious elites in the 
country, through discussion sessions and consultative forums, are very important to 
ensure that the fatāwā issued are on par with the needs of the society.  
 
Another publication that is considerably instrumental to this research, apart from the 
papers mentioned above, is the collection of selected fatāwā issued by the Fatwa 
Committee.  A total of three volumes have been published, one each in 1987, 1991 and 
                                                 
17 Md Aris, Mohd Murat, “Pengurusan Fatwa di Singapura” (Fatwā management in Singapore), Abdul 
Samat Musa, Adel Abdul Aziz, Haliza Harun & Nik Salida Suhaila Nik Saleh (eds.), Prinsip dan 
pengurusan fatwa di Negara-negara ASEAN (The principles and management of fatwā in ASEAN 
countries),  Kolej Universiti Islam Malaysia, Negeri Sembilan, 2006.  
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1998 respectively, and made available to the public, especially Muslim organizations 
and mosques to provide them with an encompassing knowledge of the rulings issued.  
These compilations of selected fatāwā are published in such a format that each fatwā is 
immediately preceded with a question.  The fatāwā issued by the Fatwa Committee, as 
reflected in the three compilations, address a wide spectrum of issues, ranging from 
personal enquiries concerning the private lives of individuals in the Singapore society, 
to public issues that carry capacious implications to the general masses.  The fatāwā 
compiled and published in the said three publications, however, are not classified into 
their respective categories according to the issues addressed. 
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 CHAPTER TWO 
LEGAL THEORIES ON IFTĀ’ AMONG SHĀFI‘Ī SCHOLARS 
 
 
In conducting an analytical investigation into the fatāwā issued in Singapore since its 
independence in 1965, it is inevitable to understand the legal theories that constitute the 
theoretical framework from which the fatāwā are formulated.  Such an understanding 
will shed light on the foundations on which the fatāwā are constructed on, the 
objectives they are set to realize, the methodology applied in the iftā’ processes, and the 
tools utilized in addressing possible conflicts.  
 
This Chapter is an attempt by this researcher to investigate the legal theories developed 
and held by jurists of the Shāfi‘ī  madhhab (school of law) on iftā’.  The deliberate 
focus rendered to the Shāfi‘ī madhhab in particular for investigation is due to the fact 
that the Muslims of Singapore have been adherents of the Shāfi‘ī madhhab for 
generations.  Based on this, the Administration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA) of the 
country’s constitution18 explicitly delineates a constitutional requirement that fatāwā 
issued by the country’s Fatwa Committee are to be formulated according to the Shāfi‘ī 
madhhab.   
 
                                                 
18 Further introduction and investigation of this Act and how it is related to the fatwa institution in 
Singapore will be attempted in Chapter Five. 
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 2.1  Definition of Iftā’ and its Parameters 
The term fatwā lexically means an answer given to a question, while the act of giving 
out the answer is termed as iftā’.  A muftī is a person who gives out the answer, while 
the one who asks is known as mustaftī. 19  
 
The technical usage of the term fatwā and its other derivatives in the realm of Islamic 
law, however, is associated with questions that only touch upon issues of the sharī‘ah, 
or religious matters. 20  The technical meaning of the term muftī is, therefore, more 
specific than its lexical definition, for it commonly refers to a person who takes upon 
himself the task of providing his people with religious guidance, by answering their 
queries that are related to their religion; and to qualify him to perform as such, he is 
expected to be knowledgeable in sciences that are in relevance with the task, such as 
knowledge of the universals and the specifics (al-‘ām wa al-khās) of the Qur’ān, 
background motives of the revelation of its verses (asbāb al-nuzūl), et. cetera.21 
 
These religious issues that a muftī is expected to provide answers on, are generally 
understood to be issues of fiqh, which is either ritualistic or juristic in nature.  As for 
                                                 
19  Ibn Manzūr, Muhammad ibn Mukram, Lisān al-‘Arab, Dār Lisān al-‘Arab, Beirut, n.d. ,vol. 15, p. 147.  
See also Ibn al-Qattā‘, ‘Alī ibn Ja‘far al-Sa‘dī, Kitāb al-Af‘āl, Dā’irah al-Ma‘ārif al-‘Uthmāniyyah, 
Heidarabad, 1360(H), vol. 2, p. 466; and al-Shīrāzī, Muhammad ibn Ya‘qūb al-Fīrūzabādī, al-Qāmūs al-
Muhīt, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 1999, vol. 4, p. 423. 
20  Lewis, Pellat and Schacht (eds.), The Encyclopaedia of Islam New Edition., E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1965, 
vol. 2, pg. 866.  See also Zaydān, ‘Abd al-Karīm, Usūl al-Da‘wah, Maktabah al-Manār al-Islāmiyyah, 
n.d., 1976, p. 130. 
21  Al-Bahutī, Mansūr ibn Yūnus ibn Idrīs, Sharh Muntaha al-Irādāt, ‘Ālam al-Kitāb, Beirut, 1993, vol. 3, 
p. 456. 
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other areas, Masud indicates that some early theorists would limit the response range of 
muftūn, citing, as an example, al-Nawawī, who identifies kalām as a problematic field.  
Masud continues to state that, according to al-Nawawī, some muftūn responded to 
theological questions by saying, “This is not included in our knowledge”, “We did not 
sit (to give fatāwā) for this”, or “A question other than this I will take.”22  However, a 
further investigation of al-Nawawī’s book, al-Majmū‘, highlights that the opposite is, in 
fact, true.  Rather than the muftūn responding to theological questions in such a fashion 
of negativity, as alleged by Masud, al-Nawawī actually reports rejection by jurists of 
such a practice.23 
 
Al-Nawawī does not seem to perceive kalām as a problematic field for a muftī to issue 
his fatāwā on, albeit it being a non-legalistic or juristic area.  His preference is more of 
a muftī not to provide laymen with answers to their theological questions in a detailed 
manner, due to the general position of scholars that members of the public should not 
delve into discussions of such a nature which they are incapable to comprehend, hence 
the possibility of creating polemics within the community.  Al-Nawawī’s reservation is 
also when a muftī who specializes only in the field of fiqh issues fatāwā on theological 
matters, which, according to al-Saimarī, whose opinion is quoted by al-Nawawī, is 
                                                 
22  Masud, Muhammad Khalid, “Muftis, Fatwas, and Islamic Legal Interpretation”, Masud, Muhammad 
Khalid, Messick, Brinkley & Powers, David S. (eds.), Islamic Legal Interpretation : Muftis and Their 
Fatwas, (eds) Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 1999, p. 20.   
23  Al-Nawawī, Abū Zakariyyā Muhyi al-Dīn ibn Sharaf, al-Majmū‘ Sharh al-Muhadhdhab,Dār al-Fikr, 
Beirut, 2000, vol. 1, p. 86.   
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impermissible.24  This generally receptive position by al-Nawawī towards muftūn 
addressing theological matters in their fatwas is reflected in Ibn al-Salāh’s book, Adab 
al-Muftī wa al-Mustaftī, where he reports that a reserved attitude by early jurists to issue  
fatāwā on theological matters was few and rare.25   
 
Masud, in mentioning al-Nawawī as an example of theorists who impose limitation to 
the response range of muftūn, further narrates that two earlier adab al-muftī writers were 
cited by Al-Nawawi as maintaining that the muftī should refer questions relating to 
Qur’anic exegesis (tafsīr) to specialists in exegesis, unless they pertained directly to 
legal rules (ahkām).26  Masud fails, however, to point out that al-Nawawī, after 
reporting the views of the two writers, al-Saimarī and al-Khatīb, makes a remark that he 
prefers the muftī to proceed in issuing fatāwā on matters relating to exegesis if he is 
competent in the field, not only verbally, but also in writing.  Al-Nawawī closes the 
passage by indicating that there is no difference between issues of tafsīr and ahkām.27 
                                                
 
It can therefore be stated that the reservation by some jurists, if there is any, for a muftī 
to give fatāwā on issues other than those pertained to fiqh or ahkām, is not due to those 
non-fiqh areas as problematic, but rather is motivated by the worry of an adverse 
 
24  Ibid., p. 86. 
25  Ibn al-Salāh, ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Shahrazūrī, Adab al-Muftī wa al-Mustaftī, Maktabah al-
‘Ulūm wa al-Hikam, Medina, 1986, p. 157. 
26  Masud, Muhammad Khalid, “Muftis, Fatwas, and Islamic Legal Interpretation”, Masud, Muhammad 
Khalid, Messick, Brinkley & Powers, David S. (eds.), Islamic Legal Interpretation : Muftis and Their 
Fatwas, (eds) Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 1999, p. 20.   
27  Al-Nawawī, Abū Zakariyyā Muhyi al-Dīn ibn Sharaf, al-Majmū‘ Sharh al-Muhadhdhab,Dār al-Fikr, 
Beirut, 2000, p. 86.   
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outcome that may be caused by either a lack of competency on the part of the questioner 
(mustaftī) to comprehend a detailed answer, as in the case of fatāwā on theological 
matters, or a lack of competency on the part of the muftī in areas that he is not 
specialized in, as in the case of fatāwā on issues of exegesis.  In short, realizing 
mas lahah ‘āmmah, or general good, is the factor of consideration in deciding which 
particular area a muftī is allowed to give fatāwā in, and which he is not.  This is in line, 
among others, with the scholars’ proposition that a muftī should impose a stricter rule in 
answering a question by a mustaftī whom he sees as having a negligent or laidback 
attitude, and a lenient rule when he sees that the situation of the mustaftī warrants for 
one.28     
 
Upon investigating the specific usage of the term iftā’ among jurists of the Shafi‘ī 
madhhab, it appears that there are different views on its practical definition.  This 
disparity in defining the term iftā’, is caused primarily by the varied positions among 
the jurists in the manner that they comprehend the term ijtihād, and the association 
between the two terms.  In addition to this, further deliberations on what constitutes the 
prerequisites that qualify a person to issue fatāwā in later parts of this chapter will also 
show that due to practical considerations, later jurists after the first four centuries of the 
Hijri calendar introduced a range of concessions in delineating the parameters of 
ijtihād, thus providing additional flexibility in the definition of iftā’.  It is therefore 
                                                 
28  Ibid., pp. 81-82.  
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essential, before this research delves further into the subject of iftā’, that the definition 
of the term ijtihād is accordingly addressed. 
 
Ijtihād is a noun to the verb ijtahada, which lexically means to exert one’s utmost effort 
to achieve an objective.29  Its technical meaning as commonly employed in the realm of 
Islamic law is one that indicates total expenditure of effort made by a jurist in order to 
infer, with a degree of probability, the rules of sharī‘ah from their detailed evidence in 
the sources.30   
 
A further investigation into the definition of ijtihād employed by jurists of the Shāfi‘ī 
madhhab highlights the fact that these jurists are not unanimous in their understanding 
of the term.  Al-Shīrāzī defines ijtihād as exhausting one’s effort to identify legal 
rulings of the Sharī‘ah.31  This definition of ijtihād is also shared by al-Baidāwī.  
However, in their commentaries to Al-Baydāwī’s Minhāj al-Wusūl fī ‘Ilm al-Us ūl, both 
al-Asnawī and al-Badkhashī add to this definition that the rulings intended are those of 
which no decisive proof (dalīl qat‘ī) on them are available in the texts.32  Al-Ghazzālī 
also suggests a definition similar to this, that is ijtihād is to exhaust one’s effort to 
                                                 
29  Al-Fīrūz Ābādī, Majd al-Dīn Muhammad ibn Ya‘qūb, al-Qāmūs al-Muhīt, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 
Beirut, 1995, vol. 1, p. 396. 
30  Kamali, Mohammad Hashim, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, The Islamic Texts Society, 
Cambridge, 2003, p. 469. 
31  Al-Shīrāzī, Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm ibn ‘Alī al-Shīrāzī, Kitāb al-Luma‘ fī Usūl al-Fiqh, Dār al-Nadwah al-
Islāmiyyah, Beirut, 1988, p. 73. 
32  Al-Badkhashī, Muhammad ibn al-Hassan, Manāhij al-‘Uqūl, Maktabah wa Matba‘ah Muhammad ‘Alī 
S ubayh wa Awlāduh, Cairo, n.d., vol. 3, pp. 191-192. 
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derive sharī‘ah rulings in cases where there has not been any prior mention of their 
decisive evidences in the texts.33  
 
Al-Shāfi‘ī in his al-Risālah states that ijtihād and qiyās34 are two nouns that share a 
mutual meaning.35  This implies that, according to al-Shāfi‘ī, a mujtahid is a person who 
exercises ijtihād in a way that he puts his best effort to apply a ruling on a particular 
case that has no explicit mention in the Qur’ān and the sunnah, by way of identifying a 
common cause, or ‘illah, between this new case and another that has prior mention in 
the texts, extending the same ruling of the original case to the new case based on the 
commonality of the effective cause. 
 
Upon comparing al-Shāfi‘ī’s definition to the one suggested by al-Ghazzālī, al-Asnawī 
and al-Badkhashī, it is noted that albeit both definitions sharing a common thrust, that 
the cases that fall under the ambit of ijtihād are only those which do not have prior 
explicit mention of their decisive proofs in the texts, the two definitions differ in the 
procedures to be employed in order to deduce a ruling for the unprecedented cases.  
While al-Shāfi‘ī specifically sets qiyās as the procedure to be followed, as implied by 
his insistence that qiyās and ijtihād share a common meaning, the other jurists 
                                                 
33  Al-Ghazzālī, Abū Hāmid Muhammad ibn Muhammad, al-Mustasfā min ‘Ilm al-Usūl, Mu’assasah al-
Risālah, Beirut, 1997, vol. 2, p. 400. 
34  Qiyās is the extension of Sharī‘ah value from an original case, or asl, to a new case, because the latter 
has the same effective cause as the former.  The original case is regulated by a given text, and qiyās 
seems to extend the same textual ruling to the new case.  See Kamali, Mohammad Hashim, Principles of 
Islamic Jurisprudence, The Islamic Texts Society, Cambridge, 2003, p. 264.  
35  Al-Shāfi‘ī, Muhammad ibn Idrīs, al-Risālah, Mustafā al-Bābī al-Halabī, Cairo, 1983, p. 477. 
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mentioned appear to have left it unfixed to any specific procedure.  Nonetheless, the 
fact that many of these scholars propose that ijtihād is a tool to be employed only for 
cases unprecedented in the texts, sheds light to the reason behind the immense 
reluctance among the scholars, especially those who lived in the first two hundred years 
of the establishment of the madhhab, to allow anyone who has yet to attain the stature 
of a fully qualified mujtahid, to issue fatāwā, as will be further elaborated in subsequent 
parts of this research.  
  
Another possible way of identifying ijtihād is by casting view on its presupposed 
opposite, which is taqlīd.  There seems to exist a large degree of agreement among 
these scholars on what constitutes taqlīd.  Al-Shāfi‘ī, al-Māwardī, al-Shīrāzī,36 al-
Ghazzālī,37      are unanimous in defining taqlīd as accepting an opinion without 
evidence (qabūl qawl bi lā hujjah).  If ijtihād can be accepted as the opposite of taqlīd, 
and this common notion of what taqlīd entails can be utilized as an indicator, it can thus 
be proposed that the common denominator that scholars refer to, to offer the meaning of 
ijtihād, is the process of identifying proofs and constructing credible arguments as the 
foundation for inferring legal rulings of the sharī‘ah.  This will then provide 
consistency in the correlation between the two opposing terms, for when a qualified 
jurist embarks on a process to identify proofs and arguments of a ruling, he is said to be 
                                                 
36  Al-Shīrāzī, Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm ibn ‘Alī al-Shīrāzī, Kitāb al-Luma‘ fī Usūl al-Fiqh, Dār al-Nadwah al-
Islāmiyyah, Beirut, 1988, p. 70. 
37  Al-Ghazzali, Abu Hamid Muhammad ibn Muhammad, al-Mustasfa min ‘Ilm al-Usul, Mu’assasah al-
Risalah, Beirut, 1997, vol. 2, pp. 462-463. 
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exercising ijtihād, while a person who readily accepts a ruling without recognizing its 
evidences and arguments is said to be employing taqlīd. 
 
Subsequent to these deliberations on the meaning of ijtihād, it is now apposite to 
present a discussion on the technical usage of the term iftā’ and fatwā among the 
scholars of the madhab of al-Shāfi‘ī.  Al-Shāfi‘ī himself, as the founder of the 
madhhab, suggests that iftā’ is ijtihād, and that the two words are parallel in their 
meaning.  He evidently maintains that the person must possess a set of skills and 
branches of knowledge in order for him to issue Islamic legal opinions, which 
comprises knowledge of the Qur’ān, the sunnah (normative practice or custom of the 
prophet), legal opinions of scholars, qiyās (analogical reasoning) and the Arabic 
language.  Al-Shāfi‘ī further elaborates the steps and processes that the person has to 
employ in each of the five disciplines stated, which, in short, resembles the very skills, 
knowledge and methods required of a mujtahid38 (one who is qualified to exercise 
ijtihād).   
  
It is al-Shāfi‘ī’s position that ijtihād is the order of the day in deriving legal judgments 
and rulings.  A judge, according to al-Shāfi‘ī, is obliged to avoid taqlīd (imitating legal 
opinions of others), even if those others are known to be superior in their knowledge 
skills.39  Although it is a judge whom al-Shāfi‘ī is making reference to, this obligation to 
                                                 
38  Al-Shāfi‘ī, Muhammad ibn Idrīs, Kitāb al-Umm, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 1993, vol. 6, p. 
287. 
39  Ibid., p. 287.   
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exert ijtihād is understandably applicable to a muftī too, as both a judge and a muftī 
share a common basic function of processing evidences, either physical, textual or 
circumstantial as they may be, to derive from them a legal ruling which is as near to the 
truth as humanly possible.  Moreover, if a judge has to have a set of knowledge skills 
that equates that of a mujtahid, as insisted by al-Shāfi‘ī, and that he has to go through a 
process of deliberations that constitutes the stages of ijtihād, his consultant,40 who is 
called a muftī and whose qualification would logically have to be comparable, if not 
superior, is expected to be a mujtahid himself too.  This is further supported by al-
Shāfi‘ī’s own assertion that both a muftī and a judge must have substantial knowledge 
of the Qur’ān and the Sunnah, in order for the muftī to issue a fatwā, and for the judge 
to cast his judgment, and that ijtihād is to be applied in a situation where they are unable 
to find explicit indication in the Qur’ān and the Sunnah on the impending issue or 
case.41  It is thus noted that al-Shāfi‘ī does not restrict a judge and a muftī to adhere to 
any particular madhhab or imām (leader of a school of law) in issuing fatāwā, due to his 
insistence that they must be mujtahidūn and that they must apply independent 
reasoning, or ijtihād. 
   
                                                 
40  On the injunction that a judge should make it a practice to seek the views of a knowledgeable and 
qualified consultant, see al-Shāfi‘ī, Muhammad ibn Idrīs, Kitāb al-Umm, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 
Beirut, 1993, vol. 7, p. 158. 
41  Al-Shāfi‘ī, Muhammad ibn Idrīs, Kitāb al-Umm, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 1993, vol. 7, p. 
154. 
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This may provide an explanation as to the strict prerequisites required of a muftī, as will 
be discussed in further detail in subsequent parts of this Chapter.  There are several 
implications to this definition by al-Shāfi‘ī :   
 
First, the various definitions suggested by jurists in identifying ijtihād itself has 
contributed towards the confusion in aligning iftā’ to ijtihād.  This will be further 
elaborated in later parts of this Chapter.  Which particular definition of ijtihād is iftā’ 
aligned to has an effect on the feasibility of providing answers to unprecedented 
religious issues faced by a muslim community, more than ever in an age where 
independent mujtahidūn are said not to be found abundantly, if not completely.     
 
Secondly, insisting a parallel meaning between iftā’ and ijtihād has led some jurists into 
adopting a rigid approach in formulating answers to religious enquiries.  As iftā’ is 
equated to ijtihād, and there no longer exists a mujtahid, as asserted by a considerable 
number of scholars, who is qualified to embark on ijtihād in its full capacity, this group 
of jurists maintain that later day muftūn, being semi-qualified, are only expected to issue 
fatāwā in the form of reporting the legal views of demised mujtahidūn.   
 
Thirdly, this position by some jurists is probably the factor that has caused a sense of 
anxiety among pockets of Muslims, who perceive it as a failure on the part of the 
Islamic legal fraternity to provide a workable framework that would enable the issues 
and challenges faced by the Muslim communities to be addressed progressively, 
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according to their contemporary needs that are affected by the environmental contexts 
they live in. 
 
Further investigation on al-Shāfi‘ī’s writings, however, reveals that he does not actually 
equate iftā’ with ijtihād to mean that they share a parallel and identicial definition.  This 
is based on al-Shāfi‘ī’s proposition that ijtihād in its actuality is qiyās.  In his Kitāb al-
Umm, al-Shāfi‘ī writes : 
 
“ … it is improper for a muftī to issue fatwā to anyone, unless if he 
accumulates (knowledge) to become well-versed with the al-Kitāb (al-
Qur’ān), its abrogating and abrogated verses, its specifics and universals, 
its convention;  well-versed with the sunnah of the Prophet, and the 
opinions of scholars, old and new;  well-versed with the language of the 
Arabs;  astute and able to distinguish between the equivocals, and to 
understand qiyās.  If he is deficient in any one of these qualities, he is not 
allowed to speak about qiyās.  Similarly, if he is knowledgeable in the 
primary sources, but does not have a grasp of qiyās, which is secondary 
(to the primary sources), it is not permissible to tell him to exert qiyās, 
when he does not understand qiyās.  If he understands qiyās, whilst he 
lacks knowledge of the primary sources, or any of them, it is not 
permissible to tell him to apply qiyās based on something that he does 
not know.” 42 
 
Here, in his listing of the qualities and knowledge areas that a muftī should possess that 
qualify him to issue a fatwā, there is a clear indication that al-Shāfi‘ī does not equate 
iftā’ to qiyās as being synonymous in their meaning.  This is implied by al-Shāfi‘ī’s 
own statement that having possession of the knowledge in qiyās is one of the 
                                                 
42 Al-Shāfi‘ī, Muhammad ibn Idrīs, Kitāb al-Ūmm, Maktabah al-Kulliyyāt al-Azhariyyah, Cairo, 1961, 
vol. 7, p. 302. 
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prerequisites of a muftī to be allowed to issue fatāwā.  Expressing an item as one part of 
a set of requirements to another, can not be construed to suggest that they are identical 
and synonymous.  There is, therefore, a need to align this proposition by al-Shāfi‘ī to 
his other statement presented earlier in this research that iftā’ is ijtihād, which is 
understood to mean qiyās.  This researcher is of the view that, when insinuating that 
iftā’ is ijtihād, al-Shāfi‘ī intends to highlight that ijtihād, and qiyās in this respect to be 
exact, is the single most important element in the procedural stages of formulating a 
fatwā.  This is comparable to the saying of the Prophet, for example, “al-hajj ‘arafah”, 
which means that the pilgrimage ritual of hajj is to be physically present at the ‘Arafah 
area.  This physical presence at the ‘Arafah area during pilgrimage is termed as wuqūf.  
However, scholars are unanimous in indicating that this prophetic narrative does not 
imply that the two terms al-hajj and ‘Arafah as parallel in their meaning.  Instead this 
narrative in particular highlights the notion that the ritual of wuqūf at ‘Arafah is the 
single most important act of worship in the whole execution of hajj. 
 
Al-Ghazzālī shows a similar inclination of equating iftā’ to ijtihād.  In his al-Wasīt, al-
Ghazzālī mentions that among the prerequisites of a judge is that he must be a muftī.  
Al-Ghazzālī explicitly indicates that what he meant by a muftī is a mujtahid whose 
fatāwā are reliably accepted.  He further elaborates that a mujtahid is he who is 
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thoroughly capable of independently arriving at the legal rulings of the sharī‘ah without 
the need to imitate the views of others.43      
 
There is a need, as has been mentioned in the earlier part of this research on the 
definitions of ijtihād and of taqlīd employed by the jurists, to clearly distinguish the 
definition of these two terms used by each jurist from the one used by another, for 
different jurists may be referring to different understanding when they mention the 
permissibility, or impermissibility, of a muqallid to issue fatāwā.  Al-Ghazzālī, for one, 
explicitly highlights that what he means by taqlīd is the acceptance of a legal statement 
or opinion without evidence (qabūl qawl bi lā hujjah).44  This is also the definition used 
by his predecessors, like al-Māwardī and al-Juwaynī.  It is therefore understandable 
when they insist that a muqallid of such a status should not be allowed to issue fatāwā, 
when he is not sufficiently equipped with the necessary knowledge to comprehend the 
proofs and arguments that form the foundation for the fatāwā, as it may result in serious 
misrepresentation of the sharī‘ah.  This position by al-Ghazzālī and earlier jurists of the 
madhhab, I believe, warrants no disagreement among all scholars.  However, when 
another jurist refers to the kind of taqlīd exercised by a muftī muqallid as answering 
questions by adhering to legal opinions of his madhhab, following the methodologies 
and principles of his imām, and, fully comprehending the evidences that constitute the 
rulings of the madhhab, albeit not deducing the ruling himself directly from the texts 
                                                 
43  Al-Ghazzālī, Abū Hāmid Muhammad ibn Muhammad, al-Wasīt fī al-Madhhab, Dār al-Kutub al-
‘Arabiyyah, Beirut, 2001, vol. 4, pp. 295-296. 
44  Al-Ghazzali, Abu Hamid Muhammad ibn Muhammad, al-Mustasfa min ‘Ilm al-Usul, Mu’assasah al-
Risalah, Beirut, 1997, vol. 2, pp. 462-463. 
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due to his deficiency in the prerequisites mentioned earlier, or possibly because he sees 
no necessity in doing so due to the availability of the ruling deduced by an earlier 
ijtihād, Ibn al-Salāh and his contemporaries, as well as their successors, have shown 
signs of being more accommodative.  What, then, would have possibly been al-
Māwardī, al-Juwaynī and al-Ghazzālī’s  position on such a situation?  The question on 
what actually constitutes iftā’ will then be in place, for there will definitely be judicial 
implications if the interchangeability between the term iftā’ and the term ijtihād is 
accepted, or rejected.   
 
A further analysis on his writings reveals that al-Ghazzālī himself, albeit having insisted 
that only an independent mujtahid is qualified to issue fatāwā as a matter of principle,45 
offers a concession, in a situation where no independent mujtahid (mujtahid mustaqill) 
is available, by allowing a person who has reached the level of ijtihād in an established 
madhhab (mujtahid fī al-madhhab) to issue fatāwā by subscribing to the views (taqlīd) 
of his imām.46  If his insistence that a muqallid should not issue any fatwā can be 
attributed to his understanding and suggestion that the term taqlīd carries the meaning 
of acceptance of a legal statement or opinion without evidence (qabūl qawl bi lā 
hujjah)47, as mentioned earlier, al-Ghazzālī must have utilized a different definition of 
taqlīd in this concession given to a mujtahid fī al-madhhab to issue fatwā by way of 
                                                 
45  Al-Ghazzālī, Abū Hāmid Muhammad ibn Muhammad, al-Wasīt fī al-Madhhab, Dār al-Kutub al-
‘Arabiyyah, Beirut, 2001, vol. 4, pp. 295-296. 
46  Ibid., vol. 4, p. 296. 
47  Al-Ghazzali, Abu Hamid Muhammad ibn Muhammad, al-Mustasfa min ‘Ilm al-Usul, Mu’assasah al-
Risalah, Beirut, 1997, vol. 2, pp. 462-463. 
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taqlīd. This provides us with a clear example of the critical need to identify the exact 
definitions used by each jurist in his deliberations of ijtihād and taqlīd, and their 
association with iftā’.   
 
Al-Rāfi‘ī offers a suggestion that the difference in views on the permissibility of a non 
mujtahid, when he is broadly knowledgeable in the madhhab of a mujtahid, to issue 
fatāwā, is induced by the differing positions among jurists on whether imitating the 
views (taqlīd) of a deceased mujtahid is acceptable.  If such is considered allowable, the 
act of a non mujtahid exercising iftā’ by way of reporting fatāwā earlier issued by a 
mujtahid is therefore accepted.  In this instance, the mustaftī, in agreeing to the muftī’s 
fatwā, is regarded not as a muqallid to the muftī, but to the mujtahid whom the muftī is 
adhering to.48 
 
There is a considerably extensive discussion among jurists of the Shāfi‘ī madhhab on 
the acceptability of imitating, by way of taqlīd, the views or fatāwā of a deceased 
mujtahid.  Earlier jurists demonstrate a tendency to reject such a practice.  Al-Juwaynī 
argues that, as an example, it has become a unanimous position that imitating the 
madhhab of Abū Bakr, who was a close companion of the Prophet, is no longer 
                                                 
48  Al-Rāfi‘ī, ‘Abd al-Karīm ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Karīm, al-‘Azīz Sharh al-Wajīz, Dār al-Kutub 
al-‘Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 1997, vol.12, p. 421. 
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permissible, despite the prophet’s recognition of Abū Bakr’s pre-eminence over the rest 
of the ummah.49 
 
A closer scrutiny into al-Juwaynī’s position displays a possible explanation to his 
rejection of such a practice.  He expresses his predilection that when a mujtahid, whose 
ijtihād or fatwā has been adhered to by a muqallid, dies, it becomes the onus of the 
muqallid to reassign that adherence to another living mujtahid.50  We know that the 
availability of mujtahiūn until the end of the fifth century was never an issue, hence al-
Juwaynī’s rejection of a muqallid imitating a deceased mujtahid is due to the abundance 
of living mujtahidūn during his time.  It can therefore be concluded that the divergence 
from the views of al-Juwaynī, and his likes of early Shafi‘ī jurists, by their successors 
within the madhhab, is motivated by the necessity caused by the dearth of mujtahidūn, a 
situation that later emerges at around the start of the sixth century.  Ibn al-Salāh and Al-
Nawawī, for example, report on both views, but maintain their preferences on the 
permissibility of imitating the ijtihād of a deceased mujtahid.  Al-Nawawī justifies his 
position by placing emphasis on the pressing needs of his time,51 while Ibn al-Salāh 
articulates that to disallow such a practice during his time would only afflict 
adversities.52      
                                                 
49 Al-Juwaynī, Imām al-H aramain ‘Abd al-Malik ibn ‘Abd Allāh, al-Burhān fī Usūl al-Fiqh, Matābi‘ al-
Dawhah al-Hadiīhah, Doha, vol. 2, p. 1350.   
50  Ibid., p. 1352.   
51  Al-Nawawī, Abū Zakariyyā Muhyi al-Dīn ibn Sharaf, al-Majmū‘ Sharh al-Muhadhdhab,Dār al-Fikr, 
Beirut, 2000, p. 87.   
52  Ibn al-Salāh, ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Shahrazūrī, Adab al-Muftī wa al-Mustaftī, Maktabah al-
‘Ulūm wa al-Hikam, Medina, 1986, pp. 160-161. 
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Again, the difference in position in this can be ascribed to the different definitions of 
ijtihād and taqlīd.  The opinion of the majority of later jurists of the madhhab, that it is 
allowed to subscribe to the ijtihād of a dead mujtahid by way of taqlīd, should not lead 
to complacency in term of accepting it indiscriminately.  There are basically two 
primary levels in the process of formulating a legal opinion that is to be offered as a 
fatwā  by a mujtahid53 : firstly, the level of deriving an objective ruling purely from the 
texts, and secondly, the level of applying this ruling onto the context of which the 
mustaftī is in.  This second dimension is of similar importance to the first, for it 
determines, based on the considerations of the intention (maqs ad) of the ruling, the 
general good (maslahah āmmah) it is designed to realize, and the anticipated outcome 
(al-dharī‘ah) from its application, as to whether the initial text-based ruling stands, or 
an exception is to be given preference.  The permissibility of emulating a dead 
mujtahid’s ijtihād should be confined to its first dimension, but not extended to the 
second, for the contexts that he was in during his lifetime when he issued his fatwā 
would most probably be unique to him.  Another muftī, living in either a different 
physical or a different temporal space, may emulate fully the ijtihād of the formerly 
mentioned mujtahid only if, upon a careful and thorough investigation of all 
environmental factors available, he finds the contexts that he is in and those of the 
former are to be in parallel.  Otherwise, the act of imposing the ijtihād of the dead 
mujtahid indiscriminately, which includes both the first and the second dimensions of 
his ijtihād as stated above, without taking into consideration the environmental factors 
                                                 
53  Al-Ashqar, ‘Umar Sulaimān ‘Abdullāh, al-Wādih  fī Usūl al-Fiqh, Dār al-Salām, Egypt, 2001, p. 278. 
 33
that may demand a need of departing from the strict ruling initially derived from the 
sources (‘azīmah) to applying legal concession (rukhsah) in cases where the 
concessions are necessarily needed, will only cause digression from the intended 
purposes of the sharī‘ah (maqās id al-sharī‘ah), hence bringing about convolution to the 
enquirer, or mustaftī.  This is as expressed by al-Zarkashī that the ijtihād of a muftī 
changes by time, and that it is improper for a lay person to emulate and adhere to a 
fatwā previously issued to another lay person.54 
 
An investigation into propositions made by al-Māwardī reveals that as early as the 
middle of the fifth century, there has already existed a tendency, at least by al-Māwardī, 
to widen the acceptability of iftā’ from only the limited sphere of ijtihād.  In discussing 
the impermissibility of applying taqlīd in passing judgment, al-Māwardī gives an 
indication that there is a middle category between ijtihād and taqlīd, when he mentions 
that if a judge puts a preference to an opinion over another by virtue of its evidences, he 
is in actuality exerting istidlāl, and he is, by that, a mustadill.55  It may be argued that 
his expression does not necessarily imply a creation of a third category between ijtihād 
and taqlīd, for exerting istidlāl carries an understanding that he is in fact referring to 
ijtihād.  This is further supported by al-Māwardī’s own definition of ijtihād, which is 
“seeking truth by the evidences that lead to it”.56  However, there are other jurists, like 
                                                 
54 Al-Zarkashī, Badr al-Dīn Muhāmmad ibn Bahādir ibn ‘Abd Allah, al-Bahr al-Muhīt fī Usūl al-Fiqh, 
Wizārat al-Awqāf wa al-Shu’ūn al-Islāmiyyah, Kuwait, 1992, vol. 6, p. 308. 
55  Al-Māwardī, ‘Alī ibn Muhammad ibn Habīb, al-Hāwī al-Kabīr fi Fiqh Madhhab al-Imām al-Shāfi‘ī, 
Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 1999, vol. 16, p. 53.  
56  Ibid., p. 117. 
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al-Shāfi‘ī and al-Juwainī, who define ijtihād as an effort of deriving rulings directly 
from the primary legal sources, which are the Qur’ān and sunnah.  This is the view of 
not only early jurists from the first two centuries of the madhhab, as reflected by a late 
eighth century jurist, al-Zarkashī, when he defines ijtihād as “exerting the best of effort 
to arrive at an applied or practical religious ruling by way of istinbāt”.57  This is further 
reiterated by al-Zarkashī himself when he defines a mujtahid as a person who “has 
reached puberty (bāligh), is sane (‘āqil) and has the capacity to derive rulings from their 
sources”.58  If this understanding of what constitutes ijtihād by the likes of Al-Shāfi‘ī, 
al-Juwaynī, and al-Zarkashī is to be taken as the benchmark, it is therefore inappropriate 
to suggest that al-Māwardī’s istidlāl is to be categorized together as ijtihād.    
 
Nonetheless, whether this iftā’ process by way of istidlāl as suggested by al-Māwardī, is 
to be termed as ijtihād, or otherwise, is, in its actuality, immaterial, for the issue of 
relevance here is that there is already a position by al-Māwardī who points out that it is 
acceptable for a person to issue an Islamic legal ruling, be it in the form of a fatwā by a 
muftī or in the form of a judgment by a judge, not by extracting a rule directly from the 
sources of Quran and sunnah to originate a legal position, but by comparing and 
analyzing between two or more views already available by other mujtahidūn, and 
subsequently putting a preference to one over the other based on the strength of its 
evidences.  This is in contrast to al-Shāfi‘ī’s and al-Juwaynī’s stringent understanding 
                                                 
57  Al-Zarkashī, Badr al-Dīn Muhāmmad ibn Bahādir ibn ‘Abd Allah, al-Bahr al-Muhīt fī Us ūl al-Fiqh, 
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58  Ibid., vol. 6, p. 199. 
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of ijtihād, and thus provides an important extension to the parameters of iftā’.  As for its 
identicalness to taqlīd, the definition of which is to accept a legal opinion without 
comprehending its proofs, istidlāl is obviously far from taqlīd.   
 
This is al-Māwardī's approach in addressing the need for a non-independent mujtahid to 
issue fatāwā, albeit his shortcoming in deriving rulings directly from the textual 
sources. If al-Ghazzālī terms it as taqlīd, not under its initial definition of accepting a 
legal statement or opinion without its evidence (qabūl qawl bi lā hujjah), but rather 
imitating the views of a mujtahid imām with full comprehension of the legal evidences, 
al-Māwardi terms it as istidlāl.  Both al-Ghazzālī and al-Māwardī, therefore, in 
addressing a common problem, put forth identical approaches, but assign to them 
different terms. 
 
Upon scrutinizing these different positions of the jurists of the madhhab, it appears that 
an important issue that has been commonly addressed by these jurists is the correlation 
between iftā’ and ijtihād.  This researcher is therefore suggesting that, in a certain way, 
ijtihād is general, while iftā’ is specific, but in a different way, the opposite is true.   
 
In term of process, iftā’ is general in comparison to ijtihād, as ijtihād is one of the 
processes of ifta’ in its various stages.  This is if ijtihād is defined as investigating the 
sources of evidence, and subsequently deducing rulings from those evidences (istinbāt 
al-ahkām), or exercising qiyās in situations where there is no direct mention of the 
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issues at hand in the sources of evidence.  As such, ijtihād is thus more specific than 
iftā’, for iftā’ requires other procedures before and after this stage of istinbāt  al-ahkām, 
one of which is understanding the question posed by a mustaftī, comprising both its 
intent and its parts.  The other is assessing the viability of applying the deduced 
theoretical ruling to the context of the mustaftī, taking into consideration the mustaftī’s 
interests and needs. 
 
However, in term of the subjects of the rulings, iftā’ is more specific.  Rulings that are 
formulated from the process of deduction from the sources of evidence, or by way of 
qiyās, are not targeted at any individual, or at any particular party.  Therefore, if this is 
what is meant by ijtihād, it is then general in nature.  Iftā’, on the other hand, is a 
specific ruling given as an answer to a specific question posed by a particular mustaftī, 
taking into account the specific context he is in.     
 
This, in a way, explains the rationale behind the issue of whether a muftī is required to 
satisfy the conditions of a mujtahid, before he is allowed to issue fatāwā.  If iftā’ is 
basically concentrated at the process of istinbāt  al-ahkām, there is no doubt that 
satisfying fully the preconditions of a qualified mujtahid is critical.  If, however, iftā’ is 
concentrated more at the stage of applying the ruling to the context of a mustaftī, or 
tanzīl al-hukm, especially in cases where rulings on certain issues are already available 
from opinions of earlier mujtahidūn, the requirement that a muftī must be a qualified 
mujtahid thus becomes less pertinent.   
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As a conclusion to this discussion on the definition of iftā’ among scholars of the 
Shāfi‘ī madhhab, it can be mentioned that the earlier scholars tend to define the role of 
a muftī as someone who puts his utmost effort to deduce rulings from their primary 
sources, and subsequently offers these rulings as fatāwā, or answers to questions.  Later 
scholars, on the other hand, place greater emphasis to the second role of the muftī, that 
is answering questions.  There are two possible reasons to this.  First, there was an 
abundance of absolute mujtahidūn, or al-mujtahidūn al-mut laqūn in the first two or 
three centuries of the establishment of the madhhab, while scholars of the later centuries 
held a common assumption that these absolute mujtahidūn were no longer in existence 
from then onwards.  Secondly, the number of readily available legal opinions, that were 
deduced from the sources as products of ijtihād, in those early years, were small, as 
those were the developmental years of positive Islamic law, or fiqh, of the madhhab. 
Whereas, after three hundred years or so, after the establishment of the madhhab, these 
legal opinions became abundantly available in the form of scholarly writings by the 
scholars.  In addition to that, gaining excess to these resources also became easier in the 
later periods.       
 
 
2.2 Qualifications of a Muftī 
An analysis of the vast literature available within the Shāfi‘ī madhhab on the technical 
definitions of iftā’ and fatwā, and the elements that form its parameters, reveals a 
theoretical shift among later jurists of the madhhab from their predecessors on what 
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actually constitutes iftā’.  There are differing views proposed by the jurists in 
identifying the required and accepted processes that a muftī is expected to employ in 
formulating his fatwās.  Earlier jurists demonstrate a tendency to equate iftā’ to ijtihād, 
hence the strict requirement that only a qualified mujtahid of the highest caliber is 
allowed to issue fatwās.  Later jurists, on the other hand, display a more receptive 
attitude towards the notion of having non-mujtahidūn as muftūn, whose fatāwa can be a 
mere reporting of rulings by earlier mujtahidūn.  This can be traced back to the jurists’ 
position in term of competencies that provides a person the full qualification to exert 
ijtihād and, subsequently, to issue fatāwā; and the possibility of finding one such 
qualified person at any one time. 
 
In presenting an analysis of the jurists’ proposition on the qualifications of a muftī, this 
part of the Chapter is designed in a way that the jurists’ legal views are arranged and 
presented chronologically, based on the year of their demise.  This is to render an 
understanding of how the propositions evolved over time, and how a common position 
generally adopted by jurists of the madhhab as its standard legal viewpoint, eventually 
came into existence.  
 
It is thus only appropriate to start this analysis with the propositioned offered by the 
founder of the madhhab himself, al-Shāfi‘ī.  As mentioned in an earlier part of this 
Chapter, al-Shāfi‘ī maintains that for a person to be qualified to exercise ijtihād and 
subsequently to issue fatāwā, he must be conversant in the sciences of the Qur’ān, the 
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sunnah, the legal opinions of other jurists, the qiyās, and the Arabic language.  The 
position held by al-Shāfi‘ī, as mentioned earlier, that only a mujtahid is qualified to 
issue fatwās, continued to prevail among scholars and jurists of his madhhab for the 
next two centuries.  This is reflected, among others, in the writings of al-Māwardī.  Like 
al-Shāfi‘ī, al-Māwardī mentions a list of knowledge skills that a person must possess to 
qualify him to issue fatāwā, which he places under the section of the administration of 
the judiciary in his al-Ahkām al-Sultāniyyah. 
 
Al-Māwardi mentions that a person who is qualified to issue fatāwā, or a judge who is 
qualified to deliver verdicts, must have knowledge of the sharī‘ah, which encompasses 
the understanding of its principles and the skill to execute legal decisions based on these 
principles.  These principles of sharī‘ah are indeed the list of knowledge skills identical 
to those mentioned earlier by al-Shāfi‘ī, the first of which is knowledge of the Qur’an, 
followed by knowledge of the sunnah, the consensus of scholars, and analogy.59   
 
Al-Māwardī, however, offers further elaboration on the various related sciences of the 
skills listed, among which are of the abrogating and abrogated verses of the Qur’ān (al-
nāsikh wa al-mansūkh), the clear and ambiguous (al-muhkam wa al-mutashābih), the 
general and particular (al-‘ām wa al-khās), and the undetermined and precise (al-
mujmal wa al-mufassar).60  This explains why, unlike al-Shāfi‘ī, al-Māwardī does not 
                                                 
59  Al-Māwardī, ‘Alī ibn Muhammad ibn Habīb, al-Ahkām al-Sultāniyyah wa al-Wilāyāt al-Dīniyyah, 
Maktabah Mustafā al-Bābī al-Halabī, Cairo, 1973, p. 66. 
60  Ibid. 
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explicitly mention mastery of the Arabic language as the fifth knowledge skill required 
of a muftī, due to the fact that for the muftī to be able to grasp these Qur’ānic related 
sciences would already command of him a high competency in the language.  
Nonetheless, in his other book, al-Hāwī al-Kabīr, which is a commentary on al-
Muzanī’s Mukhtasar, al-Māwardī concurs with every each and one of al-Shāfi‘ī’s five 
prerequisites, including the Arabic language skill, by providing them with further 
elaboration.61       
 
In the area of sunnah, its knowledge must also encompass the understanding of its chain 
of transmission that affects either its acceptance or rejection, and also the knowledge of 
whether a particular sunnah is specific or general in nature and implication.  As for the 
knowledge of the consensus of scholars, al-Māwardī complements al-Shāfi‘ī’s views 
with a proposition that it should also comprise of knowledge of the scholars’  
differences in their legal opinion, so as for him to not only adhere to their consensus, 
but to exercise his own ijtihad in areas where he understands there are differences of 
opinion.62   
 
In addition to these four areas of knowledge, al-Māwardī insists on an additional 
requirement, that such a person would have to possess a certain degree of intellectual 
                                                 
61  Al-Māwardī, ‘Alī ibn Muhammad ibn Habīb, al-Hāwī al-Kabīr fi Fiqh Madhhab al-Imām al-Shāfi‘ī, 
Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 1999, vol. 16, p. 51.  
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capacity, that not only enables him to be aware of his basic religious obligations, but 
also qualifies him to elucidate the ambiguous as well as to specify the indefinite.63 
 
Al-Māwardī emphasizes that this set of knowledge and intellectual competence are 
what is required of a mujtahid, and only a mujtahid is allowed to issue fatāwā, or 
deliver a verdict.  A person who has deficiency in all or any one of these required areas 
of knowledge is considered as unqualified to exercise ijtihād, thus for him to give 
fatāwā or deliver a verdict is taken as religiously impermissible.  A person with such an 
incompetence, al-Māwardī insists, if officially appointed, would have his rulings 
annulled and rejected, even if they are coincidentally in concordance with the truth.64   
 
Al-Māwardī proceeds to stress further that it is not only required of a muftī to possess 
the set of knowledge listed, but he is obliged, in practice, to employ ijtihād, and not 
restricting himself to the opinions of the madhhab that he associates himself with.  
According to al-Māwardī, a Shāfi‘ī judge is not obliged, in his rulings, to adhere to the 
views of al-Shāfi‘ī, unless if his ijtihād leads him to be convinced of al-Shāfi‘ī’s views.  
In a situation where his ijtihād causes him to find Abu Hanīfah’s opinion more 
persuasive, he has to employ and adopt it.65 
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64  Ibid., p. 66 
65  Ibid., p. 67. 
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By this al-Māwardī’s elaboration, it is therefore noted that the position of making it 
obligatory to exercise ijtihād in issuing legal rulings continued throughout the next two 
centuries after al-Shāfi’ī, where adhering to a particular madhhab (taqlīd) was generally 
rejected by the scholars of the time, as highlighted by al-Māwardī himself : 
 
“… and the stand of the majority of jurists is that his (a non-mujtahid’s) 
appointment is void and his rulings are rejected, and because the 
imitation (taqlīd) of the legal judgments of others is a necessity which is 
only befitting for those who are obliged to follow the truth, but not for 
those responsible for deciding what is binding in the law”.66 
 
This close resemblance in views between al-Shāfi‘ī and al-Māwardī indicates the huge 
influence that al-Shāfi‘ī had on his followers in this issue of a mufttī’s qualification, 
where after a period of more than two centuries after him, al-Shāfi‘ī’s proposition that 
only a mujtahid can issue a fatwā is still primarily echoed by al-Māwardī.  This most 
probably is due to the abundance in the number of mujtahidūn during his time, where 
there was no real necessity to give allowance for non mujtahidūn to undertake the great 
responsibility of issuing fatāwā.  
 
Nevertheless, there is a short report by al-Māwardī that marks the existence of a shift in 
the thinking of a small number of jurists, with regards to the requirement for a muftī, of 
both being a mujtahid in his qualification, and in exercising ijtihād in his practice of 
giving fatāwā.  Al-Māwardī reports that there have been differing views among some 
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jurists who disallowed a person who subscribes to a madhhab from ruling with opinions 
of other madhāhib.  According to this group, a Shāfi‘ī jurist is not allowed to deliver a 
verdict with Abū Hanīfah’s opinion, while a Hanafī jurist is similarly not allowed to 
deliver a verdict with the views of Shāfi‘ī’s madhhab, even if his ijtihad leads him to it, 
as it invites censures and disapproval in his judgments and rulings.67   
 
Al-Shīrāzī echoes al-Māwardī’s view with a firmer position on the obligation to 
exercise ijtihād on a muftī’s part.68  He classifies individuals into two categories : the 
learned scholars and the laymen.  In his discussion on taqlīd, which he defines as 
imitating an opinion without its evidence, al-Shīrāzī insists that only the latter are 
allowed to exercise it, while the former are obliged to employ ijtihād, particularly in 
making judgment and issuing fatāwā for others.69  This injunction to employ ijtihād 
continues to stand, according to al-Shīrāzī, even in a situation where, due to shortage of 
time, a learned scholar fears that being occupied with ijtihād may cause him to miss a 
religious ritual.70   
 
Al-Shīrāzī similarly shows an indifference to both al-Shāfi‘ī’s and al-Māwardī’s views 
in his listing of the knowledge prerequisites of a mufti, starting with a mastery in both 
the Qur’ān and hadīth (narrative relating deeds and utterances of the prophet), which 
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encompasses the various tools and sciences needed to comprehend their literal and 
intended meanings.  These include, among others, a competency in the Arabic language, 
which is the language of the texts, and knowledge of the abrogating and the abrogated.  
Next is the requirement that a muftī should be well-versed in the issues that earlier 
scholars have arrived at a consensus on, as well as areas where there are divergence in 
views.  Alongside this, a muftī is also required to be capable in utilizing analogy.71   
  
This position by al-Shīrāzī is then reverberated by al-Juwaynī who, in turn, apart from 
providing greater detailing of the items mentioned by al-Shāfi‘ī, al-Māwardī and al-
Shīrāzī, added new requirements that a muftī has to be knowledgeable in principles of 
jurisprudence, in history and in fiqh.  Al-Juwaynī dedicates a chapter in his book al-
Burhān fī Us ūl al-Fiqh for the discussion on fatwā, of which he starts by elaborating on 
the prerequisites and characteristics of a muftī.  Al-Juwaynī reports that already by his 
time, these prerequisites and characteristics have amounted up to a total of forty, and he 
insists that it is essential for a muftī, as a prerequisite, to completely satisfy the entire 
list.72  With reference to the set of knowledge skills that would qualify an individual for 
iftā’, al-Juwaynī firstly enumerates the language competency that enables a muftī to 
comprehend the two primary sources of the sharī‘ah, namely the Qur’ān and sunnah.73 
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Secondly, al-Juwaynī posits the requirement of a muftī to be knowledgeable in the 
Qur’an, at a competency level that enables him to understand its text, not only from its  
language aspect, but more importantly through the transmitted narrations that carry the 
intended meanings of its verses.  In addition to this, al-Juwainī asserts that the 
knowledge of the abrogating and abrogated  verses are as essential.74 
 
The third is the knowledge of ‘ilm al-usul (principles of Islamic jurisprudence), which 
al-Juwaynī describes as fundamental.  According to al-Juwaynī, this knowledge saves a 
muftī from making the error of bringing forward an item that is supposed to be 
adjourned, or otherwise.  In addition, mastery in this field helps in clearly identifying 
the different degrees of proofs and evidences.75  This is followed by the knowledge in 
history, which is instrumental in providing a muftī with the required understanding of 
the abrogating and abrogated texts.76  Next is the knowledge in hadīth, which includes 
the comprehension of the differences between its various categories.77  This is further 
complemented with knowledge of the substantive law (fiqh), which is constructed in the 
form of available rulings derived from earlier ijtihāds.78 
  
On top of all these knowledge areas, al-Juwayni states that a muftī is required to have 
the benefit of a high degree of astuteness (fiqh al-nafs).  Al-Juwayni further summarizes 
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that a muftī is he who, by having possession of all these qualities and competencies, is 
able to arrive at the rulings of the sharī‘ah with ease, independently capable of 
identifying the rulings of the sharī‘ah, both textually and deductively (nass an wa 
istinbātan).79 
 
By enumerating these prerequisites, al-Juwaynī obviously does not only conform to the 
propositions made by his predecessors that a muftī must be a mujtahid, but he 
incorporates into the list supplementary components that seems to have played its part 
in contributing towards further restricting the qualification of a muftī.   
 
It should be highlighted that until the time of al-Juwaynī, about three centuries after al-
Shāfi‘ī, the discussions on the qualifications of a muftī revolved around whether the 
individual attains the rank of mujtahid, with all its prerequisites to be able to employ 
ijtihād, or not, thus allowed and expected to only exercise taqlīd.  Ijtihād is the effort to 
find answers on rulings by analyzing the texts, while taqlīd is a mere imitation of views 
of others without the need to understand the evidences.  However, after a considerable 
period of time, it was taken as a matter of fact that nobody had the competency to 
embark on a ‘complete ijtihād’ as an absolute mujtahid anymore.  Nevertheless, due to 
various factors, like the need still to find answers and solutions to new issues of Islamic 
law, and the importance of having muftūn who should not only be able to transmit 
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opinions of scholars, but rather capable to conduct a certain acceptable degree of 
investigation of the texts, new classifications of ijtihād and mujtahidūn were developed.   
 
Al-Ghazzālī, in his discussion on the prerequisites of a mujtahid, asserts that for a 
person to become qualified to issue fatāwā, he has to have mastery of both the 
knowledge sources of the sharī‘ah and their medium, that, together, constitute the 
methodology that would enable him to construct the rulings.  Al-Ghazzālī enumerates 
the four sources as the Qur’ān, sunnah, legal consensus of scholars and the human 
intellect (‘aql), the last of which he describes as the basis for the legal principles of al-
nafy al-aslī (original nihility of obligation) and al-barā’ah al-as liyyah (original freedom 
from liability).80     
 
This is followed by a list of four knowledge skills that act as medium for the mujtahid 
to derive rulings from the sources, the first of which is the knowledge and competency 
to corroborate evidences, and this includes knowledge of their classifications, forms and 
preconditions.  Only by this, al-Ghazzālī maintains, that these proofs and evidences 
become feasible for legal deduction.81  The second medium is the knowledge of the 
language of the Qur’ān and sunnah, followed by knowledge of the abrogating and 
abrogated texts of the Qur’ān and sunnah, and finally, knowledge of the chains of 
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transmitters of the sunnah, with which the muftī is able to distinguish acceptable reports 
from the rejected ones. 82 
 
It can be seen from these listings that al-Ghazzāli continues the ideas of his 
predecessors in delineating the prerequisites of a muftī.  As a matter of fact, al-Ghazzālī 
expands further the existing knowledge requirements, especially the propositions made 
by his teacher al-Juwainī, by adding a number of unprecedented elements, such as the 
human intellect as a source of Islamic legal knowledge, and the science of proofs and 
evidences.  The only departure taken by al-Ghazzālī from al-Juwaynī’s propositions is 
the requirement that a mufti must be knowledgeable in the substantive law (fiqh), for, 
according to al-Ghazzālī, fiqh is a product of ijtihād, and as such is inappropriate to be 
taken as a precondition to ijtihād.83  
 
However, in scrutinizing further the details of each of the items listed above, we can 
identify a few aspects of concession given by al-Ghazzālī to the required realization of 
these competencies in a person before he is eligible to issue fatāwā.  One of these 
concessions is, in relation to the required knowledge of the Qur’ān and sunnah, that it 
suffices that the person possesses knowledge of only the verses and texts that touch 
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upon legal issues.  Al-Ghazzālī estimates that the total number of Qur’ānic verses on 
legal issues as around five hundred verses.84 
 
The next concession is that it is not required of the person to memorize all these 
Qur’ānic verses and ahādīth by heart, as for him to be able to locate the texts concerned, 
as and when needed, is taken as adequate.  Al-Ghazzālī states that having in possession 
authentic compilations of ahādīth would also serve the purpose of providing the person 
with the necessary sources.85  Similarly, it is not required of him to memorize all the 
abrogation that have occurrence in the Qur’ān and sunnah, nor all the legal cases that  
scholars have arrived at a consensus on.  It is sufficient for him to be able to identify 
that every Qurānic verse or hadīth that he utilizes in any of his fatāwā is not of those 
that have been abrogated, and that his fatāwā are not in contradiction with any existing 
consensus.86   
 
The most significant concession proposed by al-Ghazzālī, is the notion of partiality of 
ijtihād (tajazzu’ al-ijtihād).  According to al-Ghazzālī, the complete existence of all the 
eight  knowledge areas mentioned earlier combined is a prerequisite only of a muftī 
mut laq (absolute muftī), or a mujtahid mut laq (absolute mujtahid) who issues fatāwā in 
all areas of sharī‘ah.  As for a muftī of a specific area of knowledge, possession of such 
a comprehensive set of disciplines is not required of him.  It is an accepted possibility 
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that a person attains a position of issuing fatāwā and applying ijtihād in certain areas 
and not in others.  Al-Ghazzālī offers the example of he who is knowledgeable in 
analogy and its methods, but does not enjoy the same level of competency in the field of 
hadīth, is permitted to give fatāwā in analogical issues that he knows have no 
association with hadīth.  Another example is he who is well informed in the principles 
and rulings of inheritance law, is also allowed to give fatāwā in the area, albeit his 
knowledge deficiency in the ahādīth that are related to the impermissibility of 
intoxicants, or the issue of marriage in the absence of the bride’s guardian (walī).87 
   
This suggestion by al-Ghazzālī for partial ijtihād had never been suggested by any jurist 
of the Shāfi‘ī madhhab before him.  It was initiated by his observation that there no 
longer exist in his time any independent mujtahid (mujtahid mustaqill) who satisfies all 
of the listed prerequisites.88  Thus, an interesting but important change that al-Ghazzālī, 
at the start of the sixth century of the Hijrah (the prophet’s migration from Mecca to 
Medina, signifying the beginning of the Islamic calendar) calendar, introduced into the 
legal theory is his proposition of partial ijtihād, which consequently paved the way for 
his successors to widen the classification of qualified muftūn, from only absolute 
mujtahidūn, to accepting a few categories of muftūn with various degrees of 
qualification.  This is over and above the other several concessions suggested by al-
Ghazzālī, which were highlighted in earlier parts of this Chapter.  As such, Hallaq’s 
conclusion that “… one can safely state that he (al-Ghazzālī) follows in the footsteps of 
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his predecessors in affirming that to be a muftī is to be nothing short of a mujtahid”89, is 
not precise, for al-Ghazzāli’s suggestion for these concessions, particularly on the 
partiality of ijtihād, seems as though was not taken into consideration.   
 
Upon analyzing this discussion by al-Ghazzālī, and subsequently by his successors, we 
can identify a significant redirection of focus, in comparison to those before him, from 
addressing aspects of the prerequisites and qualifications of a muftī, to classifying 
muftūn into several categories and sub-categories.  If the jurists before al-Ghazzālī had 
divided followers of the sharī‘ah only into mujtahidūn and muqallidūn, al-Ghazzālī 
introduced sub-categories under mujtahidūn, namely absolute mujtahid and partial 
mujtahid.    
 
In his commentary to al-Ghazzālī’s al-Wajīz, al-Rāfi‘ī indicates similar prerequisites of 
ijtihād to what had been fundamentally defined by his predecessors mentioned earlier, 
namely al-Shāfi‘ī, al-Māwardī, al-Shīrāzī, al-Juwaynī and al-Ghazzālī.  Qualification 
for ijtihād, according to al-Rāfi‘ī, must comprise of knowledge of the Qur’ān, hadīth, 
consensus of the scholars, analogy and the Arabic language.  Al-Rāfi‘ī further emulates 
al-Ghazzālī’s position in his provision for concessions in each of these knowledge 
skills.90    
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 As for the complete amalgamation of these skills in an individual, al-Rāfi‘ī continues to 
display a resemblance with al-Ghazzālī’s proposition that such is required only of a 
mujtahid mut laq who issues fatāwā in all branches of Islamic law, consequently 
accepting al-Ghazzālī’s notion of partial ijtihād.91   However, unlike al-Ghazzālī, who 
provides the reason for his proposition as being the inexistence of such an individual in 
his generation, al-Rāfi‘ī is silent about this.  A possible explanation to this is that the 
absence of absolute independent mujtahidūn during his time has already been widely 
acknowledged throughout the Islamic legal and intellectual fraternity as a reality that no 
longer warrants any need for reiteration.  
 
Nonetheless, al-Rāfi‘ī develops further on al-Ghazzālī’s idea of partial ijtihād by 
suggesting that the followers of al-Shāfi‘ī, Abū Hanīfah and Mālik, or, in short, 
followers of any madhhab, are classified into three categories, the first of which are the 
laymen (al-‘awwām), who are expected to follow or imitate (taqlīd) legal opinions 
issued by qualified scholars.  The second category are those who attain the rank of 
being qualified mujtahidūn, but affiliate themselves to al-Shāfi‘ī and his likes by 
emulating his methodology in ijtihād, and in utilizing and categorizing the legal proofs 
and evidences.  The third category of followers are those who are in between the two 
earlier categories, who do not attain the rank of ijtihād in the main body of sharī‘ah (as l 
al-shar‘), but are well informed of the legal principles of his imām, thus capable of 
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applying analogy on new issues accordingly based on available issues of which rulings 
have been earlier deliberated by the imām.92    
 
Ibn al-Salāh, a younger contemporary of al-Rāfi‘ī, subsequently forged ahead with a 
more comprehensive classifications of muftūn.  He dedicates a whole book, Adab al-
Muftī wa al-Mustaftī, to discuss on the qualifications and ethics of both who issues 
fatāwā (muftī) and who requests for one (mustaftī).   
 
On top of the generally personal characteristics that a muftī must satisfy in order for him 
to be qualified to give fatāwā, from his affiliation to Islām as his creed, and his 
possession of a just and trustworthy character, to the high degree of intellect and 
sagacity that he is endowed with, Ibn al-Salāh categorizes muftūn into two main 
classifications, the first of whom is an independent muftī (muftī mustaqill).  Ibn al-Salāh 
terms a muftī mustaqill as also a mujtahid mustaqill, whom he defines as a person who 
attains a level of independency in deriving legal rulings of the sharī‘ah from its 
evidences without imitation (taqlīd) nor adherence to any madhhab.93     
 
The set of knowledge and skills that a mufti of this category must possess, Ibn al-Salāh 
maintains, starts with the knowledge of the Qur’ān, and this consists of its related 
sciences (‘ulūm al-Qur’ān).  Second is the knowledge of the sunnah, which also 
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encompasses its related sciences (‘ulūm al-hadīth), which is then followed by 
knowledge of the consensus of jurists, besides knowledge of their points of 
disagreement.  Next is the knowledge of analogy (qiyās), and knowledge of the 
principles of jurisprudence (usūl al-fiqh) which equips him with the tools needed to 
comprehend the preconditions of proofs, the various aspects of their legal indication, 
and the methodology of deriving rulings from them.  This is subsequently supplemented 
with knowledge of the abrogating and abrogated texts, knowledge of the Arabic 
language, and finally, knowledge of  fiqh94 
 
According to Ibn al-Salāh, this category of independent muftis are the group mentioned 
and meant by al-Juwainī as the only ones qualified to give fatāwā, due to their ability to 
arrive at the rulings of the sharī‘ah with ease.  Albeit his agreement to this point by al-
Juwainī as worth considering for a muftī, Ibn al-Salāh insists that it should not be taken 
as a restrictive definition of a qualified muftī. 95  It is under this category that Ibn al-
Salāh mentions the issue of partial ijtihād, which was introduced earlier by al-Ghazzālī, 
and which he supports.96 
 
The second category is the non independent muftī.  Ibn al-Salāh narrates that there has 
been an absence of independent absolute muftūn (muftī mustaqill mutlaq) for a long 
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period of time, and that the responsibility of issuing fatāwā has been taken up by jurists 
who affiliate themselves (muftī muntasib) to the founding imāms of the established 
madhahib.97  This group of affiliated jurists are the subject of discussion under this 
category, whom Ibn al-Salah further divides into four sub-categories.  The first one of 
whom is a muftī who enjoys possession of all the characteristics and knowledge skills 
required of an independent (mustaqill) muftī, hence does not imitate (taqlīd) his imām, 
neither in his legal rulings nor in his evidences.  He is, however, affiliated to his imām 
in the sense that he goes along with his methodology in ijtihād and advocates it.98 
 
The second sub-category is a mujtahid who adheres to the madhhab of his imām 
(mujtahid muqayyad) and is capable of substantiating it with legal proofs, except that he 
does not advance further beyond the principles and fundamentals of his imām.  Ibn al-
Salāh describes that although a mufti of this sub-category is a mujtahid who satisfies 
similar prerequisites of being competent in Islamic law and its principles, 
knowledgeable in the detailed evidences of legal judgments, as well as proficient in the 
art of analogy and in ascribing unprecedented cases to the principles of his madhhab, he 
is, however, inferior to the independent mujtahidūn mentioned earlier in some of their 
knowledge and skills, among which is his deficiency in the field of ‘ulūm al-h adīth, or 
in the Arabic language.  With such, he employs the writings of his imām as principles 
from which he derives rulings, in the same fashion that a mujtahid mustaqill derives 
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rulings from the divine texts.  In another scenario, this mujtahid muqayyad may come 
across a ruling, and agreeably accepts the proofs provided by his imām, without 
thoroughly investigating whether they can be challenged by other proofs, or whether 
they fulfill the required conditions. 
 
The third sub-category is he who does not attain the same echelon of the earlier 
mentioned categories of mujtahidūn, but is endowed with fiqh al-nafs (a high degree of 
natural intelligence that facilitates him to exercise some form of ijtihād), preserves the 
madhhab of his imām, and has knowledge of its legal proofs.  His inferiority to the 
earlier categories is due to his shortcomings in deriving rulings directly from the texts, 
or due to his lack of knowledge competency in the principles and fundamentals of 
jurisprudence or in other sciences that serve as tools for ijtihād. 
 
Finally, the fourth sub-category is he who assumes the task of preserving his madhhab 
and narrating from it, while at the same time has full grasp of the legal issues of his 
madhhab, both the apparent and the ambiguous.  However, he is not sufficiently capable 
in neither espousing its proofs nor employing its methods of analogy.  Ibn al-Salāh 
highlights that  it is permissible for a muftī of such a category to issue fatāwā only in the 
form of narrating and transmitting what has earlier been discussed and decreed by the 
imām or other mujtahidūn of his madhhab. 
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Al-Nawawī allocates a chapter on the ethics of fatwā, muftī and mustaftī in his opening 
to his book of Islamic law, al-Majmū‘ Sharh  al-Muhadhdhab, explaining that he relies 
primarily on al-Saymarī, al-Khatīb al-Baghdādi and Ibn al-Salāh for his writing. 
 
Analyzing the said chapter reveals that, in outlining the prerequisites of a qualified 
muftī, al-Nawawī merely transmits Ibn al-Salāh’s proposition in its entirety, from the 
general characteristics required of a muftī, to the classification of muftūn into five 
categories, and the set of knowledge skills required of each category respectively.99  Al-
Nawawī, therefore, seems to provide Ibn al-Salāh’s categorization of muftūn with a 
stamp of finality, when he reiterates it in his al-Majmū‘. 
 
In his response to the issue of whether a muqallid is allowed to give fatāwā based on the 
legal opinions of the mujtahidūn that he imitates, al-Nawawī reports differing positions, 
first, of al-Halīmī, al-Juwaynī, al-Rawyānī and others on its impermissibility; second, of 
al-Qaffāl al-Māwarzi that it is allowed; and, third, of Ibn al-Salāh who suggests that 
those who disallow such a practice are actually referring to a situation where the 
muqallid gives a fatwā in a fashion that implies as though the answer is by his own 
judgment.100   
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Al-Isnawī mentions in his Nihāyat al-Sūl that is is permissible for both a mujtahid and a 
muqallid who subscribes to and narrates the legal opinions of a living mujtahid, to issue 
fatāwā.  However, al-Isnawī also reports that there are differing views among jurists on 
whether a muqallid of a deceased mujtahid is allowed to issue fatāwā, although al-
Isnawī himself asserts that he holds the view that such is permissible, and that there was 
a consensus among jurists of his time on it.101  This statement by al-Isnawī implies that 
a muqallid can issue fatāwā.  In fact, it seems that there is no dispute if a muqallid of a 
living mujtahid is to issue fatāwā.  Al-Haytamī, on the other hand, stresses that by doing 
as such, he is not to be considered a muftī, but merely a transmitter, or nāqil.102    
 
It has to be highlighted that, although later jurists of the madhhab follow suit this 
position by Ibn al-Salāh and al-Nawawī in allowing a sub-mujtahid muftī to issue 
fatāwā in the form of narrating the ijtihād of other fully-qualified mujtahidūn of his 
madhhab, this does not imply that it can be done ignorantly of the evidences and merits 
of the opinions narrated, as well as the methodologies applied by the mujtahid in 
deriving those rulings in the first place.   
 
It is therefore a point of observation that until the time of al-Ghazzālī, the 
developmental account of this legal theory indicates a trend towards increasingly 
restricting the spheres of ijtihād, a term of which was used interchangeably to also mean 
                                                 
101  Al-Isnawī, Jamāl al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Rahīm, Nihāyat al-Sūl, Maktabah wa Mat ba‘ah Muhammad ‘Alī 
S ubayh wa Awlāduh, Cairo, n.d., vol. 3, p. 210.    
102  Al-Haytamī, Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Alī ibn Hajar, al-Fatāwā al-Kubrā al-
Fiqhiyyah ‘alā Madhhab al-Imām al-Shāfi‘ī, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 1997, vol.4, p. 294. 
 59
iftā’.  This is especially reflected by the restrictive propositions offered by al-Juwaynī, 
which paradoxically lead him to refute the qualification of a number of widely accepted 
figures in the Islamic legal fraternity, namely al-Hasan al-Basrī, Mālik and Abū 
Hanīfah, by indicating factors that, according to al-Juwainī, injure their characteristics 
as mujtahidūn.103   
 
It can, however, be assumed that al-Juwaynī and his likes, by constricting the 
prerequisites further, and by insisting that a muftī has to have the complete qualification 
of an absolute mujtahid, were possibly aiming to preserve the sanctity of the sharī‘ah, 
ensuring that only individuals with such a high qualification are allowed to issue 
fatāwā.  This is so much true to the extent that even in a situation where the existence of 
a person, or a group, with such qualities is no longer attainable, subsequent initiatives 
taken by the jurists out of necessity are by creating different classifications of muftūn 
who possess different degree of qualifications, and not by compromising the 
fundamental prerequisites of the individuals who are initially accepted as the only and 
truly qualified muftūn due to their full competency to exert ijtihād. 
 
As a conclusion to this part of this research, on the qualifications of a muftī, it should be 
mentioned that, first, the primary purpose of all the propositions suggested by the jurists 
in developing this legal theory is to safeguard the sharī‘ah from unscrupulous 
interpretations by unqualified muftūn.  Classifying the muftūn into mujtahidūn and non-
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mujtahidūn, and further into various sub-categories, is of secondary importance in 
identifying the status of their qualification to issue fatāwā.  As a matter of fact, it only 
complicates the whole deliberation of the issue at hand.  It leaves the discussion on the 
fundamental requirements of a muftī to continue to exist in the writings of the Shāfi‘ī 
madhhab as academic theories, but to a large degree impractical in term of their 
application and realization within the contexts of real communities that undergo the 
natural phenomena of evolution over time.  In addition to that, this researcher is of the 
view that such an academic position effectively became one of the factors that has led to 
the notion of the closure of the doors of ijtihād, which consequently reinforced a 
psychological hesitancy in the general psyche of many muslims, scholars and lay men 
alike, to accept new ijtihād initiatives.  This in turn would impede further progress of 
the Islamic law from taking its imperative course to develop in accordance to the ever 
changing needs and challenges of human societies.  We should not lose sight that the 
main thrust is to define the prerequisites, of which in turn must be sufficiently dynamic 
to be able to evolve and develop accordingly to the needs and necessities of each 
community, influenced by factors of time, space, and cultural and generational 
differences. 
 
Secondly, the concessions made to the prerequisites of a muftī as initiated by al-
Ghazzālī, and subsequently the various classifications of muftūn, are intended as 
responses to address the perceived decline in both the quantity and quality of absolute 
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mujtahidūn about three centuries after al-Shāfi‘ī.  As such, present calls by scholars of 
today to enhance further the establishment of collective and group ijtihāds, by having 
different individuals with different expertise to complement each other, would be 
instrumental in overcoming the inadequacy of not having in existence an individual who 
satisfies the prerequisites of an absolute mujtahid.   
 
Thirdly, it is of upmost importance, in our effort to shed light on the legal theories 
introduced and developed by scholars, that we analyze also the thoughts and intellectual 
works of those scholars not dogmatically as doctrines, but rather critically through the 
lenses of intellectual history, or history of ideas.  This research, for one, highlighted the 
fact that in studying a scholar’s opinion, it is crucial to study also as to why and how 
such a ruling was arrived at.   
 
Fourthly, the task of achieving general good (mas lahah) by addressing limitations that, 
in certain situations, may constrict the applicability of sharī‘ah, occurs not only in the 
areas of fiqh, where subjects of the law are at times given concessions (rukhsah) in 
discharging their religious obligations, but also in the dimensions of us ul fiqh, where 
concessions that affect the principles of law are sometimes initiated too. 
 
2.3 Steps of Identifying a Muftī 
The scholars of the Shāfi‘ī madhhab are unanimous in pointing out that it is a religious 
obligation on a muqallid, an individual who finds himself inadequately equipped with 
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the necessary knowledge and skills to identify rulings of the shari’ah that he direly 
needs, to seek a qualified muftī to provide him with guidance, and with answers to his 
queries.104   
 
Al-Zarkashī reports that a person that can be approached to provide fatāwā must only be 
one whose knowledge and trustworthiness are known, by way of identifying him as a 
person who possesses the qualities of such and supported by the community’s 
acceptance  that he is to be referred to for fatāwā.  Al-Zarkashī also reports that there 
has been a unanimous position among the scholars that seeking fatāwā from those 
known to be of the opposite, is prohibited.  As for an individual whose qualities are 
unknown of, al-Zarkashī indicates his preference that such is to be similarly prohibited 
too, until the mustaftī puts effort to verify the muftī’s qualification.105   
 
However, there are disagreements among these scholars on the method of identifying a 
muftī who is qualified to issue fatāwā, from another who is not.  Al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī 
is of the view that it suffices for the mustaftī to get a testimony from one trustworthy 
individual in order to identify a qualified muftī.106  This is also the position of Al-
Shīrāzī.107  
                                                 
104  Al-Zarkashī, Badr al-Dīn Muhammad ibn Bahādir, al-Bahr al-Muhīt fī Us ūl al-Fiqh, Wizārat al-
Awqāf wa al-Shu’ūn al-Islāmiyyah, Kuwait, 1992, vol. 6, p. 280. 
105  Ibid., vol. 6, p. 309.  
106  Al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī, Abū Bakr Ahmad ibn ‘Alī, al-Faqīh wa al-Mutafaqqih, Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, 
Saudi Arabia, Beirut & Cairo, 1426h., vol. 2, p. 376.  
107  Al-Shīrāzī, Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm ibn ‘Alī al-Shīrāzī, Kitāb al-Luma‘ fī Usūl al-Fiqh, Dār al-Nadwah al-
Islāmiyyah, Beirut, 1988, p. 119. 
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Al-Juwaynī refutes suggestions that a commoner should test the person whom he 
presumes to be a mujtahid, by addressing him with questions on issues that any 
qualified mujtahid is expected to have knowledge of.  This, according to al-Juwaynī, 
carries no significance, as it was never practiced by the early Arabs in consulting the 
Prophet’s companions for rulings and guidance.  The notion of accepting a person as a 
mujtahid by relying on popular reports within a community is also refuted by al-
Juwaynī, who insists that such reports are a mere transmission of information on a 
person’s qualities that are intangible and can not be physically ascertained, thus lacking 
in merit.  Al-Juwaynī consequently indicates his preference that it is sufficient for a 
layperson to accept a jurist as a qualified mujtahid, and for him to subscribe to his 
fatāwā, by depending on the jurist’s own admission that he is of such a caliber, with the 
condition that he is known to him to be trustworthy.108   
 
This position by al-Juwaynī is problematic in a way that a trustworthy non-mujtahid, 
albeit being honest and truthful, may not be able to adequately appreciate his own 
limited capacity in relation to the requirements of a mujtahid, consequently admitting of 
being one, while in actuality he is not.  Al-Juwaynī’s suggestion that popular reports by 
members of the community on the qualification of a mujtahid are of less value, due to 
them being intangible in nature, is also questionable.  The trustworthiness of a person, if 
accepted as sufficient in agreeing to his self-admission that he is a mujtahid, is as 
intangible as his intellectual capacity is.  It must be assumed that there must be a way to 
                                                 
108  Al-Juwaynī, Imām al-H aramayn ‘Abd al-Malik ibn ‘Abd Allāh, al-Burhān fī Usūl al-Fiqh, Matābi‘ 
al-Dawhah al-Hadīthah, Doha, vol. 2, p. 1342. 
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measure the trustworthiness of a person, hence al-Juwaynī’s acceptance, at least by 
relying on circumstantial factors.  This should then be similarly applied to ascertain a 
person’s qualification to exert ijtihād, and throwing a set of questions can be a useful 
tool to be utilized.  As to al-Juwayni’s assertion that it was not a practice among the 
Arabs to verify the qualification of the Prophet’s companions before approaching them 
for rulings, it can be argued that such an approach should be taken as specific to the 
situation of the time.  The level of veneration and confidence that was conferred to the 
prophet’s companions, which accordingly reflects the unparalleled acceptability of the 
guidance and rulings that they issued, explains the absence of any need for the Arabs to 
test their capacity.  This has no resemblance to the issue at hand, of the dire necessity 
for a non-mujtahid to ascertain the credibility of the person he is relying on for his 
religious observance, especially in times where fully qualified mujtahidūn can rarely be 
found, if not completely absent.     
 
Al-Ghazzālī holds the view that the mustaftī has to convince himself on the 
qualification of the muftī by way of popular reports (tawātur) by the people, if that can 
be done.  Otherwise, it suffices for the mustaftī to establish his own best estimation 
(ghālib al-zann) based on the testimony of one or two trustworthy persons.109  Al-Rāzī, 
albeit sharing with al-Ghazzālī his view that the mustaftī must establish his best 
                                                 
109  Al-Ghazzālī, Abū Hāmid Muhammad ibn Muhammad, al-Mustasfā min ‘Ilm al-Usūl, Mu’assasah al-
Risālah, Beirut, 1997, vol. 2, p. 468. 
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estimation of the muftī’s qualification, insists that it can only be achieved when the 
muftī’s practice of issuing fatāwā is widely recognized and accepted by his people.110    
 
Al-Rāfi‘ī, on the other hand, differentiates between the qualification of a muftī in term 
of his knowledge from that of his trustworthiness.  According to al-Rāfi‘ī, it is the onus 
of the mustaftī to ascertain the qualification of an unknown muftī by asking around 
about his knowledge stature.  Once the qualification of the muftī in term of his 
knowledge has been verified, the mustaftī is no longer obliged to scrutinize his level of 
trustworthiness, as it is already assumed that he is trustworthy.  This differentiation is 
based on a common notion that lay people are not generally known to be scholars, but 
scholars, in turn, are generally known to be trustworthy.111  Ibn al-Salāh agrees that the 
testimony by a single trustworthy person on the qualification of a muftī is acceptable, 
but with the condition that the testifier possesses a certain degree of knowledge 
necessary to enable him to distinguish a qualified person from an other who is not.112  
Al-Nawawī narrates that some of his contemporaries refused to accept the notion of 
seeking fatāwā from a person whose practice of issuing fatāwā has gained repute in his 
society, until the muftī himself professes that he is qualified for such, based on the 
argument that the person’s renown reputation among laypeople does not carry any 
weight due to the possibility of erroneous perception.  Al-Nawawī, however, argues that 
                                                 
110  Al-Rāzī, Fakhr al-Dīn Muhammad ibn ‘Umar, al-Mahsūl fī ‘Ilm Usūl al-Fiqh, Mu’assasah al-Risālah, 
Beirut, 1997, vol. 6, p. 81. 
111  Al-Rāfi‘ī, ‘Abd al-Karīm ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Karīm, al-‘Azīz Sharh al-Wajīz, Dār al-Kutub 
al-‘Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 1997, vol.12, pp. 423-423. 
112  Ibn al-Salāh , ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Shahrazūrī, Adab al-Muftī wa al-Mustaftī, Maktabah 
al-‘Ulūm wa al-Hikam, Medina, 1986, p. 159. 
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the muftī’s prominence within his society is sufficient as a basis to assume his 
qualification, and that getting his profession is not necessary, for his willingness to 
practice iftā’ itself denotes his proclamation of his own qualification.113  
 
This analysis, on the different opinions among the scholars on the preferred ways of 
how a mustaftī would identify whether a person is qualified to issue fatāwā, does not 
reveal any pattern of correlation between the degree of strictness or flexibility in the 
positions held by these scholars, and the different periods of time that the scholars lived 
in, unlike the earlier discussion on ijtihād and the prerequisites of a muftī.  In that earlier 
discussion, it was highlighted that scholars of a later period tend to offer a more relaxed 
position in allowing a non-mujtahid to issue fatāwā, as compared to their predecessors, 
due to the general perception that as time evolved, a process of decline in the number of 
available mujtahidūn subsequently took place.  This, in the researcher’s view, provides 
an evidence that the needs and necessity to provide for the general good of the people 
(al-maslahah al-‘āmmah) are largely influenced by limitation of resources and 
opportunities, which in turn implicates the legal opinions of scholars.  In this current 
discussion, the method that is to be employed by a mustaftī to ascertain the qualification 
of a muftī when he finds one, is not in any way affected by the limitation caused by the 
scarcity of mujtahidūn in a community, hence the absence of a pattern of moving 
towards a more relaxed position among scholars of later periods.   
 
                                                 
113  Al-Nawawī, Abū Zakariyyā Muhyī al-Dīn ibn Sharaf, al-Majmū‘ Sharh al-Muhadhdhab, Dār al-Fikr, 
Beirut, 2000, vol. 1, p. 87.   
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Another observation from this discussion is that the scholars do not seem to be stringent  
in their suggestions on the approaches to identify the qualification of a muftī, which is in 
contrast with their strict insistence on the list of prerequisites that a person must acquire 
in order to qualify him to exercise ijtihād, and consequently to issue fatāwā.  This is 
probably due to the urgent need of the mustaftī to seek answers to his religious 
questions at that particular point of time, where none among the people but only one is 
found to be reliable, hence the ways proposed by the scholars should provide the 
mustaftī with the most practical option.   
 
An other possible reason to this is that the issue at hand here is of ways to be employed 
by a muqallid mustaftī to identify whether a person is qualified as a muftī.  As earlier 
presented, a muqallid is one who does not have sufficient skill to differentiate which 
between two evidences is stronger than the other, hence exercises taqlīd, which is 
defined as ‘accepting an opinion without understanding its evidence’ (qabūl qawl bi lā 
hujjah).  It is therefore expected that the muqallid similarly would not be capable to 
ascertain whether  the person in question has the necessary prerequisites that qualify 
him to issue fatāwā, or to practice ijtihād.  Consequently, a way out, as proposed by the 
scholars, is by way of either getting self verification, or confession, by the muftī himself 
that he is qualified; or testimony from at least one trustworthy person on the muftī’s 
qualification; or by following a popular recognition by the people on the muftī.   
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However, in a hypothetical situation where a mustaftī has the capability to do more than 
just to rely on the muftī’s own confession or on a testimony by a trustworthy individual, 
a question arises as to whether this mustaftī is required to investigate further so as to 
satisfy himself on the muftī’s qualification?  The available literature reveals that the 
scholars have not given specific deliberations to this question.  Nonetheless, an analysis 
on the scholars’ deliberations on the necessary steps to be employed when a mustaftī 
manages to find more than one muftī, may shed some light on this issue. 
 
There are differing opinions among the scholars of the Shāfi‘ī madhhab on this.  The 
first of these is that held by Ibn Surayj,114 al-Qaffāl,115 and al-Khat īb al-Baghdādī,116 that 
the mustaftī is obliged to put his best effort to investigate and identify who among these 
muftūn is the most knowledgeable.  The mustaftī is then allowed to only follow the 
fatwā issued by this most knowledgeable muftī.  Al-Māwardī,117 al-Shīrāzī,118 al-
Rāfi‘ī,119 Ibn al-Salāh,120 al-Nawawī,121 al-Āmidī,122 al-Zarkashī,123 and al-Haytamī,124 on 
                                                 
114  Al-Māwardī, ‘Alī ibn Muhammad ibn Habīb, al-Hāwī al-Kabīr fi Fiqh Madhhab al-Imām al-Shāfi‘ī, 
Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 1999, vol. 1, p. 32.  See also al-Rāfi‘ī, ‘Abd al-Karīm ibn Muhammad 
ibn ‘Abd al-Karīm, al-‘Azīz Sharh al-Wajīz, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 1997, vol.12, p. 424. 
115  Al-Shīrāzī, Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm ibn ‘Alī al-Shīrāzī, Kitāb al-Luma‘ fī Usūl al-Fiqh, Dār al-Nadwah al-
Islāmiyyah, Beirut, 1988, p. 119.  See also al-Rāfi‘ī, ‘Abd al-Karīm ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Karīm, 
al-‘Azīz Sharh al-Wajīz, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 1997, vol.12, p. 424. 
116  Al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī, Abū Bakr Ahmad ibn ‘Alī, al-Faqīh wa al-Mutafaqqih, Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, 
Saudi Arabia, Beirut & Cairo, 1426h., vol. 2, p. 376.  
117  Al-Māwardī, ‘Alī ibn Muhammad ibn Habīb, al-Hāwī al-Kabīr fi Fiqh Madhhab al-Imām al-Shāfi‘ī, 
Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 1999, vol. 1, p. 32. 
118  Al-Shīrāzī, Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm ibn ‘Alī al-Shīrāzī, Kitāb al-Luma‘ fī Usūl al-Fiqh, Dār al-Nadwah al-
Islāmiyyah, Beirut, 1988, p. 119.  See also al-Shīrāzī, al-Tabsirah fī Usūl al-Fiqh, Dār al-Kutub al-
‘Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 2003, p. 244. 
119  Al-Rāfi‘ī, ‘Abd al-Karīm ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Karīm, al-‘Azīz Sharh al-Wajīz, Dār al-Kutub 
al-‘Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 1997, vol.12, p. 424. 
120  Ibn al-Salāh , ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Shahrazūrī, Adab al-Muftī wa al-Mustaftī, Maktabah 
al-‘Ulūm wa al-Hikam, Medina, 1986, p. 158. 
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the other hand, are of the view that it is not necessary, and that the mustaftī is at liberty 
to choose any one of those muftūn that he wants.  This second view is the opinion of the 
majority of the scholars, and is based on the argument that identifying the most 
knowledgeable among the muftūn can only be done by a similarly knowledgeable 
person.  Al-Āmidī125 further supports this position by asserting that it has never been a 
practice among the companions of the prophet to restrict seeking answers to religious 
queries only from those of a higher echelon among them.  
                                                                                                                                              
 
Al-Juwaynī offers two different positions in this regard, according to two different 
stages.  Firstly, at the stage of approaching a muftī; and secondly, at the stage of 
receiving response to a mustaftī’s question in the form of a fatwā.  In approaching a 
muftī, where there are more than one that a mustaftī can find, al-Juwaynī is of the same 
view with the majority of the scholars of the madhhab, that the mustaftī is at liberty to 
approach any one that he likes.126  However, at the stage where he receives differing 
answers from more than one muftī, the mustaftī is to first identify and follow the most 
knowledgeable and trustworthy among the muftūn.  If one is found to be more 
 
121  Al-Nawawī, Abū Zakariyyā Muhyī al-Dīn ibn Sharaf, al-Majmū‘ Sharh al-Muhadhdhab, Dār al-Fikr, 
Beirut, 2000, vol. 1, p. 87.   
122  Al-Āmidī, Saif al-Dīn Abū al-Hasan ‘Alī ibn Abī ‘Alī, al-Ihkām fī Usūl al-Ahkām, Dār al-Kutub al-
‘Ilmiyyah, Beirut, n.d., vol. 2, p. 458. 
123  Al-Zarkashī, Badr al-Dīn Muhāmmad ibn Bahādir ibn ‘Abd Allah, al-Bahr al-Muhīt fī Us ūl al-Fiqh, 
Wizārat al-Awqāf wa al-Shu’ūn al-Islāmiyyah, Kuwait, 1992, vol. 6, p. 311. 
124  Al-Haytamī, Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Alī ibn Hajar, al-Fatāwā al-Kubrā al-
Fiqhiyyah ‘alā Madhhab al-Imām al-Shāfi‘ī, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 1997, vol. 4, p. 301. 
125  Al-Āmidī, Sayf al-Dīn Abū al-Hasan ‘Alī ibn Abī ‘Alī, al-Ihkām fī Usūl al-Ahkām, Dār al-Kutub al-
‘Ilmiyyah, Beirut, n.d., vol. 2, p. 458. 
126 Al-Juwaynī, Imām al-H aramayn ‘Abd al-Malik ibn ‘Abd Allāh, al-Burhān fī Usūl al-Fiqh, Dār al-
Wafā’, Mansoura, 1992, vol. 2, p. 878.   
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knowledgeable while the other more trustworthy, the mustaftī is to put preference to the 
more knowledgeable over the one who is more trustworthy.  If, in a situation, the 
mustaftī is eventually still unable to make such a preferential choice, al-Juwaynī 
proposes that the mustaftī is then discharged from any obligation with regard to the 
issue concerned.  This proposition, that there can be this possible situation where a 
mustafī is discharged in such a manner from certain religious obligations, is unique to 
al-Juwaynī.  He arrived at this conclusion after his rejection of all the other 
propositions, among which is the notion that a mustaftī should opt for a stricter fatwā, 
by refuting that it is a directive without any valid argument nor justification.  Al-
Juwaynī also dismisses another notion that the mustaftī must follow the most accurate 
answer, highlighting that to expect the mustaftī to make such a decision is as good as 
getting him to follow his whims and fancies.  To further support his position, al-
Juwaynī insists that there can be taklīf, or religious responsibility on a sane adult, only 
when he can be made to comprehend what he is obligated with.  In this instant, 
however, the mustaftī’s inability to identify which of the two or more fatāwā is for him 
to adhere to, is a cause for him to be relieved from any obligation concerning the issue 
at hand. 127   
 
                                                 
127 Al-Juwaynī, Imām al-H aramayn ‘Abd al-Malik ibn ‘Abd Allāh, al-Burhān fī Usūl al-Fiqh, Dār al-
Wafā’, Mansoura, 1992, vol. 2, pp. 881-882. 
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Al-Ghazzālī proposes a considerably detailed discussion on this issue, which can be 
classified into four parts as follows128 :   
 
Firstly, in the earlier discussion on ways to verify the qualification of a muftī when only 
one muftī can be found, al-Ghazzālī insists that the mustaftī has to depend on popular 
reports (tawātur) by the people, if that can be done.  Otherwise, it suffices for the 
mustaftī to establish his own best estimation (ghālib al-zann) based on the testimony of 
one or two trustworthy persons.   
 
Secondly, in a situation where there are more than one muftī, the mustaftī is given the 
choice of asking any one that he wishes, without any need for further investigation to 
identify the one who is most qualified.  This is assumingly a situation where both or all 
the muftūn are in agreement on one common ruling, for if they are not, it will shift to the 
next part of al-Ghazzālī’s discussion.  Nonetheless, a question arises here as to why the 
mustaftī is said to be at liberty to choose any one of the muftūn, when it can be 
suggested that he follows both or all of them, for they are unanimous in their ruling?   
 
Thirdly, in his subsequent discussion, al-Ghazzālī suggests that if the muftūn hold 
different views on a particular ruling, and both or all the muftūn are of the same stature, 
the mustaftī is to approach them again for their advice.  If they agree that he can make 
his personal choice, he is then allowed to do so, while if there is one particular view that 
                                                 
128 Al-Ghazzālī, Abū Hāmid Muhammad ibn Muhammad, al-Mustasfā min ‘Ilm al-Usūl, Mu’assasah al-
Risālah, Beirut, 1997, vol. 2, pp. 468-469. 
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they agree he should follow, he is required to abide by it.  If, however the muftūn persist 
on their differing positions, the mustaftī is, again, allowed to make his own choice as to 
whom to follow. 
 
Fourthly, when these muftūn are not unanimous in their rulings, and they are not of the 
same stature, al-Ghazzālī expresses his preference that the mustaftī must follow the 
most qualified among them.  This, according to al-Ghazzālī, is to be attempted by the 
mustaftī by employing his best personal estimation, or ghālib al-zann.  
 
Al-Rāzī, on the other hand, insists that the mustaftī is required to first try his best to 
identify who among the muftūn is the most knowledgeable, although he does not 
suggest any specific method for the mustaftī to apply in doing so.  If, consequently, he 
is able to identify the one who is most knowledgeable, he is then obligated to approach 
that particular muftī over the other for fatāwā.  However, in a situation where 
subsequently the mustaftī continues to fail to distinguish the most knowledgeable 
among them, either because the testimonies or indicators that he gathered are not 
sufficiently convincing for him to reach to the required conclusion, or because all these 
muftūn are of the same echelon, he is then expected to proceed to the next stage of 
trying to identify who among them is the most trustworthy and pious, for him to follow.  
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If, eventually, the mustaftī is still unable to come up with any decision, only then is he 
given the liberty to opt for any one of the muftūn that he is comfortable with.129   
 
To a certain extent, this view by al-Rāzī bears some similarities with the one offered by 
al-Ghazzālī, where both of them express their inclination that a mustaftī cannot but exert 
a reasonable amount of effort to determine the most knowledgeable among the muftūn, 
whose fatāwā consequently becomes the only ones he is to follow.  The difference 
between the two is at the initial stage of identifying the stature of these muftūn.  If al-
Rāzī insists that the mustaftī must try to determine the highest qualified among the 
muftūn from the earliest stage, al-Ghazzālī suggests that such an effort is to be exerted 
only when there are disagreements among the muftūn in their views.        
 
This researcher is of the view that this position by al-Ghazzālī and al-Rāzī is the most 
justified, but realistic, and the closest to fulfill the need of a mustaftī to be self assured 
of the qualification of a muftī he is depending on for his religious guidance.  The 
principle is, as highlighted by Ibn al-Salāh130  and al-Nawawī,131 for a mustaftī to employ 
a realistic way according to the best of his capability, to convince himself that the 
person he approaches for fatāwā is duly qualified for such.  It is understandable that due 
to a lack of capability on the part of the muqallid mustaftī, he can not be expected to 
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thoroughly comprehend the legal and theological basis of a fatwā issued by a jurist.  
Similarly, it is unbecoming to oblige him to make an enlightened preference for a legal 
opinion over an other according to the merit of its evident and arguments, what more for 
him to deduce a ruling directly from the texts, a process of which is termed as ijtihād.  
Notwithstanding, for him to exert effort to satisfy himself, to the closest of his 
estimation, on the stature and qualification of a muftī, is practically an achievable task.  
The method and steps to be employed should otherwise be left to his discretion based 
on his capabilities, as well as the combination of resources, opportunities and 
limitations that are present before him.      
 
The proponents of the second view, who suggest that it is not obligatory on the mustaftī 
to investigate who among the muftūn is most knowledgeable, put forth an argument that 
only a similarly knowledgeable person is capable to identify the knowledge stature of a 
muftī.  This argument is valid, if the expectation is for the mustaftī to fully discover the 
exact truth with regards to the muftī’s stature.  However, this is not the case, and the 
mustaftī is not expected to do as such, for understandably he is not capable for it.  An 
analysis of the views of the scholars, both of the first and the second positions, 
illustrates that the scholars generally accept the notion of having the mustaftī to 
establish a self estimation (ghālib al-zann) as a basis for him to work upon.  This is 
supported by al-Rāzī’s report that the scholars of the madhhab agree (ittafaqū) that a 
mustaftī is not permitted to seek a fatwā, unless he is led by his best estimation (illā 
idhā ghalaba ‘alā zannih) that the person he is seeking the fatwā from is qualified to 
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exercise ijtihād, and is trustworthy.132  It is not an issue of convincing others, but rather 
an undertaking to satisfy his own need to be self-assured of the qualification of the muftī 
he is about to approach for his religious guidance.  This, as mentioned by al-Rāzī, can 
be achieved through a number of ways, among which are by getting testimony of one or 
more trustworthy persons; or by prevalent recognition among members of a community; 
or by the referral made by a muftī for the mustaftī to approach another, whom the 
former acknowledged as being more knowledgeable.133  This notion of having one’s 
best estimation as the foundation for his religious adherence and observance, should 
also be put forth as a response to al-Juwaynī’s proposition indicated earlier, that a 
mustaftī’s obligation in the issue that he sought a muftī’s view on, is discharged, if the 
mustaftī is unable to determine which fatwa is to be followed. 
                                                
 
This area of discussion is far from being archaic, when deliberations on establishing 
authority and acceptance of a contemporary fatwā institution, as in the context of 
Singapore, come into the picture.  The different positions that exist among the scholars 
of the Shāfi‘ī madhhab indicates the intensity of the need, in the views of these 
scholars, for a non-mujtahid layperson to put his best effort to satisfy himself with the 
qualification and trustworthiness of the individual from whom he seeks guidance to his 
religious queries, within a degree that is practical and realistic.  The  system and 
procedures that have been put in place for the Singapore’s Fatwa Committee and its 
 
132 Al-Rāzī, Fakhr al-Dīn Muhammad ibn ‘Umar, al-Mahsūl fī ‘Ilm Usūl al-Fiqh, Mu’assasah al-Risālah, 
Beirut, 1997, vol. 6, p. 81. 
133 Ibid., vol. 6, p. 83. 
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muftī to function, as delineated in the Administration Law Act (AMLA), were designed 
in such a way that this issue of the integrity and credibility of the country’s fatwā 
institution and its members is addressed.  This will be further discussed in later parts of 
this research.  
 
 
2.4 A Muftī’s Position in the Judiciary 
It is recommended that a judge, in passing a judgment, consults the legal opinion of a 
knowledgeable individual, or individuals.  This was mentioned by, and as early as, al-
Shāfi‘ī134, al-Māwardī135 and al-Shīrāzī, the latter of whom suggests that the learned 
consultants are to be present in the hearing sessions.136  This process of consulting the 
views of a learned jurist, or jurists, before passing judgment, resembles the current 
practice in Singapore, where occasionally the President of the Shariah Court would 
proceed to the Fatwa Committee for fatāwā on certain judicial issues.  An issue that 
arises within this discussion is whether it is acceptable for the judge to pass a judgment 
that differs from the fatwā of his consultants.  Al-Māwardī indicates his preference that 
the judge’s consultants are in no position to force him to accept their legal opinion when 
he disagrees, provided that the judge is himself a mujtahid.137  A merit stands in 
                                                 
134  Al-Shāfi‘ī, Muhammad ibn Idrīs, Kitāb al-Ūmm, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 1993, vol. 7, p. 
158. 
135  Al-Māwardī, ‘Alī ibn Muhammad ibn Habīb, al-Hāwī al-Kabīr fi Fiqh Madhhab al-Imām al-Shāfi‘ī, 
Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 1999, vol. 16, pp. 47-49. 
136  Al-Shīrāzī, Ibrāhīm ibn ‘Alī ibn Yūsuf al-Fīrūz’abadī, al-Muhadhdhab fī Fiqh al-Imām al-Shāfi‘ī, Dār 
Ihyā’ al-Turāth al-‘Arabī, Beirut, 1994, vol. 2, p. 379. 
137  Al-Māwardī, ‘Alī ibn Muhammad ibn Habīb, al-Hāwī al-Kabīr fi Fiqh Madhhab al-Imām al-Shāfi‘ī, 
Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 1999, vol. 16, p. 49. 
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allowing a judge to hold a certain degree of legal liberty to decide, even if his decision 
departs from the position of his consultant, or consultants, for it is the judge who 
presides over the court hearings, thus placing him in a better position to decide on the 
outcome of every case, due to the vital first hand information on the argumentations, 
proofs and evidences that he has the privilege of, as compared to the information held 
by the consultant, who in numerous occasions is the muftī.  It may be useful, however, 
in order to avoid juristic conflicts between the judge and his muftī consultants, that any 
legal opinion issued by the consultants is illustrated in the form of general principles 
and broad rulings, upon which the judge will, in turn, assume the task of translating it 
into specific application to the case he is presiding.   
 
 
2.5 Retraction of a Fatwā 
Al-Shāfi‘ī mentions that when a jurist finds a fatwā he has earlier issued as erroneous, 
he is obligated to retract it.  This is also the case if he realizes that the earlier fatwā was 
in contradiction with the Qur’ān, a sunnah, or an ijmā‘.  Al-Shīrāzī adds to this list the 
apparent analogy (al-qiyās al-jalī)138  However, al-Shāfi‘ī asserts that the mujtahid is to 
resort to retracting such a fatwā only if the mistake or the contradiction is definite, and 
that there does not exist a second opinion that supports the fatwā issued earlier, hence 
                                                 
138  Al-Shīrāzī, Ibrāhīm ibn ‘Alī ibn Yūsuf al-Fīrūzabādī, al-Muhadhdhab fī Fiqh al-Imām al-Shāfi‘ī, Dār 
Ihyā’ al-Turāth al-‘Arabī, Beirut, 1994, vol. 2, p. 380. 
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providing it with a possibility that it might be correct.139  A possible question that may 
arise from this position by al-Shāfi‘ī is whether, by this view, he is disallowing any 
muftī, who has a change of mind on that particular issue, from issuing a new fatwā that 
contradicts an earlier one, if the latter does not contain a definite error?  This is unlikely 
to be the case, for al-Shāfi‘ī himself is known to have departed from a number of his 
earlier rulings that constitute his old madhhab (al-madhhab al-qadim) and proposed 
new rulings which form part of his new madhhab (al-madhhab al-jadīd).  What al-
Shāfi‘ī means by retracting the abovementioned type of fatāwā, that are definitely 
erroneous or contradict a directly conspicuous text of the Qur’ān, sunnah or ijmā‘, is to 
nullify them totally, and not leaving the smallest bit of space for any member of the 
community to adopt them.  In contrast, a ruling issued earlier, but subsequently viewed 
by the issuer as weak in its evidences and argument, possibly due to newly discovered 
proofs, or due to emerging needs of people of different contexts and circumstances, is 
naturally to be reviewed and reinterpreted by its issuer.140  An expansion to its initial 
deliberations in order to realize and satisfy the general sharī‘ah principle of general 
good (mas lahah ‘āmmah) may thus be formulated, without the need to completely 
invalidate it. 
 
Al-Shāfi‘ī’s insistence that the retraction of an earlier fatwā can only be done if it is 
erroneous in a definitive form, or when it contradicts a directly conspicuous text of the 
                                                 
139  Al-Shāfi‘ī, Muhammad ibn Idrīs, Kitāb al-Ūmm, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 1993, vol. 7, p. 
156. 
140  Mutrijī, Mahmūd, al-Majmū‘ Sharh al-Muhadhdhab, Dār al-Fikr, Beirut, 2000, vol. 22, p. 51. 
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Qur’ān, sunnah or ijmā‘, carries an elemental merit, in such that there is always the 
possibility of the circumstantial factors that have earlier influenced the ruling to be 
formulated in its initial form, to reoccur after a period of time.  This signifies the 
elasticity of the Sharī‘ah that ensures its continued relevance and applicability in 
changing societies, where the formulation of its rulings, other than by utilizing the 
process of deriving them from the primary textual sources, that are the Qur’ān and the 
sunnah, also comprises of taking into significant consideration the fundamental 
objectives of the sharī‘ah, of which the personal, domestic and environmental situations 
of its subjects are hugely influential.   
 
Another point of considerable value from al-Shāfi‘ī’s proposition lies in the fact that by 
discovering new evidences, and subsequently revising an existing ruling to formulate a 
new and updated one that is, to the best of its issuer’s intellectual capacity, nearest to 
the truth, a jurist can never claim ultimate correctness.  There is always the possibility 
of other evidences yet to be discovered, as much as the possibility of the jurist changing 
his preference in the methodology applied to extract ruling from the sources, even the 
very ones he utilized in his earlier fatwā.     
 
This position by al-Shāfi‘ī and al-Shīrāzī denotes, in short, the distinction between the 
legal spheres where ijtihād is allowed and those where its exertion is not accepted, 
namely issues where the conspicuous rulings are explicitly designated, beyond doubt, 
by the Quranic texts, sunnah, ijmā‘ and al-qiyās al-jalī. 
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2.6 Procedural Stages of Iftā’ 
Upon scrutinizing the literature available within the Shāfi‘ī madhhab on the procedural 
stages that a muftī is expected to go through in the process of formulating a ruling, and 
subsequently issuing it as a fatwā, it is discovered that the scholars of the madhhab 
generally presented a list of etiquettes that range from the first instant when the muftī 
receives a question, to the method that he is expected to apply in conveying the answer 
to the mustaftī, that is the person, or party, who seeks his fatwā.  These proposed 
etiquettes should understandably constitute a significant and important part of the whole 
body of legal theories on iftā’, for they define the framework adopted by the jurists and 
muftūn in coming up with legal opinions requested by members of their community.  It 
is therefore to be expected that such a framework would effect a considerable degree of 
influence on their fatāwā in their final form.  
 
In order to facilitate further discussion and analysis of these theories, they are hereby 
categorised into three sections in accordance to three different stages, the first of which 
is the stage whence a muftī first receives a question, followed by the second stage when 
the muftī goes through a set of processes and procedures to formulate a legal opinion on 
the case being queried.  This is subsequently followed by the third stage when the legal 
opinion is finally conveyed to the mustaftī. 
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2.6.1  When a muftī receives a question. 
An investigation into the writings of scholars of the Shāfi‘ī scholars reveals that there is 
no dispute among them on the personal obligation placed onto a muftī to take up the 
task of providing the mustaftī with a fatwā, if there is no qualified person other than him 
available in the community.141  Although it has been a common notion among the 
scholars to highlight, in the initial parts of their writings on iftā’, the tremendous 
cautions of any person from imprudently delving into issuing fatāwā and answering 
religious questions, due to its inviolability as a religious obligation and as a consecrated 
practice, to the extent that to be hesitant to issue fatāwā seems almost to be a virtue in 
itself, the scholars are apparently unanimous in suggesting that if a muftī finds himself 
to be the only one availably qualified, he can not avoid from assuming the 
responsibility. 
 
In an earlier part of this research, it was presented that the majority of the Shāfi‘ī 
scholars are of the view that, in a situation where there are more than one qualified 
muftī available, the mustaftī is at liberty to choose any one of those muftūn that he wants 
to direct his questions to.  Al-Khat īb al-Baghdādī, on the other hand, is among those 
other few who insist that the mustaftī is obliged to make his best possible effort to 
identify the one most knowledgeable among those muftūn, and upon identifying one, 
                                                 
141 Al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī, Abū Bakr Ahmad ibn ‘Alī, al-Faqīh wa al-Mutafaqqih, Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, 
Saudi Arabia, Beirut & Cairo, 1426h., vol. 2, p. 386.  See also al-Shīrāzī, Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm ibn ‘Alī al-
Shīrāzī, Kitāb al-Luma‘ fī Usūl al-Fiqh, Dār al-Nadwah al-Islāmiyyah, Beirut, 1988, p. 71; Ibn al-Salāh, 
‘Uthmān ibn ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Shahrazūrī, Adab al-Muftī wa al-Mustaftī, Maktabah al-‘Ulūm wa al-
Hikam, Medina, 1986, p. 108; & Al-Nawawī, Abū Zakariyyā Muhyī al-Dīn ibn Sharaf, al-Majmū‘ Sharh 
al-Muhadhdhab, Dār al-Fikr, Beirut, 2000, vol. 1, p. 75.  
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only this particular muftī is he allowed to seek fatāwā from.  This inclination by al-
Khat īb al-Baghdādī to impose such a restriction, is further ascertained by his 
proposition that when a group of muftūn are approached, they are required to advise and 
direct the mustaftī to approach the one whom they know as the most knowledgeable 
among them.142  This consistency by al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī is an indicator of his 
persistence that preserving the sanctity of the religion by way of getting only the highest 
echelon of a scholar to provide religious guidance to the community, is a commitment 
required of both the muftī and the mustaftī. 
 
This zeal as displayed by Al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī continues to show when he proposes 
that, if the muftī receives a question that he is not confident of its answer, it becomes an 
onus on him to refer the mustaftī to another muftī that he knows is more knowledgeable, 
if there is any.  According to al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī, in a situation where there is none 
other than him, the muftī is not to proceed with answering the question at hand.  Instead, 
he is to abstain himself from answering.143  This position by al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī is 
also shared by al-Nawawī.144  Al-Shāfi‘ī, too, was reported by al-Haytamī as insisting 
that a muftī in such a situation should refrain from issuing any fatwā on the issue at 
                                                 
142 Al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī, Abū Bakr Ahmad ibn ‘Alī, al-Faqīh wa al-Mutafaqqih, Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, 
Saudi Arabia, Beirut & Cairo, 1426h., vol. 2, p. 379. 
143 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 360-361. 
144 Al-Nawawī, Abū Zakariyyā Muhyī al-Dīn ibn Sharaf, al-Majmū‘ Sharh al-Muhadhdhab, Dār al-Fikr, 
Beirut, 2000, vol. 1, p. 84. 
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hand until he is able to enlighten himself on which of the differing opinions is superior 
in its evidences.145 
 
However, a pertinent question that needs to be addressed out of this position by al-
Khat īb al-Baghdādī, al-Nawawī and al-Shāfi‘ī, is: until when should the muftī abstain 
from responding to a question that he is not totally sure of the answer, while at the same 
time there is no other more knowledgeable jurist that he knows of for him to direct the 
mustaftī to?  If we are to base our consideration mainly on the mas lahah of the mustaftī 
and the community, such a question should not be left unanswered indefinitely, or else 
the need of the mustaftī would be seen to have been unduly ignored by the muftī.   
 
To this al-Haytamī offers a different proposition.  He starts by asserting that a muftī is 
obliged to exert his utmost effort to identify the strongest opinion based on its evidences 
and merit of its argument.  It is an offence for a muftī to deliberately choose an inferior 
view for his fatwā, for such an act is considered as following his lustful desire (ittibā‘ 
al-hawā).  However, in a situation where, even after exerting a considerable amount of 
effort, the muftī is still unable to identify the stronger of the two, or more, views, he 
then has the liberty to adopt whichever view that he personally prefers.  As due effort 
has been spent prior to his making that personal preference between the various views, 
                                                 
145 Al-Haytamī, Shihāb al-Dīn Ahmad ibn Muhammad, al-Fatāwā al-Kubrā al-Fiqhiyyah ‘alā Madhhab 
al-Imām al-Shāfi‘ī, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 1997, vol. 4, p. 304. 
 84
he is therefore not to be condemned of following his lustful desire in formulating and 
issuing his fatwā.146 
 
Al-Ghazzālī discusses this issue at length in his al-Mustas fā,147 where he reports 
differing views on it among jurists.  Al-Ghazzālī classifies these jurists into two main 
categories, the first of whom are those who hold the view that there is only one truth, or 
one reality, in identifying any religious ruling; and that only one legal opinion among 
several is correct.  A mujtahid is therefore expected to exercise ijtihād with the personal 
aim to reach a degree of certainty in the one correct position.  As identifying the single 
truth is achievable and all mujtahidūn are obliged to reach as such, the jurists of this 
category assert that there can not exist a contradiction between two or more legal 
evidences that remains irreconcilable.  Therefore, in a situation where a mujtahid finds 
himself unable to determine which of the different legal positions as the correct one, he 
is obliged to either refrain from issuing any answer, or to adopt a cautious approach by 
choosing the strictest position. 
 
The second category of jurists, according to al-Ghazzālī, are those who hold the view 
that there can be multiple truths; and that the concluding results of the ijtihād employed 
by the mujtahidūn are all accepted as correct, although they may appear to be 
contradictory to one another.  Al-Ghazzālī narrates that the jurists of this category are 
                                                 
146 Ibid., vol. 4, p. 305. 
147 Al-Ghazzālī, Abū Hāmid Muhammad ibn Muhammad, al-Mustasfā min ‘Ilm al-Usūl, Mu’assasah al-
Risālah, Beirut, 1997, vol. 2, pp. 445-447. 
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further divided into two groups, one of which assert that a mujtahid or muftī who is 
unable to determine which among two or more positions is the most convincing, to 
exercise refrain (tawaqquf).  The other group are those who view that such a muftī is at 
liberty to make his personal predilection (takhyīr) of any of the differing positions. 
 
In further presenting his discussion on this issue at hand, al-Ghazzālī highlights that 
accordingly there are four possible resolutions.  The first resolution is to apply both the 
opposing positions, or both the opposing legal evidences; while the second resolution is 
to abandon all.  Al-Ghazzālī argues that these first two resolutions are unreasonable due 
to the apparent contradiction in existence.  The third resolution, according to al-
Ghazzālī, is indefinite refrain.  To this, al-Ghazzālī stresses that it is also unacceptable 
as it will only lead to disruption and impasse.  The only feasible resolution left is 
therefore to allow the muftī to have liberty to choose any of the positions as his answer, 
or fatwā. 
 
This researcher is of the view that this issue is of significant importance in the 
discussion of the duties and responsibilities of a muftī, as well as his code of conduct, 
which is termed as adab al-muftī by the jurists.  A muftī carries the religious onus of 
providing guidance to his community when he is requested to do so.  Every effort 
should be taken to ensure that this important role of providing religious guidance should 
not be put to halt indefinitely.  A muftī’s inability at any one time to be convinced of the 
stronger position between two or more legal opinions must not be accepted as a reason 
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to leave the mustaftī in desperation for an answer.  It is therefore proposed that a muftī 
in such a situation should be given the opportunity to evaluate whether it is in the best 
interest of the mustaftī to proceed with issuing a fatwā by choosing any one of the 
available positions; or to defer issuing it until a time when the muftī is satisfied with the 
most appropriate position to be employed.  However, if the muftī decides not to defer, it 
may be useful for him to be upfront with his mustaftī by declaring that his answer is to 
be taken as an interim measure, with a disclaimer that once he is able to reach a 
convincing position on the issue at hand, he will inform the mustaftī.     
 
In their writings on the role of a muftī and his etiquette at the first stage of receiving a 
question, the jurists of the Shāfi‘ī madhhab also indicate that if a muftī is confronted 
with several questions by more than one mustaftī at any one time, the muftī is expected 
to give priority to questions that came in to him earlier, according to the sequence of 
their arrival to him for his disposal. If, however, there is reasonable reason for the muftī 
to advance a question that comes in later, such as in a situation where a fatwā is 
requested by a traveller who is in dire need to have his question answered on an 
immediate basis, the muftī is therefore given the liberty to provide him with the answer 
first, before answering other questions that have reached him earlier.  This decision to 
give priority to any of the questions, based on the sequence of their arrival, or on the 
degree of urgency, or on any other consideration, is to be made discreetly for the benefit 
and the needs of the mustaftī.  Making such a decision is left to the discretion of the 
muftī, with a caution, however, that he should not cause any detriment to anyone, and 
 87
that his decision should not be taken with the illicit intention to effect preferential 
treatment unduly to anyone.148 
 
As providing religious guidance and issuing fatāwā is considered a task of great 
consequence and not to be taken lightly, a muftī naturally is expected to expend all 
effort to the best of his ability to arrive at an answer that he is convinced to be as nearest 
to the truth as humanly possible.  In order for the muftī to be able to achieve as such, it 
is thus of critical importance that before embarking on the process of formulating the 
required ruling, he is to be fully cognisant of the question that he is being presented 
with, which should be inclusive of its intention and all the necessary facts that are 
related to it.  To facilitate this, the scholars of the madhhab insist that a muftī should 
read a written question comprehensively to its very last part, highlighting that greater 
attention is to be given to this last part of the question, as generally by it, the exact 
content and intention of the question becomes clearly identifiable.149  Al-Khatīb al-
Baghdādī even suggests that the muftī has to read the question repeatedly for him to 
have adequate grasp of its content, and for him to give it his due thoughts.150  When a 
Muftī finds that there is a part of the question that is ambiguous, he should revert to the 
                                                 
148 Ibn al-Salāh , ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Shahrazūrī, Adab al-Muftī wa al-Mustaftī, Maktabah al-
‘Ulūm wa al-Hikam, Medina, 1986, p. 153.  See also al-Nawawī, Abū Zakariyyā Muhyī al-Dīn ibn 
Sharaf, al-Majmū‘ Sharh al-Muhadhdhab, Dār al-Fikr, Beirut, 2000, vol. 1, p. 82. 
149 Al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī, Abū Bakr Ahmad ibn ‘Alī, al-Faqīh wa al-Mutafaqqih, Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, 
Saudi Arabia, Beirut & Cairo, 1426h., vol. 2, p. 387.  See also al-Rāfi‘ī, ‘Abd al-Karīm ibn Muhammad 
ibn ‘Abd al-Karīm, al-‘Azīz Sharh al-Wajīz, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 1997, vol. 12, p. 426;  Ibn 
al-Salāh , ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Shahrazūrī, Adab al-Muftī wa al-Mustaftī, Maktabah al-‘Ulūm 
wa al-Hikam, Medina, 1986, p. 137;  & al-Nawawī, Abū Zakariyyā Muhyī al-Dīn ibn Sharaf, al-Majmū‘ 
Sharh al-Muhadhdhab, Dār al-Fikr, Beirut, 2000, vol. 1, p. 79. 
150 Al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī, Abū Bakr Ahmad ibn ‘Alī, al-Faqīh wa al-Mutafaqqih, Dār Ibn al-Jauzī, 
Saudi Arabia, Beirut & Cairo, 1426h., vol. 2, p. 390.  
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mustaftī for further clarification.151  It is also advocated that the muftī consult other 
scholars for their views on the issue at hand.152  
 
2.6.2 When formulating a legal position 
This is the stage when a muftī is expected to formulate or identify a ruling that will 
subsequently be provided to his mustaftī as a fatwā, either by way of deducing this 
ruling from the primary texts (istinbāt ), or applying analogy (qiyās), or reporting the 
prevalent position of the muftī’s madhhab (ittibā‘), or putting preference to one legal 
opinion of a jurist over another (tarjīh).   
 
Al-Juwaynī153 relates al-Shāfi‘ī’s proposition on the processes that a mujtahid is 
expected to consume in his effort to formulate a religious ruling for a new legally 
unprecedented case, the first of which is by investigating the Qur’ānic texts, followed 
by, in the instance of its unavailability in the Qur’ān, the mutawātir narrations, and then, 
again by virtue of their non-existence, the āhād narrations.  In dealing with any of the 
                                                 
151 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 388.  See also Ibn al-S alāh , ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Shahrazūrī, Adab al-Muftī 
wa al-Mustaftī, Maktabah al-‘Ulūm wa al-Hikam, Medina, 1986, p. 137;  & al-Nawawī, Abū Zakariyyā 
Muhyī al-Dīn ibn Sharaf, al-Majmū‘ Sharh al-Muhadhdhab,Dār al-Fikr, Beirut, 2000, vol. 1, p. 79. 
152 Al-Shāfi‘ī, Muhammad ibn Idrīs, Kitāb al-Umm, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 1993, vol. 7, pp. 
155-158.  See also al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī, Abū Bakr Ahmad ibn ‘Alī, al-Faqīh wa al-Mutafaqqih, Dār 
Ibn al-Jawzī, Saudi Arabia, Beirut & Cairo, 1426h., vol. 2, p. 390;  Ibn al-S alāh, ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Abd al-
Rahmān al-Shahrazūrī, Adab al-Muftī wa al-Mustaftī, Maktabah al-‘Ulūm wa al-Hikam, Medina, 1986, p. 
138;  & al-Nawawī, Abū Zakariyyā Muhyī al-Dīn ibn Sharaf, al-Majmū‘ Sharh al-Muhadhdhab, Dār al-
Fikr, Beirut, 2000, vol. 1, p. 79. 
153 Al-Juwaynī, Imām al-H aramayn ‘Abd al-Malik ibn ‘Abd Allāh, al-Burhān fī Usūl al-Fiqh, Matābi‘ al-
Dawhah al-Hadīthah, Doha, vol. 2, pp. 1337-1339.  This proposition by al-Shafi’i was also reported by 
al-Shawkāni, Muhammad ibn ‘Alī, in his Irshād al-Fuhūl ilā Tahqīq al-Haqq min ‘Ilm al-Usūl, ed. 
Muhammad Hasan Muhammad Hasan Ismā‘īl, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 1999, vol. 2, pp. 310-
311. 
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said texts, if they are to be found, its explicit and definite injunction is to be identified 
and adopted.  In a situation where a definite injunction can not be established, the 
apparent connotation of the texts (zāhir al-nass ) is to be resorted to.  This is done, 
however, by, first, searching for a mukhas sis  that provides a clearer understanding to the 
intended implication of the generalities of the texts. 
 
When after all effort to investigate the texts has been exhausted without a satisfying 
conclusion, rather than instantaneously resorting to apply analogy (qiyās), a jurist is 
expected to give due consideration to the universals of the sharī‘ah and the general 
good it is set to realize.  Only in a situation where a common good is nowhere to be 
identified for the case at hand, ijmā‘ is then assumed.  Qiyās, or analogy, is 
consequently applied when there is no unanimous position taken by jurists by way of 
ijmā‘.  In his commentary to this proposition by al-Shāfi‘ī, al-Juwainī highlights his 
view that it is allowable for the mujtahid to resort to ijmā‘ first before embarking on 
investigating all the other legal steps as outlined by al-Shāfi‘ī. 
 
There is, however, a slight disparity in al-Ghazzālī’s narration of al-Shāfi‘ī’s 
proposition, as compared to al-Juwaynī’s narration of the same.  In al-Ghazzālī’s 
version, it is stated that after failing to derive a ruling from the primary textual sources, 
and subsequently from ijmā‘, a mujtahid should proceed to employ qiyās.  The 
consideration of the universals of the sharī‘ah and its general good (kulliyyāt al-shar‘ 
wa mas ālihuhā al-‘āmmah) is not mentioned as a step on its own before ijmā‘ or qiyās.  
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Nonetheless, in the application of qiyās, al-Shāfi‘ī is reported by al-Ghazzālī as 
asserting that the universal legal maxims (al-kulliyyāt al-‘āmmah) should be 
prominently observed in order to identify the ‘illah, or the underlying legal cause of a 
ruling, before any consideration can be given to the other specific evidences.154           
 
Scholars of the Shāfi‘ī madhhab also highlight their assertion that it is illicit for a muftī 
to adopt an attitude of laxity (tasāhul) in formulating and issuing fatāwā, and that those 
who are known for it are not to be further approached for fatāwā.  Among the forms of 
this attitude is by being hasty and imprudent in issuing fatāwā, without first lending the 
issue at hand a proper investigation, nor exerting adequate effort to go through the 
necessary process in formulating an acceptable ruling.  Another form of this attitude of 
laxity, or tasāhul, is by letting oneself to be taken in by corrupted motives to incessantly 
quest for legal artifices (al-hiyal) that contradict the sharī‘ah.  This is done with the 
intention to either offer an accommodating and permissive ruling to those a muftī hopes 
to gain personal benefit from, or issue an astringent and uncompromising fatwā to those 
he wishes to cause harm to.155  To the same effect, Al-Zarkashī also expresses 
preference that when a muftī is convinced by his ijtihād of a particular ruling for a 
mustaftī, he is not allowed to deliberately reject the mustaftī and refer him to another 
                                                 
154 Al-Shawkānī, Muhammad ibn ‘Alī, Irshād al-Fuhūl ilā Tahqīq al-Haqq min ‘Ilm al-Usūl, ed. 
Muhammad Hasan Ismā‘īl, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 1999, vol. 2, pp. 310-311. 
155 Al-Rāfi‘ī, ‘Abd al-Karīm ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Karīm, al-‘Azīz Sharh al-Wajīz, Dār al-Kutub 
al-‘Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 1997, vol. 12, p. 419.  See also Ibn al-Salāh , ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-
Shahrazūrī, Adab al-Muftī wa al-Mustaftī, Maktabah al-‘Ulūm wa al-Hikam, Medina, 1986, p. 111 & al-
Nawawī, Abū Zakariyyā Muhyī al-Dīn ibn Sharaf, al-Majmū‘ Sharh al-Muhadhdhab, Dār al-Fikr, Beirut, 
2000, vol. 1, p. 76. 
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muftī whom the former knows as holding a view different from his own, with the 
similar illicit intention as mentioned above, of curtailing the mustaftī with impediments, 
or facilitating relief in his personal benefit.156  
 
Notwithstanding, this austere position by the scholars should not be construed to mean 
that the interests of the mustaftūn are not taken as factors of consideration in the 
processes of iftā’.  To the contrary, it is praiseworthy if a muftī conducts an 
investigation into exploring legal artifices (al-hiyal) that are in concordance with the 
sharī‘ah, with the chaste intention of finding solutions to the predicaments faced by the 
mustaftī.  In support of this notion, Ibn al-Salāh and al-Nawawī narrated the words of 
Sufyān al-Thawrī that true acquaintance is, in reality, the ability by a trustworthy and 
qualified scholar to provide ease and relief, whilst merely providing strict and rigid 
rulings is an act any person can perform.157 
 
If the muftī is being asked about an issue that he had earlier given his fatwā on, he is 
allowed to repeat the same answer instantaneously, if he can still remember the 
arguments and evidences that constituted the basis for his earlier fatwā.  However, if he 
is unable to recall those earlier evidences and arguments, he is not permitted to proceed 
with issuing the same fatwā without first repeating the process of exercising ijtihād, 
                                                 
156 Al-Zarkashī, Badr al-Dīn Muhāmmad ibn Bahādir ibn ‘Abd Allah, al-Bahr al-Muhīt fī Usūl al-Fiqh, 
Wizārat al-Awqāf wa al-Shu’ūn al-Islāmiyyah, Kuwait, 1992, vol. 6, p. 317. 
157 Ibn al-Salāh , ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Shahrazūrī, Adab al-Muftī wa al-Mustaftī, Maktabah al-
‘Ulūm wa al-Hikam, Medina, 1986, p. 111.  See also Al-Nawawī, Abū Zakariyyā Muhyī al-Dīn ibn 
Sharaf, al-Majmū‘ Sharh al-Muhadhdhab, Dār al-Fikr, Beirut, 2000, vol. 1, p. 76. 
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and, consequently, only upon it is he expected to issue a new fatwā.158  This is unless if 
his self estimation implies that his earlier fatwā was founded on a considerably strong 
argument.159  Al-Juwaynī, on the other hand, is of the view that the muftī is not obliged 
to repeat the process of exercising ijtihād if the first fatwā was formulated based on an 
authentic text, for it is not conceivable that a text can possibly change.  This concession 
of a muftī being spared from repeating the process of ijtihād, is similarly given in cases 
where, by compelling him to do so, it would only cause predicaments and grave 
difficulties, such as the need to travel to great distances, and the like; or in cases where 
the issues in question are repetitive and habitual in nature.160   
 
If this second fatwā is not in accordance with his earlier fatwā, he is expected to inform 
his earlier mustaftī of the change in his opinion.  This is due to the fact that the 
execution by the earlier mustaftī of the particular religious practice in question was built 
upon the earlier fatwā, hence when the muftī abandons it at a later stage, there no longer 
exists any valid foundation for the mustaftī to continue to build his practice on.161 
 
                                                 
158 Al-Rāzī, Fakhr al-Dīn Muhammad ibn ‘Umar, al-Mahsūl fī ‘Ilm Usūl al-Fiqh, Mu’assasah al-Risālah, 
Beirut, 1997, vol. 6, pp. 69-70.  See also al-Āmidī, Sayf al-Dīn Abū al-Hasan ‘Alī ibn Abī ‘Alī, al-Ihkām 
fī Usūl al-Ahkām, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, Beirut, n.d., vol. 2, pp. 454-455, & al-Zarkashī, Badr al-Dīn 
Muhāmmad ibn Bahādir ibn ‘Abd Allah, al-Bahr al-Muhīt fī Usūl al-Fiqh, Wizārat al-Awqāf wa al-
Shu’ūn al-Islāmiyyah, Kuwait, 1992, vol. 6, p. 302. 
159 Al-Rāzī, Fakhr al-Dīn Muhammad ibn ‘Umar, al-Mahsūl fī ‘Ilm Usūl al-Fiqh, Mu’assasah al-Risālah, 
Beirut, 1997, vol. 6, pp. 69-70. 
160 Al-Juwaynī, Imām al-H aramayn ‘Abd al-Malik ibn ‘Abd Allāh, al-Burhān fī Usūl al-Fiqh, Dār al-
Wafā’, Mansoura, 1992, vol. 2, p. 878. 
161 Al-Rāzī, Fakhr al-Dīn Muhammad ibn ‘Umar, al-Mahsūl fī ‘Ilm Usūl al-Fiqh, Mu’assasah al-Risālah, 
Beirut, 1997, vol. 6, pp. 69-70.  See also al-Zarkashī, Badr al-Dīn Muhāmmad ibn Bahādir ibn ‘Abd 
Allah, al-Bahr al-Muhīt fī Usūl al-Fiqh, Wizārat al-Awqāf wa al-Shu’ūn al-Islāmiyyah, Kuwait, 1992, 
vol. 6, p. 304. 
 93
A non mujtahid muftī is not allowed to issue fatwās by way of narrating the opinions of 
a deceased mujtahid, unless if the reporting muftī has the necessary knowledge to 
understand and appreciate the deceased’s opinions and their evidences.162  Al-Rāzī 
reports that scholars of his time were unanimous that this practice is allowed, due to the 
cessation of the existence of independent mujtahidūn then. 
 
2.6.3 When issuing the answer 
A muftī is expected to observe that he is in a good personal and emotional condition 
when issuing a fatwā to his mustaftī. The muftī is warned not to proceed with giving out 
answers if he is in a state of anger, hunger, thirst, depression, boredom, lethargy, illness, 
or any other condition that may have an effect on the muftī’s ability to be just and 
objective in making his judgement.163   
 
In issuing a fatwā to a mustaftī who has difficulty in understanding the answer given, a 
muftī must have patience in assisting the former to comprehend the fatwā.164 A muftī is 
also enjoined, in providing the requested answer, to try his best to help solve the 
                                                 
162 Al-Rāzī, Fakhr al-Dīn Muhammad ibn ‘Umar, al-Mahsūl fī ‘Ilm Usūl al-Fiqh, Mu’assasah al-Risālah, 
Beirut, 1997, vol. 6, pp. 70-71. 
163 Al-Shāfi‘ī, Muhammad ibn Idrīs, Kitāb al-Umm, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 1993, vol. 7, p. 
157.  See also al-Rāfi‘ī, ‘Abd al-Karīm ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Karīm, al-‘Azīz Sharh al-Wajīz, Dār 
al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 1997, vol. 12, p. 425; Ibn al-Salāh, ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-
Shahrazūrī, Adab al-Muftī wa al-Mustaftī, Maktabah al-‘Ulūm wa al-Hikam, Medina, 1986, p. 113; & al-
Nawawī, Abū Zakariyyā Muhyī al-Dīn ibn Sharaf, al-Majmū‘ Sharh al-Muhadhdhab, Dār al-Fikr, Beirut, 
2000, vol. 1, p. 76. 
164 Ibn al-Salāh , ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Shahrazūrī, Adab al-Muftī wa al-Mustaftī, Maktabah al-
‘Ulūm wa al-Hikam, Medina, 1986, p. 135.  See also al-Nawawī, Abū Zakariyyā Muhyī al-Dīn ibn 
Sharaf, al-Majmū‘ Sharh al-Muhadhdhab, Dār al-Fikr, Beirut, 2000, vol. 1, p. 79. 
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problems faced by a mustaftī, and relieve him from any predicament that he is in.165  To 
support this notion, al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī presented several narrations, among which is 
‘Alī ibn Abī Tālib’s fatwā to a man who had earlier made an oath that his wife was to 
be divorced with the maximum three talāqs if he did not have sexual intercourse with 
her in the day of the fasting month of Ramad ān.  In his fatwā, ‘Alī ibn Abī Tālib 
proposed that the husband travel with his wife in Ramadān and have intercourse with 
her during the journey.  In another incident, al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī narrated that al-
Shāfi‘ī was asked by a man about his earlier oath to divorce his wife if he ate a 
particular date or if he threw it away. To help the man to extricate himself from the 
predicaments of his oath, al-Shāfi‘ī suggested that he ate half of the date and threw the 
other half away.166  
 
The interest of the mustaftī, therefore, seems to have always been a major factor of 
consideration by these scholars in their deliberations on the processes and etiquettes of 
iftā’.  Another indication of this is that a muftī is allowed to issue an answer that is not 
exactly in accordance to his preferred view, if he sees a good reason in doing so in the 
interest of the mustaftī.  Among others, if a muftī sees that there is a need to issue a 
stringent fatwā as a deterrent to a particular mustaftī from committing a crime, the muftī 
is allowed to proceed as such.  To this effect, al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī, al-Rāfi‘ī and al-
                                                 
165 Al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī, Abū Bakr Ahmad ibn ‘Alī, al-Faqīh wa al-Mutafaqqih, Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, 
Saudi Arabia, Beirut & Cairo, 1426h., vol. 2, p. 411.  See also al-Nawawī, Abū Zakariyyā Muhyī al-Dīn 
ibn Sharaf, al-Majmū‘ Sharh al-Muhadhdhab, Dār al-Fikr, Beirut, 2000, vol. 1, p. 81. 
166 Al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī, Abū Bakr Ahmad ibn ‘Alī, al-Faqīh wa al-Mutafaqqih, Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, 
Saudi Arabia, Beirut & Cairo, 1426h., vol. 2, pp. 411-414. 
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Nawawī narrated that Ibn ‘Abbās, a companion of the Prophet, was once approached by 
someone who posed him a question on the status of repentance offered by a murderer, 
to which Ibn ‘Abbās replied that his repentance would not be accepted.  However, to 
another who asked him a similar question, Ibn ‘Abbās offered a contradictory answer, 
indicating that a murderer’s repentance would be accepted.  Subsequently, Ibn ‘Abbās 
explained that he had seen in the eyes of the first enquirer a desire to commit murder, 
thus Ibn ‘Abbās’s uncompromising reply, which was intended to provide deterrence.  
As in the case of the second enquirer, Ibn ‘Abbās clarified that the man had come to 
him with a sincere intention to repent from a murder he had earlier committed.167      
 
In addition to this narration on Ibn ‘Abbās’s fatwā in the issue of a murderer’s 
repentance, al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī presented several other narrations that bring to the 
same effect, one of which is the Prophet’s response to a question directed to him by a 
young man on whether he was allowed to kiss his wife while fasting.  The Prophet gave 
the young man a negative answer.  However, to an old man who asked him the same 
question, the Prophet gave him permission to do so.  To this, the Prophet explained that 
the old man, due to his age, has the ability to better control his lustful desires, and to 
                                                 
167 Al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī, Abū Bakr Ahmad ibn ‘Alī, al-Faqīh wa al-Mutafaqqih, Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, 
Saudi Arabia, Beirut & Cairo, 1426h., vol. 2, p. 407.  See also al-Rāfi‘ī, ‘Abd al-Karīm ibn Muhammad 
ibn ‘Abd al-Karīm, al-‘Azīz Sharh al-Wajīz, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 1997, vol. 12, p. 423; & 
al-Nawawī, Abū Zakariyyā Muhyī al-Dīn ibn Sharaf, al-Majmū‘ Sharh al-Muhadhdhab, Dār al-Fikr, 
Beirut, 2000, vol. 1, pp. 81-82.  
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contain himself from acting further than a mere kiss, which would in turn taint his 
fast.168   
 
In this respect, Al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī, who is one of those scholars who view that it is 
a personal obligation of a muftī to assume the responsibility of issuing fatāwā if there is 
no other qualified person in the community except him, goes even further to suggest 
that in certain situations, a muftī holds the right to refrain from answering any particular 
question that he sees wisdom in not answering.  As an example, al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī 
reported that Mālik ibn Anas once avoided answering a question posed to him by a man, 
who, in turn, questioned him on his motive for not providing the requested answer.  To 
the enquirer Mālik said, “If the issue that you asked me was something that you need in 
your religious life, I would have answered you.”  Another example mentioned by al-
Khat īb al-Baghdādī is his narration of an incident where Sa‘īd ibn Jubayr was asked by 
someone about the payment of zakāt.  Sa‘īd replied by saying that the enquirer should 
perform his zakāt obligation by giving it to the rulers of the time.  When Sa‘īd left the 
place, the enquirer followed him, and subsequently questioned him about his answer, 
for the rulers, according to the enquirer, were known to have mismanaged the zakāts 
that had been paid to them.  Sa‘īd clarified that the correct answer should have been that 
the enquirer was to channel his zakāt according to God’s injunction.  However, Sa‘īd 
                                                 
168 Al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī, Abū Bakr Ahmad ibn ‘Alī, al-Faqīh wa al-Mutafaqqih, Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, 
Saudi Arabia, Beirut & Cairo, 1426h., vol. 2, p. 408. 
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revealed, he could not have answered it that way because the question was posed to him 
in the audience of the leaders of his community.169 
 
These positions, as exhibited by the scholars mentioned, generally imply that the 
interests of the mustaftī are of grave importance in a muftī’s assessment for fatwā 
formulation.  As highlighted in the previous paragraphs, a muftī may decide to 
deliberately issue rigid rulings to certain mustaftīs to act as deterrent, or to issue 
contradictory answers to different mustaftīs, or to avoid answering a question altogether 
in certain situations.  This, nonetheless, can not be construed to mean that the muftī is 
given an infinite freedom to fabricate rulings according to his whims and fancies, either 
to suit the personal interests of his mustaftī, or those of his own.  There has to be a 
structured guideline for a muftī to conform to, in order for his fatāwā to be in 
compliance with the objectives and fundamentals of the sharī‘ah.   
 
This is reflected, among others, by the cautionary remarks made by Ibn al-Salāh and al-
Nawawī, that a muftī has to be constantly aware not to discriminatorily sway towards 
satisfying the personal interests of his mustaftī, or conversely those of the mustaftī’s 
adversary, in any of his fatāwā.  One of the examples of such an attitude is by 
highlighting only the rights that are to be enjoyed by a mustaftī, while his obligations 
and responsibilities are deliberately concealed or ignored in a muftī’s fatwā.  In a 
situation where a muftī is conscious of his mustaftī’s intent to be issued with a fatwā that 
                                                 
169 Al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī, Abū Bakr Ahmad ibn ‘Alī, al-Faqīh wa al-Mutafaqqih, Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, 
Saudi Arabia, Beirut & Cairo, 1426h., vol. 2, pp. 415-420. 
 98
is to the latter’s personal favour, the muftī has to abstain from giving him the fatwā he 
desires.170  
 
A differentiation, therefore, has to be made to distinguish a mas lahah mu‘tabarah, 
which is an interest that is acknowledged by the sharī‘ah, in the advantage of an 
individual or a group of people, based on their genuine needs and necessities; from a 
mas lahah mulghāh, which is an interest that is based solely on illicit human desires, 
thus rejected by the sharī‘ah from being taken as a point of consideration in formulating 
Islamic rulings.  This will be further deliberated in the next Chapter of this research. 
 
In relation to this, integrity of the muftī is another issue that is of similar importance.  
Al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī insists that a muftī is not allowed to receive any form of reward 
from the party whom he provides fatwā to, as in the case of a judge who is also not 
allowed to accept any payment from any of the disputing parties involved in a legal case 
that he presides.171  Ibn al-S alāh highlights the fact that corruption is a crime abhorrent 
in the eyes of the sharī‘ah, and that if this kind of reward made by the mustaftī for the 
benefit of the muftī resembles bribery, the muftī is thus forbidden from accepting it.172 
 
                                                 
170 Ibn al-Salāh , ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Shahrazūrī, Adab al-Muftī wa al-Mustaftī, Maktabah al-
‘Ulūm wa al-Hikam, Medina, 1986, p. 146.  See also al-Nawawī, Abū Zakariyyā Muhyī al-Dīn ibn 
Sharaf, al-Majmū‘ Sharh al-Muhadhdhab, Dār al-Fikr, Beirut, 2000, vol. 1, p. 81 
171 Al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī, Abū Bakr Ahmad ibn ‘Alī, al-Faqīh wa al-Mutafaqqih, Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, 
Saudi Arabia, Beirut & Cairo, 1426h., vol. 2, p. 347. 
172 Ibn al-Salāh , ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Shahrazūrī, Adab al-Muftī wa al-Mustaftī, Maktabah al-
‘Ulūm wa al-Hikam, Medina, 1986, p. 115. 
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To further safeguard the integrity of the muftī and the institution of iftā’, it is therefore 
important to curtail any possibility of a muftī being exposed to manipulation by parties 
with dissipated interests.  It is crucial that a muftī is not left in dire condition without 
sufficient support from the state, or alternatively, his own community.  It therefore 
becomes the responsibility of an imām, or ruler, to allocate from the bait al-māl some 
form of remuneration for a muftī whom he officially appoints to assume the post.  This 
remuneration is intended to relieve the muftī from the need to take up other jobs to 
provide for himself or his family.  In a situation where there is no bait al-māl in 
existence, or where the muftī is not given any allocation from the bait al-māl, the muftī 
is permitted to accept a kind of remuneration from members of his community if they 
agree to collaborate in providing for him, with the agreement that he dedicates his time 
to assume the task of answering their religious questions.173   
 
Ibn al-Salāh174 and al-Nawawī175 offer further detail to this position by al-Khatīb al-
Baghdādī, by asserting that the muftī is only allowed to accept the financial allocation 
from bait al-māl if he has no other source of income that suffices for his needs.  This 
researcher is of the view that such a uncompromising stand by Ibn al-Salāh and al-
Nawawī is a reflection of the degree of seriousness that they lend to the issue of a 
muftī’s integrity.  This is generally consistent with the common cautiousness displayed 
                                                 
173 Al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī, Abū Bakr Ahmad ibn ‘Alī, al-Faqīh wa al-Mutafaqqih, Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, 
Saudi Arabia, Beirut & Cairo, 1426h., vol. 2, p. 347. 
174 Ibn al-Salāh , ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Shahrazūrī, Adab al-Muftī wa al-Mustaftī, Maktabah al-
‘Ulūm wa al-Hikam, Medina, 1986, p. 114. 
175 Al-Nawawī, Abū Zakariyyā Muhyī al-Dīn ibn Sharaf, al-Majmū‘ Sharh al-Muhadhdhab, Dār al-Fikr, 
Beirut, 2000, vol. 1, p. 76. 
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by scholars of the madhhab when it comes to the issue of the sanctity of iftā’ and the 
revered position of a muftī, both of which are of critical importance to be guarded and 
maintained. 
 
In the area of writing the text of the fatwā to be issued to the mustaftī, if a question 
consists of more than one possible aspect that need to be addressed, a muftī has to 
categorize the different issues and answer them all, and not to be selective in his fatwā 
by only providing answer to a particular part of the question, while ignoring the other 
parts.  As an example, al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī narrates an incident where the Prophet 
was asked on the status of a dead rat found in fatty oil.  To it the Prophet responded by 
saying that, if the fatty oil is in a solid state, the required action to be taken is to discard 
only the dead rat together with the immediate solid oil around it, whereas if the fatty oil 
is in liquid form, the oil is then to be disposed off totally.176  Ibn al-Salāh, on the 
contrary, emphasizes that to furnish the mustaftī with a comprehensive answer, that 
encompasses the different aspects of the question with all its possible scenarios, would 
only cause the whole answer to be too complicated for the mustaftī to comprehend, nor 
for him to benefit from.177  Al-Shīrāzī and al-Nawawī suggest that if the mustaftī is 
available, and there is opportunity for the muftī to revert to him for further clarification 
on which particular issue or part of the question is of specific concern to him, the muftī 
is therefore at liberty to either answer only that specific aspect of the question, or to be 
                                                 
176 Al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī, Abū Bakr Ahmad ibn ‘Alī, al-Faqīh wa al-Mutafaqqih, Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, 
Saudi Arabia, Beirut & Cairo, 1426h., vol. 2, p. 399. 
177 Ibn al-Salāh , ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Shahrazūrī, Adab al-Muftī wa al-Mustaftī, Maktabah al-
‘Ulūm wa al-Hikam, Medina, 1986, p. 135. 
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exhaustive in his fatwā, by categorizing all possible aspects of the question, and 
subsequently answering these various aspects thoroughly.  However, if the muftī is 
unable to get clarification from the mustaftī, due to his absence, the former is then 
expected to answer all parts of the question in a comprehensive manner.178 
 
Although if the answer is to be thorough, encompassing the various possible aspects 
that the question may imply, as insisted by al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī, or as preferred by al-
Nawawī, it should be briefly phrased in a fashion that can be easily comprehended by 
the mustaftī.179  Al-Khatīb al-Baghdādi enjoins that a muftī avoid using complicated 
words and convoluted phrases, so as not to cause confusion or misunderstanding to the 
mustaftī.180  
 
The style of handwriting and other aspects of how the text should be written are also 
given attention by the scholars.  A muftī is expected to have his fatwā written in a 
legible manner, and the handwriting should be average in size.  A muftī is also 
                                                 
178 Al-Shīrāzī, Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm ibn ‘Alī, Kitāb al-Luma‘ fī Usūl al-Fiqh, Dār al-Nadwah al-Islāmiyyah, 
Beirut, 1988, p. 71.  See also al-Nawawī, Abū Zakariyyā Muhyī al-Dīn ibn Sharaf, al-Majmū‘ Sharh al-
Muhadhdhab, Dār al-Fikr, Beirut, 2000, vol. 1, p. 78. 
179 Al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī, Abū Bakr Ahmad ibn ‘Alī, al-Faqīh wa al-Mutafaqqih, Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, 
Saudi Arabia, Beirut & Cairo, 1426h., vol. 2, p. 399.  See also Ibn al-Salāh, ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Abd al-Rahmān 
al-Shahrazūrī, Adab al-Muftī wa al-Mustaftī, Maktabah al-‘Ulūm wa al-Hikam, Medina, 1986, p. 141, & 
al-Nawawī, Abū Zakariyyā Muhyī al-Dīn ibn Sharaf, al-Majmū‘ Sharh al-Muhadhdhab, Dār al-Fikr, 
Beirut, 2000, vol. 1, p. 80. 
180 Al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī, Abū Bakr Ahmad ibn ‘Alī, al-Faqīh wa al-Mutafaqqih, Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, 
Saudi Arabia, Beirut & Cairo, 1426h., vol. 2, p. 400.   
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encouraged to use one single pen and the same ink throughout the whole of the fatwā 
text, so as to minimize the possibility of the text being tempered with.181  
   
It is suggested by al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī that there is nothing wrong for a muftī to 
mention in his fatwā the evidences that he employs for his fatwā.182  In this respect, al-
Nawawī183 and al-Zarkashī184 agree with al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī, but with an additional 
condition that the evidence, or argument, is unambiguous and brief.  Al-Saymari, as 
narrated by al-Nawawī, supplements this with another condition, that is a mufti may 
mention the evidence in his fatwā only when it is issued to a faqīh, or a person with 
knowledge is Islamic law, and not when the fatwā is given to a lay person.185  At the 
same time, Al-Nawawī also narrated that al-Māwardī, on the other hand, disagrees that 
the evidence can be mentioned in the muftī’s fatwā, in order to distinguish iftā’ from 
teaching.186  In contrast to al-Māwardī’s general refusal in this regard, however, al-
Nawawī expresses his preference that there should be a detailed differentiation between 
issuing a fatwa to a knowledgeable person, and another to an ignorant one; and between 
an evidence that is brief and explicit, and another that is lengthy or ambiguous.  Al-
                                                 
181 Ibn al-Salāh , ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Shahrazūrī, Adab al-Muftī wa al-Mustaftī, Maktabah al-
‘Ulūm wa al-Hikam, Medina, 1986, p. 139.  See also al-Nawawī, Abū Zakariyyā Muhyī al-Dīn ibn 
Sharaf, al-Majmū‘ Sharh al-Muhadhdhab, Dār al-Fikr, Beirut, 2000, vol. 1, p. 79. 
182 Al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī, Abū Bakr Ahmad ibn ‘Alī, al-Faqīh wa al-Mutafaqqih, Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, 
Saudi Arabia, Beirut & Cairo, 1426h., vol. 2, p. 405. 
183 Al-Nawawī, Abū Zakariyyā Muhyī al-Dīn ibn Sharaf, al-Majmū‘ Sharh al-Muhadhdhab, Dār al-Fikr, 
Beirut, 2000, vol. 1, p. 84. 
184 Al-Zarkashī, Badr al-Dīn Muhāmmad ibn Bahādir ibn ‘Abd Allah, al-Bahr al-Muhīt fī Usūl al-Fiqh, 
Wizārat al-Awqāf wa al-Shu’ūn al-Islāmiyyah, Kuwait, 1992, vol. 6, p. 311. 
185 Al-Nawawī, Abū Zakariyyā Muhyī al-Dīn ibn Sharaf, al-Majmū‘ Sharh al-Muhadhdhab, Dār al-Fikr, 
Beirut, 2000, vol. 1, p. 84. 
186 Ibid., p. 85. 
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Nawawī also differentiates between mentioning an evidence, which he agrees should be 
allowed with these conditions that he mentions, and explaining in detail the method of 
ijtihād applied, which he is not in agreement with.187  In this aspect, these scholars 
clarify that it has never been a practice for a muftī to provide explanation in the fatwā 
that he issues, on the method of ijtihād he utilizes, or the procedures of analogy and 
istidlāl that he employs, to formulate the answer.  This is unless if it is for the 
consumption of a judge, so as to assist him to understand the argument that forms the 
basis for the muftī’s legal opinion, or if there has been an earlier fatwā issued by 
somebody else that the muftī does not agree with, so as to provide explanation on his 
differing view.188    
 
In issuing fatāwā on criminal cases that may lead to corporal punishment being 
exercised by a judge, such as in cases of murder, apostasy, and the like, a muftī is 
cautioned not to be impulsive in passing his own judgment.  Instead, it is expected that 
the muftī provides a cautionary advice on the procedures that are to be taken by a judge 
before the latter returns his verdict, especially on the process of getting clarification and 
verification from the accused on his prior intention, and the subsequent process of 
getting him to repent.  The muftī should provide the judge with a methodical fatwā that 
                                                 
187 Ibid. 
188 Al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī, Abū Bakr Ahmad ibn ‘Alī, al-Faqīh wa al-Mutafaqqih, Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, 
Saudi Arabia, Beirut & Cairo, 1426h., vol. 2, p. 406.  See also al-Rāfi‘ī, ‘Abd al-Karīm ibn Muhammad 
ibn ‘Abd al-Karīm, al-‘Azīz Sharh al-Wajīz, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 1997, vol. 12, p. 426; Ibn 
al-Salāh , ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Shahrazūrī, Adab al-Muftī wa al-Mustaftī, Maktabah al-‘Ulūm 
wa al-Hikam, Medina, 1986, p. 152; & al-Nawawī, Abū Zakariyyā Muhyī al-Dīn ibn Sharaf, al-Majmū‘ 
Sharh al-Muhadhdhab, Dār al-Fikr, Beirut, 2000, vol. 1, p. 85. 
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encompasses the various circumstances possible of a case, and their legal implications.  
As an example, in a case of apostasy, which is considered a crime in Islamic law, a 
muftī is warned not to rush into sentencing that the accused is to be punished, by death, 
or otherwise.  Instead, the muftī should highlight in his fatwā that if the accused is to be 
eventually convicted, either by establishing evidences against him, or by his own 
statement, he is still to be given an opportunity by the authority to repent.  If the convict 
repents, the muftī should advise, his repentance is to be accepted; but if, otherwise, he 
refuses to do as such, he is to be sentenced to such and such a punishment.  The muftī 
must thus furnish in his fatwā a comprehensive list of possible punishments for the 
judge to consider, and from which the judge should not transgress.189     
 
Finally, in preparing a written answer, after all considerations have been duly taken, as 
elaborated in the previous paragraphs, it is recommended that a muftī should reassess 
his draft answer before issuing it to the mustaftī, in order to ascertain that there is no 
essential part missing that may lead to misunderstanding.190  
 
                                                 
189 Al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī, Abū Bakr Ahmad ibn ‘Alī, al-Faqīh wa al-Mutafaqqih, Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, 
Saudi Arabia, Beirut & Cairo, 1426h., vol. 2, p. 403.  See also Ibn al-Salāh, ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Abd al-Rahmān 
al-Shahrazūrī, Adab al-Muftī wa al-Mustaftī, Maktabah al-‘Ulūm wa al-Hikam, Medina, 1986, p. 142; & 
al-Nawawī, Abū Zakariyyā Muhyī al-Dīn ibn Sharaf, al-Majmū‘ Sharh al-Muhadhdhab, Dār al-Fikr, 
Beirut, 2000, vol. 1, pp. 80-81. 
190 Al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī, Abū Bakr Ahmad ibn ‘Alī, al-Faqīh wa al-Mutafaqqih, Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, 
Saudi Arabia, Beirut & Cairo, 1426h., vol. 2, p. 401.  See also Ibn al-Salāh, ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Abd al-Rahmān 
al-Shahrazūrī, Adab al-Muftī wa al-Mustaftī, Maktabah al-‘Ulūm wa al-Hikam, Medina, 1986, p. 139; & 
al-Nawawī, Abū Zakariyyā Muhyī al-Dīn ibn Sharaf, al-Majmū‘ Sharh al-Muhadhdhab, Dār al-Fikr, 
Beirut, 2000, vol. 1, p. 79. 
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An analysis of this part of the research, on the procedural stages and the processes of 
iftā’, highlights the fact that the literature available within the Shafi‘ī madhhab on iftā’ 
generally deals with the etiquettes of a muftī in answering questions.  By perusing the 
propositions made by the scholars of the madhhab in all the three stages of an iftā’ 
process, as presented in the preceding paragraphs, one can easily discover that not much 
discussion was allocated to the legal principles and the methodical framework needed in 
formulating legal rulings, be it by way of deducing the rulings directly from the primary 
texts (istinbāt ), or by way of applying analogy (qiyās) for unprecedented cases of which 
there is no direct mention in the primary texts, or by way of putting preference to one 
legal opinion of a jurist over another (tarjīh).   
 
It is also observed that the available literature of the Shāfi‘ī madhhab on iftā’ basically 
touches on several main themes as follows : 
 
One : the obligatory status of a muftī to issue fatāwā. 
 
Two : the safeguards to preserve the sanctity of the iftā’ institution, as well as the 
integrity of a muftī. 
 
Three : the precautions on the need for a muftī to be prudent, alert, just, and objective, in 
understanding a question and in providing an answer. 
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Four : the proper format to be used in drafting an answer, both in terms of the language 
and the style of handwriting used, so as to ensure that it can be understood by the 
mustaftī with ease and clarity. 
 
Five : the content structure of the answer, that it has to be all-inclusive, but at the same 
time not too complicated, to a point where the mustaftī faces difficulty to comprehend, 
hence the general reservation by the scholars for a muftī to include his legal arguments 
and evidences within his answer to the mustaftī. 
 
Six : the injunction to place the interest of the mustaftī as a major consideration in iftā’, 
and this encompasses multiple measures that range from a muftī giving priority to 
answer questions that need urgent responses, or avoiding to answer certain questions 
altogether if it is for a greater good; to the muftī answering in a fashion that can be 
easily identified by his mustaftī, or assisting him to comprehend the answer he is 
provided with if he has difficulty to comprehend it duly.  In addition, these measures 
also range from offering the mustaftī solutions to the problems he is facing and relieving 
him from any predicament he is in, or exploring legal artifices (hiyal) that are 
recognised by the sharī‘ah; to issuing differing answers to different mustaftūn, or 
providing an alternative ruling that contradicts the muftī’s own initial view, in the best 
interest of the mustaftī.     
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This suggests that the scholars, in their writings on the processes of iftā’, departed from 
al-Shāfi‘ī’s definition of the term iftā’.  In the initial parts of this chapter on the various 
definitions of iftā’ utilized by the scholars of the madhhab, it was displayed that al-
Shāfi‘ī equates iftā’ with ijtihād, and, in a separate location, he equates ijtihād with 
qiyās.  Instead, in this area of discussion, these scholars seem to refer the term iftā’ to its 
lexical meaning, that is answering a question.  This observation by this researcher is 
derived at due to a number of factors : 
 
One : the term ijtihād was mentioned as an exercise that a muftī has to apply in 
formulating a legal ruling in the processes of iftā’, not as a second term to iftā’ itself, 
that shares with it an identical definition. 
 
Two : the absence of significant mention of qiyās as a major legal tool to be utilized in 
these processes of iftā’. 
 
Three : the main bulk of the discussion deals with the way a muftī should conduct 
himself in dealing with questions and in his interaction with his mustaftī, not in a 
mujtahid’s interaction with the primary sources or texts, nor with any other legal tool or 
principles of law, all of which form the subject matter of ijtihād and qiyās.    
 
Four : a substantial portion of the discussion is found to have been allocated to address 
the issue of a mustaftī’s interest, which indicates a resemblance with the utilization of 
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istislāh as the legal tool in formulating a fatwā.  In certain parts of the discussion, a 
tendency to employ istihsān is also evident, when the scholars express their preference 
that a muftī issues a fatwā that is not in concordance with his own initial view, if it is in 
the best interest of the mustaftī.  This is albeit the fact that al-Shāfi‘ī, as the founder of 
the madhhab, is known to be extremely wary in utilizing istislāh and istihsān in the 
process of ijtihād. 
 
It can be said that generally the scholars in their writings on iftā’ and muftūn tend to 
ignore the process of applying the deduced ruling to the mustaftī, by taking into 
consideration the mustaftūn conditions, needs, restrictions or predicaments.  The 
principle of istislāh or mas ālih mursalah should be of significance here.  In the second 
stage of processing a ruling, the scholars generally show a very high degree of 
dependency on the processes of ijtihād, in its form of deducing rulings directly from the 
textual sources, or by way of analogy.   
 
This is further supported by their assertion on the list of prerequisites that a muftī must 
possess to qualify him as a mujtahid, which reflects the skills required to deduce rulings 
from the texts.  As when in later periods of the madhhab, when mujtahidūn were no 
longer assumed to be in existence, the scholars moved towards a position where muftūn 
are only expected to issue fatāwā based on taqlīd, by reporting the views of their imāms 
or established positions of their madhāhib,  but with the condition that they fully 
comprehend their arguments and evidences, and the principles that these legal positions 
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are based on.  In a situation where there are more than one opinion available, the muftī 
is then expected to exercise tarjīh and consequently issue a fatwā according to the 
strongest evidence. 
 
It is this researcher’s view that this second stage is, in its actuality, what most part of the 
whole content of Us ūl al-fiqh itself is all about.  Still, it does not extensively address the 
need of finding answers that solve the problems of the questioners in particular. 
 
As in the third stage, it is also discovered that most of the discussion was on the 
technical forms of how to write the answer, what language to be used.  Only minor parts 
are available in mentioning about adjusting a muftī’s position to suit the conditions of a 
mustaftī.  This constitutes an inconsistency, when in listing down the prerequisites, 
majority of the scholars insist that a mujtahid, or a muftī, must have the ability to 
understand the environment and the community.  In addition to this, in the first stage, 
many of these scholars state that in receiving a question, the muftī must get further 
clarification not only on the intended question, but also the condition of the mustaftī.  
Another irony is many of these scholars highlighted the point that a muftī can issue a 
fatwā to a particular not according to his preferred view, if there is maslahah in doing 
so. 
 
This researcher is of the view that, in order to render justice to this discussion on the 
significance of general interests, or al-mas ālih al-mursalah, in a muftī’s consideration 
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when formulating fatwās, a dedicated chapter on it should be developed.  An analysis 
on the theory of al-mas ālih al-mursalah within the framework of iftā’ among the 
scholars of the Shāfi‘ī madhhab will therefore be conducted in the next Chapter. 
 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
1 There has been a wide variation of notions among the jurists of the 
Shāfi‘ī school of law on the legal theories of iftā’ and fatwā.  These 
differences exist in their definition of the term iftā’ and fatwā itself, the 
prerequisites for a person to be allowed to issue fatāwā, and the 
foundations of iftā’ in every of its processes and procedural stages.  This 
Chapter has shown that these differences occurred due to the intellectual 
evolution that took place in the long history of the madhhab, largely 
influenced by the decreasing number of qualified mujtahidūn over time, 
until it reached a point where mujtahidūn were widely perceived to be no 
longer in existence.  Adjustments to existing legal opinions inevitably 
had to be made from time to time to ensure continuation in 
accommodating the religious needs of Muslim communities for guidance 
in their religious life and practices, while at the same time preserving the 
sanctity of the religion and its laws. 
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2 The practice of iftā’ can, should and has always been an effective 
channel in contributing towards the ever-important development and 
expansion of the Islamic positive law, or fiqh.  It has to be pointed out, 
however, that iftā’ is not just fiqh, and that fiqh alone cannot be taken as 
the sole point of reference in formulating fatāwā.  This is due to the fact 
that iftā is a process of identifying a legal ruling that best suits the 
specific needs and situation of a certain mustaftī.  This process is 
generally termed as tanzīl al-hukm.  Fiqh, on the other hand, is generally 
a set of legal opinions by jurists that were developed and deduced from 
the texts, directly on indirectly, without rendering any consideration to 
any specific context or person. 
  
3 Major parts of the writings on iftā’ and fatwā within the madhhab were 
allocated to the discussion on the etiquettes of a muftī and mustaftī.  
While these deliberations are useful, a much more critical aspect of legal 
discourse with regards to iftā’ and fatwā was largely not given due 
attention by jurists of the Shāfi‘ī madhhab.  This refers to the dearth of 
deliberation on the legal framework for iftā’.  As for the vast writings 
widely available in the field of usul al-fiqh, they are basically intended to 
provide guidelines in the process of deducing legal rulings from the 
primary texts.  Therefore the framework and guidelines that exist in the 
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books of usūl al-fiqh are general in nature and is insufficient for iftā’ 
purposes.         
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CHAPTER THREE 
MASLAHAH  AS A LEGAL TOOL IN IFTĀ’ 
 
 
 
Throughout the history of Islamic legal thought, mas lahah has been consistently 
described as one of the central attributes of the sharī‘ah, as popularly claimed that 
“good” is “lawful” and that, in turn, “lawful” must be good.191  It is the intent of the 
sharī‘ah to promote the welfare of men both individually and socially and not the 
glorification of the Lawgiver, for He is above all wants and weaknesses.  Islam dictates 
that the welfare of  men as individuals which its law seeks to promote is not in respect 
merely of life on this earth, but also in the future life of the hereafter, hence the 
realization of man’s salvation in life after death becomes another factor underlying the 
Islamic conception of law.192 
 
However, Muslim jurists were not homogeneous in accepting the concept of mas lahah 
as a principle of jurisprudence.  Even among those who accepted it as one, no uniform 
position was arrived at in term of its definition, criteria and specification.  
 
In the context of contemporary Muslim communities, the emergence of Muslim 
minorities in numerous numbers of sovereign countries, with new and unprecedented 
contexts and environments, has created a necessity for a review of the application of 
                                                 
191 Al-Raysūnī, Ahmad, al-Ijtihād: al-Nass, al-Wāqi‘, al-Maslahah, Dār al-Fikr, Damascus, 2002, p. 30. 
192 Mawil Izzi Dien, Islamic Law From Historical Foundations to Contemporary Practice, Edinburgh 
University Press, Edinburgh, 2004, p.56. 
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this important principle in the processes and approaches of iftā’.  This is in view of the 
prevailing needs to realize maslahah, or general good, of which is the purpose of the 
sharī‘ah itself, especially for the Muslim minorities, individually and collectively. 
 
It was mentioned in Chapter One that this research intends to investigate the legal 
theories of iftā’ with special reference made to the Shāfi‘ī school of law.  As such, it is 
only appropriate that the following discussion in this chapter on the technical 
consideration and usage of mas lahah as a legal tool within the processes of iftā’ is 
restricted to the opinions offered by those jurists of the said school of law.  In doing so, 
this chapter will analyze, first, the definitions of the term ‘mas lahah’ employed by these 
jurists, followed by an effort to examine their propositions of its legal status and 
significance in the general framework of Islamic law.  This will incorporate an 
examination of its different categories and the preconditions of its utilization.  
Subsequently, a discussion on the application of mas lahah as a legal tool specifically in 
developing fatāwā according to the Shāfi‘ī school of law will be attempted, before this 
chapter is concluded. 
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3.1 Definition of maslahah 
 
The root word of mas lahah is s a-la-ha or s a-lu-ha, one literal definition of which is “to 
be good, to repair or improve”.193  It can also mean a thing or person which/who 
becomes “good, incorrupt, right, just, righteous, virtuous or honest”.194   
 
Izzi Dien is of the view that the Arabic word mas lahah, which derives from the root 
word of s-l-h , indicates construction, restoration of good and the removal of harm or 
corruption.195  Kamali mentions that literally, mas lahah means ‘benefit’ or ‘interest’.196 
 
Nyazee proposes that the literal meaning of mas lahah is defined as jalb al-manfa‘ah wa 
daf‘ al-madarrah, or the seeking of benefit and the repelling of harm.  However, he 
further insists that manfa‘ah (benefit or utility) is not the technical meaning of 
mas lahah, for what the jurists actually mean by mas lahah is the seeking of benefit and 
the repelling of harm as directed by the Lawgiver.197 
 
Al-Ghazzālī defines mas lahah as an act to attain a benefit or prevent a harm.  He, 
however, highlights that the mas lahah intended in his deliberation is not what realizes 
human desires, but rather that harmonizes with the objectives, or maqās id, of the 
                                                 
193 Wehr, Hans, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, Librairie Du Liban, Beirut, 1980, pp. 521-522. 
194 Lane, Edward Wlliam, Arabic-English Lexicon, Islamic Book Centre, Lahore, 1982, vol. 4, pp. 1714-
1715.  Originally published in 1877 by Williams and Norgate, London. 
195 Mawil Izzi Dien, Islamic Law From Historical Foundations to Contemporary Practice, Edinburgh, 
2004, p. 69. 
196 Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, Cambridge, 2003, p. 351 
197 Nyazee, Imran Ahsan Khan, Islamic Jurisprudence, The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 
Islamabad, 2000, pp. 195-196. 
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sharī‘ah.  According to al-Ghazzālī, these objectives constitute the preservation of five 
essentials of human existence: religion, life, intellect, progeny and property.  
Consequently, every act that ensures the preservation of these five essentials is a 
mas lahah, and similarly, any act that causes their eradication is a mafsadah, or a harm, 
thus avoiding it is a mas lahah.198 
 
Al-Badawī suggests that al-Ghazzālī, with this definition, applied the terms mas lahah 
and maqās id interchangeably to indicate a common object.199  This is in concordance 
with Izzi Dien’s position that does not distinguish between a cause and its effect in 
defining mas lahah, as long as it contributes to the betterment of life and faith in 
Islam.200  However, upon closer scrutiny, al-Ghazzālī appears to utilize mas lahah to 
connote any measure taken as a means to realize the preservation of maqās id, which are 
the objectives, of sharī‘ah.  In other words, maslahah is the cause and maqās id are the 
effects.  Al-Alwani, however, suggests otherwise, when his definition of mas lahah 
implies that the principal objective of the sharī‘ah and all its commandments is to 
realize maslahah, hence placing it above maqās id as the ultimate goal of the 
sharī‘ah.201 
  
                                                 
198 Al-Ghazzālī, Abū Hāmid Muhammad ibn Muhammad, al-Mustasfā min ‘Ilm al-Usūl, Mu’assasah al-
Risālah, Beirut, 1997, vol.1, pp. 416-417. 
199 Al-Badawī, Yūsuf Ahmad Muhammad, Maqāsid al-Sharī‘ah ‘inda Ibn Taymiyyah, Dār al-Nafā’is, 
Amman, 2000, p. 60. 
200 Mawil Izzi Dien, Islamic Law From Historical Foundations to Contemporary Practice, p. 69. 
201 Al-Alwani, Taha Jabir, Source Methodology in Islamic Jurisprudence, 3rd ed., The International 
Institute of Islamic Thought, Virginia & London, 2003, p. 75. 
 117
Al-Ghazzālī’s definition of mas lahah highlights three significant points, the first of 
which is that the pursuit of human goals and the principle of utility based on human 
reason is not what is meant by maslahah.  Secondly, mas lahah is the securing of goals 
or values that the Lawgiver has determined for the sharī‘ah.  Finally, the goals 
determined for the sharī‘ah by the Lawgiver may or may not coincide with values 
determined by human reason.202   
 
It is a point of significance to differentiate mas lahah, as a means, from maqās id, as 
objectives, for it is based on this conception that mas lahah has also been designed by 
many jurists as a legal tool to derive rulings, as will be discussed in later parts of this 
research, albeit the fact that jurists applied different terms to indicate it as such. 
 
The term ‘mas lahah’ has therefore been generally utilized in the realm of Islamic law to 
indicate two different facets, of which one is more general than the other.  First, as a 
general term, mas lahah is considered as the prime factor that underlies the spirit and 
intention of the sharī‘ah as a divine body of law.  It is a universally accepted notion 
among jurists across all legal schools that the sharī‘ah was revealed with the intention 
of preserving general good and interest of human life.  Based on this first understanding 
of the meaning of mas lahah, the term is commonly used interchangeably by some 
jurists with the term maqās id, or maqās id al-sharī‘ah. 
 
                                                 
202 Nyazee, Imran Ahsan Khan, Islamic Jurisprudence, The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 
Islamabad, 2000, pp. 196-197. 
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Secondly, in most cases of Islamic law, mas lahah is referred to technically as a tool 
used in the process of establishing rulings on cases that were not mentioned in the two 
primary sources, namely the Qur’an and sunnah.  It is considered as one of the 
subsidiary or secondary sources of law, termed by the jurists of Mālikī school of law as 
mas ālih mursalah, and by the jurists of the Hanbalī school of law as istislāh.    
 
However, this utilization of mas ālih mursalah and istislāh as a legal tool to derive 
rulings and as a secondary source of Islamic law does not enjoy the similar level of 
unanimous agreement by jurists, as compared to their position towards it as the 
underlying purpose of shari’ah.  The jurists of the Shāfi‘ī school of law are widely 
assumed to have generally rejected it.  Doi, for example, mentions that the Shāfi‘ī 
school of law is the only school that does not recognise it as a source of Islamic law, 
citing al-Shāfi‘ī’s caution that it can open the door to the unrestricted use of fallible 
human opinions, since the public interest differs from place to place and time to time.203    
 
A closer scrutiny into the discussion on mas lahah among the jurists of the Shāfi‘ī 
school of law, nonetheless, discloses that in their application of qiyās and other legal 
tools of the Islamic law, these jurists do adopt an approach that renders significance to 
the application of mas lahah.  The consideration given to mas lahah by jurists of the 
Shāfi‘ī school of law even bears similarities to mas ālih mursalah widely utilised by the 
                                                 
203 Doi, Abdur Rahman I., Sharī‘ah, the Islamic Law, Ta Ha Publishers, London, 1984, p. 82. 
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Mālikī school of law, istihsān as utilised by the Hanafī school of law, and istislāh of the 
Hanbalī school of law, all of which are commonly said to be strictly rejected by the 
scholars of the Shāfi‘ī school of law. 
 
To further shed light on this, the following section of this research shall delve into the 
various legal tools or principles used by the Shāfi‘ī school of law that have correlation 
with mas lahah. 
 
3.2 Categories of maslahah 
Many of the jurists classify mas lahah into three general categories, the first of which is 
mas lahah mu‘tabarah, or an interest that is recognised by a primary textual evidence.  
The second category is maslahah mulghāh, or an interest that is rejected due to its 
contradiction with an existing textual evidence.  The third category is maslahah 
mursalah, or an interest that is not mentioned nor discussed by any of the textual 
sources.204  This includes any public interest that falls within the objectives of Islamic 
law without being found in a known designated legal source reference, be it in the text 
or otherwise. 
 
When it is qualified as mas lahah mursalah, however, it refers to unrestricted public 
interest in the sense of its not having been regulated by the Lawgiver insofar as no 
                                                 
204 Abū Zahrah, Muhammad, Us ūl al-Fiqh, Dār al-Fikr al-‘Arabī, Cairo, n.d., pp. 279-280.  
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textual authority can be found on its validity and or otherwise.205  More technically, 
mas lahah mursalah is defined as a consideration that is proper and harmonious (was f 
munāsib mulā’im) with the objectives of the Lawgiver; it secures a benefit or prevents a 
harm; and the sharī‘ah provides no indication as to its validity or otherwise.’206 
 
Therefore, the issue yet to be addressed is which category of mas lahah is the point of 
contention among jurists, especially those of the Shāfi‘ī school of law?  Is it al-
mas lahah al-mursalah?  Or is it the whole concept of mas lahah as a principle that is 
objected by the likes of al-Shāfi‘ī?   The discussion on maslahah can thus be done at 
two different levels.  The first is the process level of formulating a legal ruling, or hukm, 
where mas lahah therefore forms a part of the secondary tools utilized in the field of 
us ūl al-fiqh to derive rulings.  The second is the foundational level, where mas lahah is 
taken as the basis of the whole body of sharī‘ah.  In other words, it has to do with 
discussions in maqās id al-sharī‘ah.   
 
Al-Juwaynī discusses the issue of al-maslahah al-mursalah at length in a dedicated 
chapter of his book, al-Burhān fī Us ūl al-Fiqh.  However, his propositions will not be 
analyzed here, as he assigned a different term to indicate al-maslahah al-mursalah, 
which is istidlāl.  Besides the assigning of a different term, this researcher is also of the 
view that it is only proper not to discuss al-Juwaynī’s istidlāl in this section due to the 
                                                 
205 Khallāf, ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, ‘Ilm Usūl al-Fiqh, 12th ed., Dār al-Qalam, Kuwait, 1978, p. 84.  See also 
Badrān, Abū al-‘Aynayn, Usūl al-Fiqh al-Islāmī, Mu’assasah Shabāb al-Jāmi‘ah, Alexandria, 1984, p. 
209. 
206 Ibid., p. 210.  
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fact that al-Juwaynī is the only jurist of the Shāfi‘ī madhhab to use the term istidlāl in 
such a fashion.  We shall therefore revert to al-Juwaynī’s istidlāl in a later part of this 
research, when the relation between al-maslahah and other legal tools is analyzed. 
 
Al-Zarkashī, in his discussion on mas alih mursalah, reports that there are generally four 
different views on mas ālih.207  However, a fundamental point to note is that this 
discussion is primarily addressing the process of formulating rulings at the stage of 
istinbāt, or deducing rulings from the primary sources, hence the various conditions as 
asserted by the jurists.  However, there is a need to investigate whether it is the same 
issue when it comes to iftā’.  The propositions made by scholars in their writings on 
adab al-muftī provide an indication that there can be different consideration.  Due to 
this, there is no need to delve further into this particular area of discussion, except in 
discussing the utilization of istislāh in iftā’.  For example, al-Ghazzālī insists that there 
must be three conditions fulfilled before a maslahah can be accepted, the first of which 
is that the case should lie in the area of darūrāt (necessities), that is, it should be one of 
the five top purposes of the Islamic law.  The second condition is that it should be 
definitive (qat ‘ī), that is, we should be certain about the resulting consequences.  The 
third condition is that it should be general (kullī), that is, it should affect the entire 
Muslim ummah and be a public interest.208 
 
                                                 
207 Al-Zarkashī, Badr al-Dīn Muhammad ibn Bahādir, al-Bahr al-Muhīt fī Usūl al-Fiqh, Wizārat al-
Awqāf wa al-shu’ūn al-Islāmiyyah, Kuwait, 1992, vol. 6, pp. 76-79.   
208 Nyazee, Imran Ahsan Khan, Islamic Jurisprudence, International Institute of Islamic Thought, 
Islamabad, 2000, p. 246. 
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To a certain degree, the scholars’ discussion in adab al-muftī in narrations like the case 
of repentance of a murderer, and the case of someone kissing his wife when he is 
fasting, indicates that this condition of kulliyyah in iftā’ can be transgressed in situations 
where such an application is called for.  Ibn Daqīq al-‘Īd is reported to have said that he 
does not reject the consideration of mas ālih, for what he rejects is actually its liberal 
utilization (istirsāl).209  Al-Zarkashi expresses his agreement to accept masālih if it does 
not contradict qiyās.210 
 
Al-Juwaynī211 relates al-Shāfi‘ī’s proposition on the processes that a jurist is expected to 
consume in his effort to formulate a religious ruling for a new legally unprecedented 
case, the first of which is by investigating the Qur’ānic texts, followed by, in the 
instance of its unavailability in the Qur’ān, the mutawātir narrations, and then, again by 
virtue of their non-existence, the āhād narrations.  In dealing with any of the said texts, 
if they are to be found, its definite injunction is to be identified and adopted.  In a 
situation where a definite injunction can not be established, the apparent connotation of 
the texts is to be resorted to.  This is done, however, by, first, searching for a mukhass is  
that provides a clearer understanding to the intended implication of the generalities of 
the texts. 
                                                 
209 Al-Zarkashī, Badr al-Dīn Muhammad ibn Bahādir, al-Bahr al-Muhīt fī Usūl al-Fiqh, Wizārat al-
Awqāf wa al-Shu’ūn al-Islāmiyyah, Kuwait, 1992, p. 80. 
210 Ibid., p. 81. 
211 Al-Juwaynī, Imām al-H aramayn ‘Abd al-Malik ibn ‘Abd Allāh, al-Burhān fī Usūl al-Fiqh, Matābi‘ al-
Dawhah al-Hadīthah, Doha, vol. 2, pp. 1337-1339.  This proposition by al-Shafi’i was also reported by 
al-Shawkānā, Muhammad ibn ‘Alī, in his Irshād al-Fuhūl ilā Tahqīq al-Haqq min ‘Ilm al-Usūl, ed. 
Muhammad Hasan Muhammad Hasan Ismā‘īl, Dār al-Kutub al-’Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 1999, vol. 2, pp. 310-
311. 
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 When after all effort to investigate the texts has been exhausted without a satisfying 
conclusion, rather than instantaneously resorting to apply analogy (qiyās), a jurist is 
expected to give due consideration to the universals of the sharī‘ah and the general 
good it is set to realize.  Only in a situation where a common good is nowhere to be 
identified for the case at hand, ijmā‘ is then assumed.  Qiyās, or analogy, is 
consequently applied when there is no unanimous position taken by jurists by way of 
ijmā‘.   
 
3.3 Mas lahah and other legal tools in the Shāfi‘ī school of law 
3.3.1 Qiyās 
Al-Juwaynī mentions in the section on qiyās in his al-Burhān fī Usūl al-Fiqh that the 
fundamentals of sharī‘ah, or usūl al-sharī‘ah, are five.  The first is amr darūrī lā budda 
minh, or an essential need without which a man’s life shall cease to continue.  The 
second is hājah ‘āmmah lā yantahī ilā hadd al-darūrah, or a general necessity without 
which a man shall face grave difficulty, albeit not causing his life to cease.  The third is 
not darūrah and not hājah, but an act of makrumah, or virtue.  The forth is an act that in 
itself is not a makrumah, but its realization leads to another act that is considered as a 
virtue.  The fifth is an act that has no bearing of any meaning of darūrah, hājah, or 
makrumah, and this, according to al-Juwaynī, is rare, and it generally encompasses the 
physical acts of rituals.  Al-Juwaynī discusses these five fundamentals of the sharī‘ah at 
length and the different aspects of their correlation with the application of qiyās in cases 
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where the establishment of ‘illah is unattainable due to the absence of relevant primary 
evidences.212 
 
It is therefore observed that al-Juwaynī explicitly and repetitively uses terms like 
mas lahah, its plural form mas ālih, and also istis lāh, to indicate an act of which the 
purpose is to realise mas lahah.  With this, al-Juwaynī establishes his proposition that 
mas lahah is indeed a valid consideration in deriving rulings, by way of qiyās.  This is 
based on the fact that the necessities and needs to realise maslahah determines the legal 
ruling in cases where no primary textual evidence of direct relevance exists in order to 
identify the ‘illah.  The only situation where mas lahah is not accepted as a valid point 
of consideration is in rituals, where the rational of many injunctions can not be 
comprehended by human mind. 
 
Al-Bayd āwī, al-Isnawī and al-Badkhashī incorporate the consideration of mas lahah 
under the discussion of qiyās, which is unanimously accepted by scholars of the Shāfi‘ī 
madhhab as a legal tool utilized to formulate rulings for cases where there is no 
preliminary mention of their rulings in the existing primary texts.  The application of 
qiyās is done by extending a sharī‘ah value from an original case, or asl, to a new case, 
because the latter has the same effective cause, or ‘illah, as the former.213  
 
                                                 
212 Al-Juwaynī, ‘Abd al-Malik ibn ‘Abdillāh ibn Yūsuf, al-Burhān fī Usūl al-Fiqh, ed. ‘Abd al-‘Azīm 
Mahmūd al-Dīb, Dār al-Wafā’, Mansoura, 1992, vol. 2, pp. 602-620. 
213 Kamali, Mohammad Hashim, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, The Islamic Texts Society, 
Cambridge, 2003, p. 264.  
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Al-Bayd āwī lists down nine different methods of identifying ‘illah,214 or the common 
effective cause that eventually determines the ruling for an unprecedented issue.  One of 
these methods is relevant to our discussion herein, and it is what al-Baydāwī terms as 
munāsabah, which literally means correspondence or correlation.  Al-Isnawī215 and al-
Badkhashī,216 in their commentaries on al-Baydāwī’s Minhāj al-Wusūl fī ‘Ilm al-Usūl, 
indicate that this process of munāsabah takes place when an act by an individual 
corresponds with the general injunction of the sharī‘ah to realize things that are 
beneficial, and avoid those which effect harm.   
 
This method of identifying the ‘illah by munāsabah is positioned fourth, after the first 
identification process by way of explicit and definitive indication of the ‘illah in the 
texts (al-nass  al-qāti‘), followed second by way of implied insinuation of the texts (al-
īmā’), and subsequently the third method, which is by way of the consensus of the 
scholars (ijmā‘).   The ‘illah identified by this method of munāsabah is not derived from 
the insinuation of any individual text, explicitly or otherwise, but through identifying a 
general purpose of the sharī‘ah, which is arrived at from the collective implication of 
all relevant sources of evidence.  This general purpose of the sharī‘ah, of realizing good 
and avoiding harm, thus becomes the ‘illah, or the common effective cause, that 
correlates an unprecedented act or event, to either one that has earlier been given 
                                                 
214 Al-Isnawī, Jamāl al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Rahīm, Nihāyat al-Sūl Sharh Minhāj al-Wusūl fī ‘Ilm al-Usūl, 
Maktabah Muhammad ‘Alī Subaih, Cairo, vol. 3, pp. 39-73. 
215 Ibid., vol. 3, pg. 52. 
216 Al-Badkhashī, Muhammad ibn al-Hasan, Manahij al-‘Uqūl Sharh Minhāj al-Wusūl fī ‘Ilm al-Usūl, 
Maktabah Muhammad ‘Alī Subaih, Cairo, n.d., vol. 3, p. 52.  
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acquiescence by the sharī‘ah due to a benefit it causes to happen, or an other that was 
deemed illicit due to the harm that it brings about.    
 
To render acceptance to an ‘illah that is identified by way of munāsabah, al-Baidāwī 
insists that it must be recognised by the Lawgiver.217  An ‘illah identified through 
munāsabah that is not recognised by the Lawgiver is termed by al-Baidāwī as munāsib 
mursal, which he proposes that its acceptability, in the absence of any cogent evidence 
suggesting otherwise, is not definite.  In his further illustration to this position by al-
Baidāwī, al-Isnawī categorises such an ‘illah into three types, the first of which is 
rejected by the Lawgiver, thus its unsuitability for consideration in Islamic law is not to 
be doubted.  The second is that recognised by the Lawgiver, the consideration of which 
is therefore undisputable.  The third category is termed as munāsib mursal, which 
according to al-Isnawī is a value that the Lawgiver is silent about, for there is no 
implied indication that it is recognised nor rejected.218   
 
In his discussion on qiyās al-Zarkashī lists munāsabah as the fifth path in identifying 
‘illah.  Al-Zarkashī highlights that munāsabah is also termed as ikhālah, maslahah, 
istidlāl and ri‘āyah al-maqās id.  He defines munāsabah as identifying an ‘illah by way 
of recognizing a benefit attained or a harm prevented from a particular act.219  Al-
                                                 
217 Al-Isnawī, Jamāl al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Rahīm, Nihāyat al-Sūl Sharh Minhāj al-Wusūl fī ‘Ilm al-Usūl, 
Maktabah Muhammad ‘Alī Subaih, Cairo, vol. 3, p. 54. 
218 Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 56-58. 
219 Al-Zarkashī, Badr al-Dīn Muhammad ibn Bahādir ibn ‘Abdillāh, al-Bahr al-Muhīt fī Us ūl al-Fiqh, 
Wizārah al-Awqāf wa al-Shu’ūn al-Islamiyyah, Kuwait, 1992, vol.5, p. 206. 
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Zarkashī categorizes the general good that is recognized in the process of munāsabah 
into darūrah (an essential need without which a man’s life shall not continue), hājah (a 
necessity without which a man shall face grave difficulty, albeit not causing his life to 
cease) and tahsīn (a nicety).  Al-Zarkashī reports that jurists of the Shāfi‘ī school of law 
have generally accepted that under the ambit of the essentials, or darūrah, there are five 
aspects of a human’s life that are enjoined by the Lawgiver to be preserved: his life, his 
property, his progeny, his faith, and his intellect.  The preservation of these five 
constitutes the maqās id, or the general purposes of the sharī‘ah.  Al-Zarkashī further 
reports that there are some jurists who added the preservation of honour, or a‘rād, as the 
sixth aspect in addition to those five.  Al-Zarkashī stresses that observing the sequence 
of the three categories of the general good, which are the darurah, hajah and tahsin, is 
of huge importance, for in the event of contradicting benefits, predilection is to be given 
to the essentials over the niceties.220 
 
Al-Zarkashī also makes another categorization of mas lahah, not unlike the one 
proposed by both al-Isnawī and al-Badkhashī in their elucidation of al-Baydāwī’s views 
mentioned earlier, where benefits, or mas lahah, are classified into three types:  the first 
of which are those benefits that the sharī‘ah is known to render recognition and 
acceptance.  The second type are those rejected by the sharī‘ah, while the third are 
benefits that are not mentioned in any of the textual evidences, thus the sharī‘ah is not 
known as to whether recognises or rejects them.  Al-Zarkashī further highlights that the 
                                                 
220 Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 208-213. 
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benefits which fall under this third category are the ones termed by jurists of the Mālikī 
school of law as mas ālih mursalah, a legal tool that is widely known to be significantly 
advocated and utilised by the Mālikī school of law.  Al-Zarkashī however insists that 
the application of masālih mursalah should not be considered as unique to the Mālikī 
madhhab, for jurists of other schools of law tend to term it as munāsabah, which in its 
actuality is identical to mas ālih mursalah.221   
 
3.3.2 Istihsān 
One of the most controversial secondary legal tools in the Shāfi‘ī school of law in term 
of its validity is istihsān.  Jurists of the madhhab, led by its founder himself, are widely 
known to have extreme reservation in accepting istihsān as a tool to deduce rulings.222   
However, al-Shāfi‘ī’s rejection of istihsān should not be taken for granted without 
qualification of its specifics.  The legal tools of istihsān and mas lahah share certain 
common traits between the two, in the sense that general good, or al-mas ālih, occupies 
a central role in both tools.  An investigation into al-Shāfi‘ī’s legal thoughts reveals that 
his rejection of istihsān is not in itself absolute.  Rather, al-Shāfi‘ī’s rejection 
materializes when istihsān is not applied in conjunction with the application of qiyās.  
This is reflected by al-Shāfi‘ī’s own statement that istihsān without qiyās is not allowed 
(al-istihsān bi ghair qiyās lā yajūz).223  This implies that al-Shāfi‘ī is of the view that, in 
                                                 
221 Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 214-216. 
222 See, among others, ‘Abd al-Wahhāb Ibrāhīm Sulaimān,  Manhajiyyat al-Imām Muhammad ibn Idrīs 
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223 Al-Shāfi‘ī, Muhammad ibn Idris, Kitāb al-Umm, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 1993, p. 156. 
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the process of formulating legal rulings to novel issues, prominence is to be given to 
qiyās, before mas lahah is consequently utilized when qiyās is not applicable.   
 
 
3.3.3 Istidlāl 
 
Al-Juwaynī extensively discusses the notion of applying general good as a legal tool to 
formulate rulings, in a chapter of his al-Burhān.  He terms it as istidlāl, and an 
investigation of his writing on istidlāl suggests that there is a close association between 
istidlāl and the notion of adopting istislāh and mas ālih mursalah for cases that have no 
primary evidence, or asl, to be based on, and no ‘illah by way of qiyās can be developed 
to suit.  Al-Juwaynī defines istidlāl as an implied meaning of a ruling that is consistent 
with logical reasoning, in the absence of a primary evidence, but which a general 
inference of an ‘illah corresponds with.224   
 
This definition of istidlāl by al-Juwaynī insinuates that he positions istidlāl in parallel 
with qiyās in term of employing a ruling to a legal matter by way of identifying an 
applicable meaning appropriate for the ruling, or ma‘nā munāsib li al-hukm.  The 
difference, however, lies with the existence, or non existence, of a specific primary 
evidence for the ruling to be based on.  If there is one, the application is categorized as 
qiyās, and the applicable meaning is termed as ‘illah.  However, the application is 
                                                 
224 Al-Juwaynī, ‘Abd al-Malik ibn ‘Abdillāh ibn Yūsuf, al-Burhān fī Usūl al-Fiqh, ed. ‘Abd al-‘Azīm 
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termed istidlāl if there exists no primary evidence of specific relevance to the issue.  In 
such a situation, the effective meaning applicable in identifying a ruling is then derived 
from the need to realize general good and interest for humans.   
 
By this definition of istidlāl by al-Juwanī, it is also observed that it bears a certain 
degree of similarity with the definition of al-mas lahah al-mursalah which was earlier 
discussed under the classification of mas lahah.  In that earlier discussion, it was 
mentioned that there are generally three categories of mas lahah, the first of which is 
accepted as valid in the sharī‘ah due to the concordance between the mas lahah and a 
textual evidence.  This is termed as mas lahah mu‘tabarah.  The second category is 
known as mas lahah mulghāh, one that is rejected by the sharī‘ah because of a 
contradiction between the mas lahah and a textual evidence.  The third category is 
mas lahah mursalah, which is the subject of comparison here with istidlāl.   
 
Al-Juwaynī narrates that al-Shāfi‘ī and most of the Hanafites accept istidlāl, but not as 
excessive as Mālik, who al-Juwaynī reports as accepting even interests that are remote 
from the inferences of the primary evidences.225  In contrast to Mālik‘s liberal practice 
in applying the principles of general good in formulating his legal opinions, al-Shāfi‘ī, 
as reported by al-Juwaynī, only allows the application of istidlāl if a meaning that is to 
be taken as the foundation for a particular ruling, has resemblance with, and is not 
                                                 
225   Ibid., vol. 2, p. 721. 
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remote from, the established meanings of the primary textual evidences.226  Al-Shāfi‘ī 
further stresses his point that if the formulation of legal rulings is to be restricted in its 
foundation to only those availably mentioned in the primary texts, the spheres of ijtihād 
could not have expanded, for the existing primary texts and their implied meanings 
merely “occupy a small portion of a vast ocean”.  This is evident, al-Shāfi‘ī further 
reiterates, when the practice of the Prophet’s companions in formulating their legal 
opinions, is examined.  There is no report to suggest that the companions developed a 
set of legal principles beforehand, based on the primary textual evidences and the 
implied meanings of these evidences, for them to subsequently build their legal 
opinions by restrictively applying these principles to novel and unprecedented issues.227  
 
This examination of al-Shāfi‘ī’s proposition, as narrated by al-Juwaynī, highlights a few 
points of observation, one of which is that al-Juwaynī was not the pioneer among the 
jurists of the Shāfi‘ī madhhab to render validity to the utilization of general good, or al-
maslah ah, in formulating legal rulings.  It was al-Shāfi‘ī himself, as the founder of the 
madhhab, who expressed his acceptance of al-mas lahah in issues where related primary 
texts are not in existence, while applying qiyās is not attainable due to the 
incompatibility of the ‘illah.    
 
The next point of observation is that al-Juwaynī’s reports of al-Shāfi‘ī’s propositions on 
istidlāl indicates that the latter was receptive towards the idea of rendering a learned 
                                                 
226   Ibid., vol. 2, p. 722. 
227    Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 723-724. 
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jurist the flexibility to formulate rulings, in certain situations, without the need to rigidly 
confine his legal thought processes to the standard sets of tools and principles of law.  If 
such is true, why then did al-Shāfi‘ī take upon himself the task of systematically 
developing a framework of legal principles, an endeavour by which he was later widely 
referred to as the founder of us ūl al-fiqh?  This researcher therefore suggests an 
assumption that the legal principles and framework, as encompassed in the body of 
us ūl-al-fiqh, are meant to provide safeguards from abuses in exercising legal thought 
processes in the sharī‘ah, and not to broadly impose rigid restrictions that impede the 
practices and development of ijtihād.  
 
 
 
 
3.4 Utilisation of maslahah in iftā’ 
To comprehend the allocation for public interest mentioned in the Singapore’s 
Administration of Mulsim Law Act (AMLA) as al-masālih al-mursalah is improper, 
since al-mas ālih al-mursalah, or istislāh, is a process of establishing a ruling for a case 
that has no mention in textual sources.  Istislāh is utilized for new cases that bear no 
parallels in the texts nor precedent legal opinions of the jurists (aqwāl al-fuqahā’), 
whereas the consideration for public interest allocated by AMLA implies abandoning an 
established opinion within the Shāfi‘ī school of law in preference to another opinion 
from another madhhab.  As such, it is therefore more appropriate to apply istihsān as it 
indicates, by the approach mentioned in AMLA, an act of giving priority to a particular 
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ijtihād, in this case of a non-Shāfi‘ī origin, above another, of which in this instance is an 
established opinion in the Shāfi‘ī madhhab.   
 
In his Kitāb al-Faqīh wa al-Mutafaqqih, Al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī gives an indication that 
there are three possible situations where the consideration of mas lahah may affect a 
muftī’s edict.  The first situation is when a muftī sees that, in providing an answer to a 
mustaftī’s question, there is a need to impede the mustaftī from committing an unlawful 
act.  In such a situation, the muftī is allowed to resort to allegorical interpretation, or 
ta’wīl, and issue a fatwā based on a ruling that the muftī himself is originally not keen 
of.  To support this proposition, Al-Khat īb al-Baghdādī narrates an incident where the 
Prophet was approached by a young man who asked him whether it was permissible for 
him to kiss his wife while fasting.  The Prophet replied by saying, “No”.  The Prophet 
was then approached by an old man who asked a similar question.  To this second 
person, however, the answer given by the Prophet was a positive one.  Subsequently, 
the Prophet explained that he allowed the latter to kiss his wife while fasting because 
the old man was capable of self restraint. 
 
Al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī also mentions another narration of an incident where Ibn 
‘Abbās, a companion of the Prophet who was widely known for his astuteness in 
matters of the religion, was once asked by a man on the status of the repentance of a 
murderer.  To him Ibn ‘Abbās responded by saying that the murderer’s repentance 
would not be accepted.  However, to another person who came to him asking the same 
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question, Ibn ‘Abbās replied with a contradicting answer by insisting that the 
murderer’s repentance would be accepted.  Ibn ‘Abbās later clarified that he saw in the 
eyes of the first enquirer a determination to kill someone, and hence issued a stringent 
answer with the intention to act as a deterrent.  Whereas, Ibn ‘Abbās found the second 
person as one who was remorseful for a murder he had earlier committed, and hence the 
response was such that not to cause him despair.228  
 
The second situation of where the consideration of mas lahah may be allowed to affect a 
muftī’s edict is when he sees a way to extricate his mustaftī from a particular 
predicament.  The muftī is thus allowed to resort to applying hīlah229 and incorporate it 
in his edict, and consequently point it out to the mustaftī.  In support of this proposition, 
al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī relates the story of Ayyūb who was once very angry with his 
wife during his illness and swore that if he recovered, he would punish her with one 
hundred lashes.  To this, Ayyūb was ordained by God to fulfill his oath by lashing her 
only once but with a wisp of one hundred blades of grass.230 
 
                                                 
228 Al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī, Abū Bakr Ahmad ibn ‘Alī ibn Thābit, Kitāb al-Faqīh wa al-Mutafaqqih, Dār 
Ibn al-Jawzī, Saudi Arabia, Beirut & Cairo, 1426h., vol. 2, pp. 407-409. 
229 Al-Shātibī defines hīlah as the use of certain means in order to escape an obligation or to make some 
forbidden thing permissible.  It is termed by Muhammad Khalid Masud as ‘legal evasion’ and by Ahmad 
Mohamed Ibrahim as ‘legal fiction’.  Qoutoub Moustapha Sano terms it as ‘artifice’, while C. G. 
Weeramantry terms it as ‘stratagem’.   
Hīlah is a highly controversial legal tool rejected by a considerable number of jurists.  For further 
understanding of its legal validity among the jurists, see al-Shātibī, Abū Ishāq, al-Muwāfaqāt, Mustafā 
Muhammad, Cairo, n.d., pp. 378-391 & Masud, Muhammad Khalid, Islamic Legal Philosophy, Islamic 
Research Institute, Pakistan, 1977, pp. 284-285.  See also Ibrahim, Ahmad Mohamed, Sources and 
Development of Muslim Law, Malayan Law Journal Limited, Singapore, 1965, p. 34; Qut b Mustafā Sānū, 
Mu‘jam Mustalahāt Usūl al-Fiqh, Dār al-Fikr, Damascus, 2002, p. 190 & Weeramantry, C. G., Islamic 
Jurisprudence: An International Perspective, The Other Press, Kuala Lumpur, 2001, p. 41.  
230 This story of Ayyūb is mentioned in the Qur’an in verse 44 of Sūrah Sād (38).  
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Al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī also quotes a number of narrations, one of which is about a man 
who approached ‘Alī ibn Abī Tālib, a learned companion of the Prophet who was also 
his son-in-law, for a fatwā.  The man was in a predicament as he had earlier made an 
oath that his wife was to be divorced with three talāqs if he did not have sexual 
intercourse with her in the daylight of Ramad ān.  In his reply, ‘Alī ibn Abī Tālib 
suggested that the man took his wife for a trip in the month of Ramadān and had sexual 
intercourse with her on the trip during daytime.  Another narration cited by al-Khatīb al-
Baghdadī was of a man who came to al-Shāfi‘ī for a ruling on an oath he had made to 
have his wife divorced, either if he ate a date that he had with him or threw it away.  Al-
Shāfi‘ī ruled that the man should eat half of the date and throw away the other half.231 
 
The third situation of a muftī taking mas lahah as a point of consideration in issuing a 
fatwā is when he is of a view that there is a justified need to refrain from issuing a 
fatwā, or to withhold some information from being disseminated.  On this, al-Khatīb al-
Baghdādī cites a narration where a jurist by the name of Sa‘īd ibn Jubayr was once 
asked about the payment of zakāh, to which he responded by saying that its payment 
should be made to the rulers.  However, Sa‘īd ibn Jubayr was later questioned by the 
mustaftī after they left the place on why the latter was advised to pay zakāh to the rulers 
knowingly the rampant mismanagement of zakāh funds perpetrated by the rulers.  To 
this, Sa‘īd clarified that the questioner should execute the obligatory zakāh payment to 
the relevant parties as God dictated, not to the rulers.  Sa‘īd however explained that as 
                                                 
231 Al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī, Abū Bakr Ahmad ibn ‘Alī ibn Thābit, Kitāb al-Faqīh wa al-Mutafaqqih, Dār 
Ibn al-Jawzī, Saudi Arabia, Beirut & Cairo, 1426h., vol. 2, pp. 411-414. 
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the question was initially raised before a large audience of people, he was not in an 
advantageous position to offer a forthright answer. 
 
Another narration reported by al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī is al-Shāfi‘ī’s position that skilled 
craftsmen should be made liable for the damages of merchandises that are in their care 
only if the damages were caused by them, and not merely due to the merchandises being 
in their care.  However, al-Shāfi‘ī was reluctant to have this position of his to be made 
known publicly, as he was concerned that it might lead to complacency on the part of 
the craftsmen.  Al-Khat īb al-Baghdādī also narrates the saying of Ibn Shabrumah that 
there are issues and questions which are not apposite to be asked by a questioner, nor 
are they apposite for a muftī to answer.232 
 
Similarly reflected by the various books on iftā’ by other jurists of the Shāfi‘ī madhhab, 
al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī did not elaborate on the legal framework or the guiding 
principles of utilizing mas lahah for iftā’ purposes.           
 
 
It was mentioned in the earlier discussion on istidlāl that al-Shāfi‘ī restricts the 
utilization of istidlāl for cases where no primary evidences can be found to build a 
ruling upon, and where not even qiyās can be applied due to the remoteness of the 
‘illah.  Istidlāl, however, in such a restrictive manner of its application, may not be 
sufficient for the purposes of iftā’.  This is based on the discussion forwarded in the 
                                                 
232 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 415-420. 
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previous chapter of this research, that in certain situations, the consideration of al-
mas ālih and the interest of a mustaftī is to be given significance, to the extent that an 
existing standard ruling may be abandoned in order to provide preference to an initially 
weaker legal position, when the need to fulfil greater good in the interest of the mustaftī 
demands for such. 
 
One particular fact that should not be ignored is that al-Shāfi‘ī’s insistence for such a 
strict application of istidlāl is in the realm of general ijtihād, where the intended 
outcome is to formulate a legal ruling by way of deducing it from the primary texts, 
without the need to render consideration to specific individuals in specific contexts.  
This is also the very objective of us ūl al-fiqh, and its correlation with the positive law of 
fiqh does not suggest otherwise.  This is as highlighted by a number of jurists of the 
Shāfi‘ī madhhab, among whom is al-Ghazzālī, that the subject matter of us ūl al-fiqh is 
actually the texts, and that usūl al-fiqh does not deal with specific cases of any 
particular individual.233 
 
Is it that usūl al-fiqh was designed by al-Shafi’i, and adopted by his followers, to be a 
set of principles and tools for the sole purpose of formulating rulings by relying on texts 
only, be it by istinbāt or qiyās?  If that is the case, it is therefore understandable if there 
is no, or minimal, discussion within us ūl al-fiqh on taking the mustaftī’s maslahah, 
based on his context and condition, as a primary factor for consideration in formulating 
                                                 
233 Abū Sulaimān, ‘Abd al-Wahhāb Ibrāhīm, Manhajiyyat al-Imām Muhammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfi‘ī fī al-
Fiqh wa Usūlih, Dār Ibn Hazm, Beirut, 1999, pp. 119-120. 
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legal ruling.  However, if this is true, it will mean that chapters on iftā’, even if 
mentioned or written as one of the chapters of us ūl al-fiqh, are not exactly a subject 
matter of usūl al-fiqh.  
 
Nonetheless, this researcher is of the view that iftā’ can, and should be, included as one 
of the major parts of us ūl al-fiqh in the Shāfi‘ī school of law, for it deals with the 
process of formulating rulings, although not in the form of deducing it from the texts.  
Deducing rulings directly from the texts by istinbāt , or indirectly by qiyās, which in its 
actuality still relies on the texts, is primary, but formulating rulings by taking the 
context of the mustaftī as a factor of consideration and practically applying it to realize 
his mas ālih, is as important. 
 
In order to achieve this, few steps should be taken, the first of which is that the notion of 
ijtihād should be expanded to also encompass formulating rulings beyond sole reliance 
on texts.  Secondly, it is imperative to acknowledge the significance of applying the 
most fitting ruling to a subject, through the process of iftā’, in the Islamic legal 
discipline.  Finally, the framework on how to apply istislāh and istihsān in the process 
of iftā’ should be developed and included within the main body of us ūl al-fiqh. 
 
The process of iftā’ starts at the stage of receiving enquiry and understanding the issue 
that is being asked.  Once a question has been comprehended and the issue of relevance 
has been identified, a muftī then proceeds to conduct an investigation of existing 
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evidences to base his legal opinion on.  In this instance, for a mujtahid muftī, he goes 
directly to the primary sources of the Qur’an and the hadīth in order for him to deduce a 
legal ruling by way of istinbāt.  In cases where direct primary evidences do not exist, or 
could not be located, for the mujtahid muftī to deduce a ruling on the issue at hand, he is 
then expected to proceed to apply analogy, or qiyās.  For a muqallid muftī, on the other 
hand, he is to start, not by directly analyzing the primary evidences of the texts, but 
rather by conducting a scanning exercise of preceding rulings available on a similar 
issue, which had been deduced and offered by earlier mujtahids.  After obtaining these 
existing rulings, the muqallid muftī should put effort to comprehend the arguments and 
legal evidences utilized by those earlier jurists to build their opinions on.  Only after 
these arguments and evidences have been clearly identified is the muftī permitted to 
issue his fatwā, according to the legal opinion available.  This should be classified as 
ittibā‘, not taqlīd.  The muqallid muftī is not allowed to merely narrate a legal opinion 
of a jurist without first understanding its arguments and evidences.  As such, it can be 
implied that even for a muqallid muftī in this particular instance, the primary textual 
sources again are still the basis for his eventual fatwā, although the process that he has 
to go through initially started with investigating earlier juristic opinions of other 
mujtahidūn.   
 
Subsequently, after establishing the legal ruling, by way of istinbāt, qiyās or ittibā’, a 
muftī should not hastily issue it as his fatwā to the question posed by the mustaftī.  The 
muftī is required to proceed to the next stage of applying the ruling to the mustaftī, 
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taking into account the context he is in, with all the relevant circumstances related to it.  
This is the process of tanzīl al-hukm.  It is at this stage that the consideration of mas ālih 
mursalah, istihsān, ‘urf, dharā’i‘ and the like become factors of utmost importance, and 
the application of legal maxims of darūrah, mashaqqah, rukhs ah, etcetera come into 
play.  One possible outcome that may result at this stage is that the original ruling that 
was deduced from the texts, or formulated through the process of qiyās, or identified by 
way of ittibā‘, can be applied straightforwardly to the context of the mustaftī.  However, 
there is also a possibility that such may not materialize, and that the ruling identified 
can not be applied as originally expected due to probable complications on part of the 
mustaftī.  The muftī has then to return to the sources of evidence again to explore an 
alternative ruling that shall suit the needs of the mustaftī and in his best interest.  On top 
of this, another possible outcome, is that the muftī may not even find any suitable 
alternative ruling from the sources of evidence, and he thus has to resort to apply his 
own reasoning according to the best of his ability to provide a fatwā to his mustaftī.  
This is where the general objectives of the sharī‘ah (maqās id al-sharī‘ah) are of crucial 
importance as a legal principle for the muftī to base his fatwā on.  An issue worth 
mentioning, nonetheless, is that a mujtahid muftī would most probably face no difficulty 
to exercise such a legal process due to his intellectual capacity that he is endowed with, 
but a muqallid muftī may not be able to similarly assume such a task.  What, then, is the 
way out?   
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To suggest that the application of legal maxims of istislāh, istihsān and the like should 
be included within the framework of ijtihād and iftā’, is, in a way, immaterial and 
academic.  This was how the opposing views on the permissibility and legality of 
applying istislāh and istihsān in the process of ijtihād and iftā’ came into existence.  If 
the notion of ijtihād and iftā’ is restricted to deducing rulings from the primary textual 
sources, and to qiyās in cases where there is no direct mention in the texts on certain 
issues, istislāh and istihsān should therefore not be accepted as a legal tool, as asserted 
by a number of scholars of the Shāfi‘ī madhhab.  However, if the subsequent process of 
tanzīl al-hukm, after a particular ruling has earlier been identified from its sources of 
evidence, is to be considered as part of ijtihād and iftā’, istislāh and istihsān should then 
taken as a significant factor of consideration, as preferred by other jurists of the Shāfi‘ī 
madhhab, among whom are al-Juwaynī, al-Ghazzālī and Ibn ‘Abd al-Salām. 
 
One particular observation that is worth mentioning is that the scholars of the Shāfi‘ī 
madhhab seem to place prime emphasis on istinbāt , or deducing ruling from the textual 
sources, as the major practice of ijtihād.  This is to be subsequently followed by the 
phase of applying qiyās in issues or cases where no directly relevant text is to be found.  
Notwithstanding, qiyās is again a procedure where available texts are taken as the legal 
foundation for the new ruling, as both the text and the new case at hand share a similar 
raison d'être, or ‘illah.  Their modus operandi in Islamic jurisprudence therefore 
revolves mainly around the texts.  This may probably provide an explanation as to why 
the process of tanzīl al-hukm has not been given significance in their writings and 
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discussions on iftā’.  Tanzīl al-hukm is a procedure where the needs of a mustaftī, as 
well as the problems and predicaments that he is faced with, are to be given prominent 
consideration over the general or original ruling deduced from the texts, either directly 
by way of istinbāt, or indirectly by way of qiyās.  In other words, it is an issue of text 
factor against human factor; whether prominence is to be rendered, in the process of 
issuing a fatwā that is requested by a mustaftī, to the interests and the needs of the 
mustaftī over the general ruling formulated from the texts, or the converse is true.  
 
This conventional approach among the scholars of the Shāfi‘ī madhhab is in contrast to 
that adopted by their compatriots from the Mālikī madhhab, who give greater emphasis 
to the human factor above the texts.  This is manifested, among others, by their 
methodology of accepting the practices of the people of Medina, or a‘māl ahl al-
madīnah, as one of the legal principles adopted in the madhhab.  This is later supported 
by writings offered by the Mālikī scholars, among whom is al-Shāt ibī in his al-
Muwāfaqāt, where the issue of tanzīl al-hukm is highlighted prominently. 
 
 
Nonetheless, it is far from the truth to insinuate that the interests of the mustaftī are 
totally discounted by the Shāfi‘ī scholars.  Discussion presented in earlier parts of this 
Chapter suggested that there have been considerable significance allocated for the 
application of mas lahah within the legal doctrines of the Shāfi‘ī madhhab.  Al-Shāfi‘ī’s 
own famous phrase “man istah sana fa qad shara‘a” (whoever utilizes the tool of 
istihsān, he is considered to have introduced innovation to the sharī‘ah), is not to be 
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taken for granted as representing a standard principle of the madhhab, but with 
qualification of its specifics.  This is based on the acceptability of observing the 
mustaftī’s interests as an important factor of consideration in the process of ijtihād and 
iftā’ among the Shāfi‘ī scholars, although it is not accorded with a similar degree of 
mention, as compared to its significance among scholars of other madhāhib, in 
particular scholars of the Mālikī madhhab.   
 
If this is seen as an inconsistency or a deficiency within the Shāfi‘ī madhhab, it should 
be clarified that al-Shāfi‘ī’s methodology of giving prominence to the texts was 
primarily motivated by his undertaking to address a legal defect that he observed as 
prevalent among the jurists of his time.  Al-Shāfi‘ī noticed that the religious texts, and 
particularly the hadīth, were in his view not accorded due prominence as the primary 
sources in formulating Islamic law.  In contrast, the consideration that was generally 
given to the needs and interest of the people, was already by his time tremendously 
emphasized, hence al-Shāfi‘ī’s insistence on the prominence of texts.  Al-Shāfi‘ī was 
providing a balance to the utilization of al-mas ālih al-mursalah, by introducing the 
hadīth as the guideline.  As suggested by many researchers, there are several parts in al-
Shāfi‘ī’s writings that indicate the importance of observing al-masālih al-mursalah, and 
that al-Shāfi‘ī himself adopts istihsān, albeit not using the term explicitly.  This proves 
that al-Shāfi‘ī does not totally reject the utilization of al-masālih al-mursalah as a legal 
tool.  Instead, al-Shāfi‘ī was putting forth his proposition that the texts, particularly the 
hadīth, should be given prominence, in order to provide judicial guideline and 
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framework to the practice of al-mas ālih al-mursalah, failing which would only have 
caused the Muslims to be allowed to unduly indulge in the spheres of personal interests 
and desires.   
 
In his relatively lengthy discussion on tarjīh, or the act of giving preference to one 
evidence over the other, or to one ruling over another, al-Ghazzālī seems to have 
restricted his proposition to the textual aspects of the law.  Only three areas were 
addressed by al-Ghazzālī in this regard, namely exercising tarjīh when there are 
contradictions in the main bodies of the textual evidences, or al-matn; in the chains of 
narration of the texts, or al-sanad; and in the raisons d’être of the evidences, or al-
‘illah.234  The issue of giving preference to one ruling over another based on specific 
needs of the mustaftī was completely unaddressed.  Al-Haytamī, however, proposes an 
opposite position to the one presented by al-Ghazzālī.  According to al-Haytamī, a muftī 
can issue a fatwā that is not in line with the views of the madhhab that he adheres to, if 
he sees there is mas lahah in it.235  
 
There is, therefore, a pressing need to further construct the existing literature on iftā’, 
and in doing so, the widely familiar literature on us ūl fiqh of the Shāfi‘ī school of law 
only should not be taken as sufficient for iftā’ purposes.  One important aspect in the 
                                                 
234 Al-Ghazzālī, Abū Hāmid Muhammad ibn Muhammad, al-Mustasfā min ‘Ilm al-Usūl, ed. Muhammad 
Sulaimān al-Ashqar, Mu’assasah al-Risālah, Beirut, 1997, vol. 2, pp. 471-491.  
235 Al-Haytamī, Shihāb al-Dīn Ahmad ibn Muhammad, al-Fatāwā al-Kubrā al-Fiqhiyyah ‘alā madhhab 
al-Imām al-Shāfi‘ī, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 1997, vol. 4, pp.320-321. 
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futher development of such a literature is the set of guidelines (dawābit ) for employing 
mas lahah.  In this respect al-Būtī’s writing may prove to be very useful.  
   
The first guideline proposed by al-Būt ī is that the maslahah should comply with the 
objectives of the sharī‘ah, or maqās id al-shar‘.  As suggested by al-Ghazzālī, al-Būt ī 
asserts that the five basic necessities (preservation of life, creed, mind, progeny and 
property) are, in their essence, means to realize an ultimate goal of the sharī‘ah, which 
is for man to manifest worship to Allah in his actions, choices and behaviour, by 
obliging to Allah’s divine rules and instructions.236 
 
The second guideline is that the mas lahah should not contradict the Qur’ān.  In this 
aspect, al-Būt ī categorizes Qur’anic injunctions into two, one of which is of those 
explicit in their implied meanings that do not carry any possibility of other denotations; 
and another is of those subject to specifics and exceptions.  It is only in this second 
category that a mujtahid exerts his effort to exercise ijtihād in relation to the Qur‘an.  
Quoting al-Shawkānī and al-Māwardī as references, al-Būt ī confines the work of a 
mujtahid in this area into the processes of authenticating the text (ithbāt al-nas s ), 
extracting its raison d'être (istikhrāj ‘illatih), substantiating its inferences (dabt  
madlūlātih), exercising preference among its possible connotations (al-tarjīh bayn 
ihtimālātih), and uncovering of its universals and specifics (al-kashf ‘an ‘umūmih wa 
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khus ūsih).  Al-Būtī asserts that as long as there is a certain degree of injunction in the 
Qur’ān on a particular issue, the consideration of mas lahah must not digress from it.237 
 
The third guideline is that the mas lahah should not contradict the sunnah.238  Al-Būtī 
distinguishes the words and actions of  the Prophet in his capacity as a prophet, from 
those that he said and did in his capacity as a community leader.  Only his words and 
actions that constitute religious injunctions are to be regarded as sunnah that the 
consideration of mas lahah should effect any influence.  Examples offered to illustrate 
this are the rituals, such as salāh and zakāh.  On the other hand, the Prophet’s 
administering of social issues of the time was more of a leadership call that was based 
on his personal judgment, thus was contingent upon changes of time and circumstances.  
The lack of permanency in such a matter naturally deprives it from being conferred the 
esteem status as sunnah that commands subservience and compliance, and therefore is 
not constituted under these guidelines.239 
  
The fourth guideline is that the mas lahah must not contradict qiyās,240 while finally, the 
fifth guideline is that the consideration of a particular mas lahah must not result in 
neglecting or ignoring another maslahah greater than the former.241 
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3.5 Conclusion 
1.  The consideration of mas lahah in Islamic law is existent and accepted as 
one of the tools for ijtihād in the Shāfi‘ī school of law, the discussion of 
which is positioned under the legal tools of qiyās, istidlāl, istihsān etc.  
However, jurists of this madhhab differ in the degree of their acceptance 
of mas lahah, and how it is to be practically employed.  
 
2.  The framework of its utilization is considerably strict and restrictive, for 
its utilization is generally allowed only when qiyās is not applicable.  
Nonetheless, the common discourse is within the ambit of us ūl fiqh, 
hence focus of discussion is biased towards considering mas lahah in the 
legal stage of formulating general rulings, either by way of textual 
deduction (istinbāt) or by qiyās.  In contrast, the formulation and 
application of rulings for the purpose of iftā’ are apparently specific in 
nature, where the specific needs and contexts of the mustaftī have critical 
influence on the fatāwā that are to be issued. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
SINGAPORE AND ITS IFTĀ’ INSTITUTION 
 
 
 
 
The conditions that a society live in not only shape their perspective towards life and 
the world, but also has a bearing on the rules that govern their lives, either in the private 
life of the individual members of the society or in their social interactions.  This is 
similarly true in the spheres of Islamic law, for generally it was designed in a fashion 
that aims at realizing common good to both the individuals as well as the community at 
large.  This is as what has been articulated by al-Ghazzālī that it is the intention of the 
sharī‘ah to preserve the five basic necessities of man (al-darūrāt al-khams), namely his 
life, his intellect, his faith, his genealogy and his property.  Apart from these five basic 
necessities that constitute the primary needs of man, without which it is impossible for 
him to practically continue with his life, there are also other needs that are 
acknowledged by the sharī‘ah.  Al-Ghazzālī named these as al-hājāt. Albeit being 
accorded a lesser degree of criticality as per compared to the al-darūrāt al-khams, they 
nonetheless effect consequences in rulings of the sharī‘ah, for their absence results in 
man facing great difficulties in life.242   
 
The significance of common good and its realization as the objective of sharī‘ah was 
further reiterated by Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, who insisted that the sharī‘ah and its 
                                                 
242    Al-Ghazzālī, Abū Hāmid Muhammad bin Muhammad, al-Mustasfā min ‘Ilm al-Usūl, Dār Ihyā’ al-
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rulings are based on the foundation of mas ālih al-‘ibād, or attaining common good for 
the humans.  Ibn al-Qayyim insisted that the whole body of sharī‘ah is built upon 
justice, compassion, common good and wisdom, and that if there is any case where 
damage, harm and injustice is done instead of good and justice, it therefore has nothing 
to do with sharī‘ah.243 
 
In order to establish the context setting for this research, this chapter is intended to cast 
light on present day Singapore as an independent state, and the conditions in which its 
Muslim community are living.  This will consist of accounts of the country’s modern 
history; its political, social and economic background; the socio-economic realities of 
the Singapore Muslims; and the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore and its Fatwa 
Committee.  It is hoped that this will shed light on the socio-economic, political and 
legal factors that come into play as a backdrop to better understand the rationale and 
motivation behind the fatāwā issued in the country. 
 
These political, social, economic and legal conditions of a community may cause it to 
develop a certain way of thinking or to behave in a particular manner.  If such a 
behaviour becomes habitual and rampant within a community, it can be categorized as 
‘ādah, which was defined by al-Asfahānī as a noun that indicates a repetition in action 
and reaction, to the extent that its actualization becomes easy as if it is a second 
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nature.244  Ibn ‘Ābidīn suggests that ‘ādah is derived from the word mu‘āwadah 
(repetition), for by way of continuous repetition of a particular action or reaction time 
and again, it becomes a familiar behaviour that is inherent in the hearts and minds of the 
people, and which is received with acceptance without any need for relevance nor 
evidence, as it eventually becomes a cultural reality.245  Such a common habitual 
behaviour of a community, or ‘ādah, will have an effect on the rulings for the 
community and its members, if it satisfies a set of criteria, the first of which is that this 
‘ādah should not be in disagreement with the sharī‘ah.  Secondly, it should be 
commonly practised by all or most of the members of the community.  Thirdly, that the 
‘ādah that is intended to be taken into consideration is one that is already in existence 
within the community, not one that is intended to be put into existence.  Finally, parties 
who enter into any contractual agreement do not express disagreement with the 
‘ādah.246   
 
Providing an account of Singapore and its Muslims is therefore of crucial importance to 
the study of its fatāwā, for most of these fatāwā were issued to address their religious 
questions and concerns according to their environment, and subsequently also according 
to any existing  common ‘ādah widely practiced by the community.  This is in line with 
the notion of the necessity to align fatāwā according to the changes that occur in a 
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particular community, as asserted by Ibn al-Qayyim that it is incumbent on a muftī to 
observe the need to be conscious of the ‘ādah of the individual or community that seek 
his fatāwā.  It is similarly vital for the muftī to be aware of any changes that are taking 
place in society and their cultures, and that, according to Ibn al-Qayyim, it is 
unbecoming of a muftī to issue fatāwā by merely narrating the content of books in his 
possession which is in contradiction with the realities of their environment and cultures, 
and which does not take into account the differences in time, space and conditions.247       
 
 
4.1 Singapore and its Modern History 
Singapore consists of the island of Singapore and some 60 small islands within its 
territorial waters.  It is situated approximately 137 kilometres north of the Equator.  The 
main island is about 42 kilometres in length and 23 kilometres in breadth and 582.8 
square kilometres in area.248     
 
The geographical position of Singapore defines the history and contemporary position 
of its Muslim community.  Singapore is the northernmost island in the Riau 
archipelago, which links the east coast of Sumatra with Peninsula Malaysia.  This 
territory is the traditional home of the Malay people.  Malay history is intimately linked 
with Islam, and the first Malay-Muslim trading city, Melaka (Malacca), flourished in 
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the fifteenth century.  The sacking of Melaka by the Portuguese in 1511 marked the 
beginning of an era of intrusions by various colonial powers interested in the strategic 
sea lanes through the Straits of Melaka.249   
 
Before the 15th century, the island was under the rule of the Majapahit Kingdom of 
Java,250 and subsequently was put under the patronage of the Thai Kingdom.  In the 
period between 1400s and 1511, the island was part of the Malacca empire, and later in 
the 18th century Singapore was ruled by the Johor-Riau empire.251 
 
Modern Singapore started when Sir Stamford Raffles, representing the English East 
India Company, negotiated with Temenggung Abdul Rahman, the ruler of Singapore, 
and Sultan Husain of Johor, to occupy the island.252  The British, who were extending 
their hegemony in India and whose trade with China in the second half of the eighteenth 
century was expanding, saw the need of a half-way house to refit, victualise and protect 
its merchant fleet.  As a result, they established Singapore as their trading post in 1819, 
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besides Penang in 1786 and Malacca in 1795.  These three states later became the 
Straits Settlements in 1826, under the control of British India.253     
 
After attaining self-governance in 1959, a merger with Malaya was agreed in 1961 as 
part of a larger federation to include the British territories in Borneo.  This led to the 
formation of Malaysia, of which Singapore was one of its states, in September 1963.  
However, the merger was short-lived, and Singapore was separated from the rest of 
Malaysia on August 9, 1965, and became a sovereign, democratic and independent 
nation.254 
 
 
4.2 Singapore and its Economic Development 
With the advent of the steamship and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, Singapore 
became a major port of call for ships plying between Europe and East Asia.  Singapore 
experienced unprecedented prosperity as trade expanded eightfold between 1873 and 
1913, attracting migrants from areas around the region.255 
 
The economic transformation of Singapore began in 1961, two years after it gained 
internal self-government.  With the establishment of the Economic Development Board 
to implement the industrialisation programme, the country went through several stages 
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of development leading to a strong manufacturing base and a well-developed business 
sector.256 
 
With better-trained workforce and increased industrial capabilities, companies in the 
1970s began to bring in more sophisticated processes to manufacture more capital-
intensive products.  By the early 1980s, a vibrant base of manufacturing capabilities had 
been established, and by the middle of 1990s, the economic development strategy has 
been broadened, the emphasis is on the manufacturing and the service sectors as the 
twin engines of growth.  In addition, local enterprises are encouraged to diversify their 
operations, upgrade their skills and develop into strong export-oriented companies.257 
 
By the end of the twentieth century, Singapore was already the second busiest port in 
the world, and probably the world’s most computerized nation, has had a foreign 
exchange market with the world’s fourth largest turnover, after London, New York and 
Tokyo, boast of having the best airport in the world, which had received 9.42 million 
passenger arrivals in 1993 (6.4 million of whom were tourists), had gross official 
international reserves towards the end of 1994 of about US$57 billion (twenty one per 
cent higher than a year earlier and equal to about 5.7 months of imports, and providing 
the highest per capita figure in the world), a life expectancy at birth of seventy five 
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years and an adult literacy rate of about eighty eight per cent and has achieved the 
world’s highest proportion of share owners in the population.258   
 
Such a tremendous economic progress of the state is in line with its government’s vision 
to work towards developing Singapore into a developed country status.  Singapore has 
visualized attaining developed country status by 2020 under a Dutch model or by 2030 
if the United States is the model.  The then First Deputy Prime Minister Goh Chok 
Tong was the first in 1984 to set the target for Singapore to attain the Swiss per capita 
GNP by 1999.259  By the end of the century, the nation is convinced, to a large degree, 
that it has reached a developed country’s income level, albeit not a fully developed 
country as yet.260  
 
 
4.3 Islam and Muslims in Singapore 
Records of Islam and Muslims in Singapore during the early days are threadbare.  
However, Islam itself was already entrenched in Southeast Asia, spread in the early 
thirteenth century by merchants and Sufi missionaries who came from Hadramaut in 
Yemen and from the southern parts of India.261    
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The Singapore Department of Statistics reported that as at June 2006, the resident 
population of Singapore, comprising citizens and permanent residents, was estimated at 
3,583,100.  75 per cent of these resident population were the Chinese who form the 
majority.  The Malays numbered 490,600 or 13.7 per cent, Indians 313,400 or 8.7 per 
cent and persons of other ethnic groups 92,100 or 2.6 per cent.262   
 
There has long been a prevalent perception that being a Malay in Singapore is so much 
synonymous to being a Muslim, that what is commonly referred to as Singapore’s 
Muslim community is actually rather exclusively the Malay-Muslim community, and 
that Indian Muslims are generally excluded or are thought of as a minority.263    This is 
due to the fact that almost all Malays in Singapore are Muslims, and they make up the 
largest group within the Muslim community in Singapore, where non-Malay Muslims 
constitute only about thirteen per cent of the community.  Even writings about 
Singapore Muslims have always been focusing mainly on the Malays and not on other 
ethnic Muslims like Arabs and Indians.264  In a study conducted on the religious 
communities in Singapore, based on a census of its population that was carried out in 
1990, it was reported that 85.2 per cent of the country’s Muslim population were 
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Malays,265 while Indians constituted only 12.2 per cent of the Muslim community.266  
Within the Malay community, they were religiously, as they were culturally, 
homogeneous with 99.6 per cent professing the Islamic faith.267 
 
 
4.4 The Economic Standing of Singapore Muslims 
The state’s preoccupation to aggressively grow a booming economy and its success in 
achieving such, however, will have a bearing on the underclass of its society, as shown 
by experiences and lessons drawn from other developed industrial countries.268  In 
many of the cases, the underclass ends up non-employed or employed at low rates or 
employed insecurely.  On top of these, many would probably have bad relationships and 
would be single parents, perpetuating the underclass syndrome with its symptoms of a 
vicious circle where genes, parenting, nutrition and even chance lead to low ability, low 
education, low skill, and low motivation, reinforcing each other.269       
 
The government has attached a great deal of importance to improving the standard of 
living of the Malay-Muslim minority.  Traditionally this community has tended to lag 
behind the Chinese majority in terms of educational achievement, occupational 
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advancement, and income levels.  Government policy has been to emphasize and 
support self-help groups within the community, such as MENDAKI (Council on 
Education for Muslim Children) and the AMP (Association of Muslim Professionals).270 
 
Historically, this situation of their economic stature can be traced back to the earlier 
days of British colonialism, which started in 1819, about one and a half century before 
the country’s independence.  In his explorative journey to the Malay archipelago in the 
middle of the nineteenth century, Alfred Russell Wallace gave a picture of the 
population by narrating that the native Malays were usually fishermen, boatmen and 
policemen.  Besides the native Malays, there were also immigrants from other parts of 
the archipelago, mainly from Java, who were sailors and domestic servants.  This is in 
contrast to the economic superiority of the Chinese, who already formed the great mass 
of the population, and who included some of the wealthiest merchants, the agriculturists 
of the interior, and most of the mechanics and labourers.271 
 
Land ownership policies adopted by the colonial British government with regards to the 
Malays were among the factors that contributed towards them lagging behind the other 
communities economically.  In the early twentieth century, many Malays were enticed 
to take up the lucrative rubber cultivation, thus abandoning the historical role assigned 
to them by the British to cultivate rice.  Due to the fear that such a trend would effect 
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food production for the needs of the new and fast expanding cities under the impetus of 
colonial capitalism, a ‘no rubber’ clause was imposed as a condition in the alienation of 
agricultural land to the Malays, diverting them away from commercial and cash crop 
cultivation other than rice.272  Over and above this policy, the British enacted the Malay 
Reservation Policy, which curtailed the ability of the Malays to mortgage or sell lands 
to non-Malays.  This policy in particular eventually resulted in the value of Malay 
reserve land to fall, in some areas by as much as fifty per cent, as compared to land 
outside the reservation.273  
     
Although there were Arab and Indian Muslims who, as petty merchants and shop-
keepers274, were considerably well-off in comparison to the native and immigrant 
Malays, the Arabs and Indians constituted a very small component of the Muslim 
community, and their private wealth was not reflective of that of the community in 
general.       
 
In present day Singapore, one distinctive feature about the country is the racial 
heterogeneity of its population, the product of past immigration patterns.  Three ethnic 
groups - Chinese, Malay, and Indians - constitute about 97 per cent of the population.  
Despite a long history of interaction, each race has retained its cultural distinctiveness.  
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This is reflected in the distinct employment patterns which have emerged among them.  
In a study published in 1976, a decade after Singapore’s independence, it was reported 
that the Chinese, with about 76 per cent of the population are, by virtue of their 
numerical size, dominant in most industrial groupings, particularly in the service, 
commercial and manufacturing sectors.  The Malays, who comprise some 15 per cent of 
the population, are concentrated in the public sector and to a lesser degree as unskilled 
workers in transport, storage and communication activities.  This feature of the Malay 
occupational structure is in part due to past colonial policies which encouraged Malay 
participation in the government sector.  The Indians, who constitute about 6 per cent of 
the population, are found mainly in the service and commercial sectors.275 
     
Although the Chinese are found in a wide variety of professions and occupations, a 
greater proportion of them, compared to the Malays, are white-collar workers.  Of the 
Malays who work in the service, transport and communications establishments, a 
greater number of them are employed in lower-paid jobs such as drivers and 
messengers.  In the public sector they feature relatively more frequently as policemen, 
guards and watchmen.  As for the Indians, they are found in a wide spectrum of jobs as 
lawyers, doctors, shop-keepers and labourers.  In 1970 about 9 per cent of the Indians 
were professional or administrative and managerial workers compared to about 6 per 
cent for Malays and 10 per cent for Chinese.276      
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 This socio-economic condition of the Malays, who are normally considered as 
representing the Muslim community, as mentioned earlier, continued without any 
significant changes until the last decade of the twentieth century.  Using the level of 
education as one of the important indicators of the socio economic status of a person, 
the 1990 census of Singapore’s population shows that among the non-student 
population, Muslims constituted only 7.2 per cent of those with upper secondary and 
polytechnic qualification, and a mere 2.6 per cent of those with university (and above) 
qualification.277  As among the student population, Muslim students constituted 8.5 per 
cent of those attending upper secondary and polytechnic institutions, and 4.3 per cent of 
those attending universities.278  These numbers are considerably small in comparison to 
the size of the Muslim community, who in 1990 made up 15.4 per cent of the whole 
population of the country.  
 
The education level of members of a community is also associated with other indicators 
of their socio-economic status, including occupation, income and in the Singapore 
context especially, the type of dwelling one lives in.  Data from the same 1990 census 
also highlights the fact that only 9.0 per cent of those working in the professional and 
technical categories and 3.4 per cent of those working in the administrative and 
managerial categories were Muslims.  In contrast, Muslims constituted as many as 20.6 
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per cent of those working in the production lines and in other related jobs of lower 
status.279  In terms of housing type, a mere 3.7 per cent of those living in landed 
properties and 2.2 per cent of those living in condominiums and private apartments 
were Muslims, while the rest were living in public housing flats.280   
 
 
4.5 The Administration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA) and the Islamic Religious 
Council of Singapore 
The Islamic Religious Council of Singapore281, under the Ministry of Community 
Development, Youths and Sports (MCYS), conducts the affairs of the Muslim 
population.282  The Council was established as a body corporate in 1968 when the 
Administration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA) came into effect.  Under AMLA, the 
Council is to advise the President of the Republic of Singapore on all matters relating to 
Islam in Singapore.  The Council’s role is to see that the many and varied interests of 
Singapore’s Muslim community are looked after.  The principal functions of the 
Council include: 
 
1. Administration of zakāh and fitrah  
2. Management and development of waqf 
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3. Administration of pilgrimage and da‘wah activities   
4. Management of Mosque Building Fund and construction of new mosques 
5. Administration of the affairs of all mosques 
6. Coordination of Islamic educational programmes 
7. Issuance of fatāwā 
8. Provision of study grants to Muslim students 
9. Provision of financial relief to poor and needy Muslims 
10.  Assistance to new converts283 
 
Apart from the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore, the Administration of Muslim 
Law Act (AMLA) through Sections 34-56 also establishes the Shari’ah Court which has 
jurisdiction throughout Singapore to hear and determine actions and proceedings which 
relate to marriages and divorces of Muslims.284  Sections 89-109 of the Act provides for 
the establishment of a Registry of Muslim Marriages and the appointment of its 
Registrar. 
 
The existence of this particular Act, with its provisions for a law relating to Muslim 
religious and legal affairs in Singapore, and the manner of how this law is to be 
administered, provides the Muslims of the country with a conducive condition for them 
to fulfill their religious duties pertinently, albeit Singapore being a secular state.  The 
                                                 
283   Zuraidah Ibrahim, Muslims in Singapore: A Shared Vision, Times Editions, Singapore, 1994, p. 121.  
See also M. B. Hooker, Islamic Law in Southeast Asia, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1984, pp. 
110-118. 
284   Hooker, M.B., Islamic Law in South-East Asia, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1984, p. 111. 
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combination of these elements that shape the milieu of the country defines the identity 
and characteristics of the Singapore Muslims living in it, and consequently delineates 
the way they conduct their religious life.  The Administration of Muslim Law Act 
(AMLA) thrusts the community to be systematically organized in administering and 
discharging their religious obligations, that encompasses these various issues as 
mentioned above.  At the same time, however, being a secular state, the government 
does not provide heavy funding in support of such religious initiatives and programmes, 
as it can not project a bias inclination towards any particular faith group, however 
accommodating it may be towards all religions and religious communities.  This could 
have put the Muslims in a predicament, for administering an act of law as extensive as 
the AMLA and the institutions established under its provision naturally stipulates a 
huge amount of financial resources, especially when the Muslims themselves as a 
community are trailing behind the others in terms of their economic well being.   
 
The accomplishment achieved by the community in administering their religious life 
effectively over the past four decades since Singapore gained its independence in 1965, 
however, demonstrates a strong conviction of the Singapore Muslims to nurture an 
identity of financial independence and self confidence in managing their religious well 
being.  An indication of this achievement is the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore 
itself who experienced significant expansion since its inception in 1968 to its present 
state, both in term of its staff strength and its functions.  With only a president serving 
in a part-time capacity and a staff of seven, the Council has developed into a multi-
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department organization with a strength of more than 140 officers at present.  The 
Council has moved from being the official administrator of mosques in the country that 
played a reactionary role of merely repairing physical damages of the mosques and 
attending to public feedbacks and complaints, to a progressive agency who has 
successfully coordinated the financial resource of the Muslim community, planned and 
executed the building of modern mosques, designed their comprehensive religious and 
social programmes, managed a broad network of professionals and volunteers to run all 
the mosques, and nurtured these mosques to become national institutions that contribute 
towards social cohesion of the whole nation.  This, for one, is an achievement that is felt 
by the Muslim community of Singapore as their collective success that they are proud 
of.       
 
The Council has also expanded its function from overseeing the administration of 
various waqf properties by their respective trustees, to an active waqf developer who has 
undertaken numerous projects to enhance the asset value of these properties, the profit 
from which is considerably beneficial in the social development of the Muslim 
community.  The success achieved by the community and the Council in this area of 
waqf development was further amplified by the International Sheikh Mohammed bin 
Rashid Al-Maktoum Award conferred in 2006 by the Ruler of Dubai, for Innovative 
Solutions in Islamic Finance. 
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Other achievements by the Islamic Religious of Singapore, that encompass areas of 
religious education for the Muslims, administration of hajj and zakāt, interfaith  
interactions, halāl food certification, social development of the less fortunate Muslims, 
are all but manifestations of the determination of the Singapore Muslims to 
continuously enhance their religious life, albeit being a minority within a secular 
state.285    
 
 
4.6 The Fatwā Institution in  Singapore 
The parts of this Administration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA) which are of direct 
relevance to this research are those spelled out in Sections 30, 31, 32 and 33.  Section 
30 provides for the appointment of a Mufti by the President of Singapore, where the 
Mufti shall be ex-officio a member of the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore.  
Section 31 of the Act establishes the Fatwa Committee of the Islamic Religious 
Council, which consists of five members: the Mufti as the chairman; two other fit and 
proper members of the Islamic Religious Council; and not more than two other fit and 
proper Muslims who are not the members of the Council.286  These members of the 
Fatwa Committee shall be appointed by the President of Singapore on the advice of the 
Council for such a period as he thinks fit, and the notification of every such 
                                                 
285 Green, Anthony, Honouring the Past, Shaping the Future: The Muis Story, Majlis Ugama Islam 
Singapura, Singapore, 2009. 
286 Subsection 31(1) of AMLA. 
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appointment shall be published in the Gazette.287  The chairman and two other members 
of the Fatwa Committee, one of whom shall not be a member of the Islamic Religious 
Council, shall form a quorum.288  This Fatwa Committee may regulate its own 
procedure, subject  to the provisions of this Administration of Muslim Law Act 
(AMLA).289   
 
As this Section 31 spells out the requirement that two of the four appointed members of 
the Fatwa Committee, other than the Mufti as the chairman, should not be from the 
members of the Islamic Religious Council, and that one of the two members who shall 
form a quorum for any of its meetings should also not be from the members of the 
Council, it is apparent that this Act is designed in a such a way that a certain degree of 
transparency and balance is to be consciously observed in all of the Fatwa Committee’s 
deliberations.  This is useful in ensuring that every single fatwā and opinion issued by 
the committee is perceived by the Muslims of the country to be independent from any 
possible biases of the Islamic Religious Council, or of the government, hence 
safeguarding the authenticity and integrity of those fatāwā issued, for such an 
arrangement implies that the government has no interference or influence in the 
decisions of the committee. 
 
                                                 
287 Subsections 31(2) and 31(3) of AMLA. 
288 Subsection 31(6) of AMLA. 
289 Subsection 31(7) of AMLA. 
 168
Section 32 of the Act spells out the procedures for issuing fatāwā by the Committee, 
where it shall consider every request that it receives for a fatwā or ruling on any point of 
the Muslim law, and shall prepare a draft ruling thereon, unless in its opinion the 
question referred is frivolous or for other good reason ought not to be answered.290  The 
Mufti shall then officially issue the ruling on behalf and in the name of the Islamic 
Religious Council of Singapore, if such draft ruling is unanimously approved by the 
Legal Committee or those members thereof present and entitled to vote.291  In a case 
where the Fatwa Committee is not unanimous, the question shall then be referred to the 
Islamic Religious Council, which shall in like manner issue its ruling in accordance 
with the opinion of the majority of its members.292  
 
This section of the Act warrants a note that the Mufti of Singapore is not designated to 
individually issue any fatwā on his own accord based on his personal opinion.  The role 
of a Mufti in Singapore, as provided by the Act, is to chair the Fatwa Committee and to 
finally issue a fatwā only according to the unanimous decision reached by the Fatwa 
Committee.  Even in the event where the committee is unable to arrive at a unanimous 
decision in answering the question at hand, the Mufti is still not at liberty to provide his 
own opinion as a fatwa.  Instead, such a question is to be tabled to the Islamic Religious 
Council, whose members shall in turn make a decision based on their majority votes.  
However, such a decision, if issued as an answer to the party who requested for a legal 
                                                 
290 Subsections 32(1), 32(2) and 32(3) of AMLA. 
291 Subsection 32(4) of AMLA. 
292 Subsection 32(5) of AMLA. 
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ruling, is to be considered as the position of the Islamic Religious Council, and not 
accorded the status of a fatwā, as it is not the decision of the Fatwa Committee.       
 
This arrangement, as provided in the Administration of Muslim Law Act, would 
inevitably cause impediment to both the inquirer and the fatwā issuing authority; at the 
deliberation stage as part of the iftā’ process, as well as at the stage of delivering the 
answer to the inquirer.  During the stage of deliberation within the Fatwa Committee, 
such a provision may probably trigger some amount of anxiety among the committee 
members, as any inability to reach a unanimous decision would lead to the non-issuance 
of fatwā on a particular question, which in turn may create the perception among the 
community that the committee members and the Mufti as its chairman are not fully 
qualified in terms of their knowledge to accordingly address issues of concern of the 
community at large.    
  
Apart from the question of perception, such a situation of non-issuance of any requested 
fatwa by the Fatwa Committee would most definitely leave its members feeling 
dissatisfied, as the fundamental intention of them providing their services to the 
committee would have naturally been to provide assistance and guidance to the Muslim 
community in dealing with their religious questions.  This motivation to help guide the 
community, according to their needs and interest, is reflected in the provisions of the 
Administration of Muslim Law Act itself, where under Subsection 33-(2), it is 
mentioned that in a situation where the interest of the public requires the committee to 
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issue a fatwā according to the tenets of a school of law other that those of the Shāfi‘ī 
school of law, they are to place preference to the public interest, even though the Shāfi‘ī 
school of law is outlined by the Act as the principal school of law to be ordinarily 
followed in issuing fatāwā.  
 
Section 32 of this Administration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA) also mentions that if in 
any court, which includes the Shari’ah Court constituted under this Act, any question of 
the Muslim law falls for decision, and such court requests the opinion of the Islamic 
Religious Council on the question, the question shall be referred to the Fatwa 
Committee which shall, for and on behalf and in the name of the Council, give its 
opinion thereon in accordance with the opinion of the majority of its members.293   
 
Section 33 of the Admnistration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA) outlines the authorities to 
be followed by both the Islamic Religious Council and the Fatwa Committee, where in 
issuing any ruling both shall ordinarily follow the tenets of the Shāfi‘ī school of law.294  
In a situation where it is considered that the following of the tenets of the Shāfi‘ī school 
of law will be opposed to the public interest, the tenets of any of the other accepted 
schools of Muslim law may be followed, as may be considered appropriate.  However, 
in any such ruling the provisions and principles to be followed shall be set out in full 
detail and with all necessary explanations.295  In any case where the ruling is requested 
                                                 
293 Subsections 32(7) and 32(8) of AMLA. 
294 Subsection 33(1) of AMLA. 
295 Subsection 33(2) of AMLA. 
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in relation to the tenets of a particular school of Muslim law, the Islamic Religious 
Council or its Fatwa Committee shall give its ruling or opinion in accordance with the 
tenets of that particular school of Muslim law.296 
 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
As a conclusion to this chapter, let it be emphasized again that it is of utmost 
importance to encapsulate the social, political and economic elements that embody the 
environment that the Singapore Muslims live in and the challenges that they face, so as 
to comprehend the factors that the Mufti of the state and its Fatwa Committee have but 
to take into consideration in their fatwā deliberations.   
 
Firstly, from the historical perspective, Islam has reached Singapore in particular and 
the Malay archipelago in general many centuries ago, and has captured the conviction 
of the Singapore Malays, who were the native inhabitants of the island, by ways of 
peaceful propagation and not by military means.  They have been followers of the 
Shāfi‘ī school of law since the earliest days of Islam in the archipelago.  Upon the 
arrival of the colonial rulers who brought together with them unprecedented economic 
progress to the island, Singapore subsequently opened up its shores to immigrants and 
traders from all corners of the globe, resulting in its native Malay Muslims to find 
                                                 
296 Subsection 33(3) of AMLA. 
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themselves eventually transformed into a minority group within the new social fabric of 
the country’s population.  
 
Secondly, in terms of the political environment that the Singapore Muslims are living 
in, Singapore is currently a democratic state, where general elections are held once in 
every four years to elect the people’s representatives as members of Parliament.  
Singapore is a also a secular state, where religion is not accorded any effective role and 
position in the political administration of the state, to the extent that the line of 
separation between religion and the politics is clearly defined through the Religious 
Harmony Act.  However, this secular attitude of the state and the government is 
accommodative in nature, where the faith communities are allowed to profess their 
religions accordingly, and that these religions are left to progress as may be seen 
appropriate by their respective adherents, but without any discriminative preference 
given to any particular religion above the others.     
 
Thirdly, in terms of the socio-economic standing of the Muslims in Singapore, it has 
been numerously mentioned in various studies, that the Singapore Muslims are still 
trailing behind the other communities with regards to their educational achievement, 
employment status, wealth accumulation, property ownership, and business proprietary, 
albeit some degree of progress shown in the last couple of decades.  Although there has 
been an increase in recent years in terms of Muslim presence in professions, such as 
lawyers airline pilots and medical doctors, many Muslims face the possibility of being 
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unemployable, due to the highly competitive life culture in Singapore and its emphasis 
on meritocracy for vertical mobility.297  The high percentage of Muslims among those 
involved in a number of social predicaments, such as drug abuse and divorce cases 
among married couples, is also indicative of the challenges that the Muslims are still 
facing as a community.      
 
Fourthly, as a minority which numbers no more than seventeen per cent of the whole 
population, Muslims in Singapore are considerably independent and well organized in 
performing their religious obligations and in administering their religious affairs.  The 
establishment of the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore, together with the 
formation of its Fatwa Committee and the official state appointment of a Mufti, under 
the provisions of the Administration of Muslim Law Act, has played a significant role 
in the religious life of the community, albeit the extremely minimal funding provided by 
the government for the administration of the act and the management of the Islamic 
Religious Council.    
 
                                                 
297 Hussin Mutalib, Islam in Southeast Asia, Institute of Southeast Asia, Singapore, 2008, pp. 51-52.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
FATĀWĀ ISSUED BY THE SINGAPORE FATWĀ COMMITTEE 
 
 
This chapter looks at the fatāwā issued by the Fatwa Committee of the Islamic 
Religious Council of Singapore, and the application of the legal theories of iftā’, as 
discussed in the preceding chapters of this research, in these fatāwā issued.  
 
An investigation on the fatwā files kept in the Office of the Mufti, Islamic Religious 
Council of Singapore were conducted.  These files contain records of the fatwā 
meetings conducted since the first Fatwā Committee was put into inception in 1968 to 
the present.  The areas on which the fatwās were issued vary from basic religious rites 
for individual persons, such as the daily prayers, pre-prayer ablution or wudū’ and the 
verbal proclamation of faith, to major decisions that have a broad implication on the 
wider muslim community, like fatāwā on organ donation, halāl food requirement, 
administration of zakāh, and the like. 
 
As the fatāwā issued in this period of about four decades number in more than one 
thousand six hundred fatāwā altogether by estimation, this researcher is of the view that 
it is only appropriate to choose several fatāwā for investigation to satisfy the need of 
this research.  As such, a criteria used by this researcher in choosing the fatāwā is by the 
breadth of their implication on the lives of the muslim community in Singapore.  
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Another particular focus is also given to fatāwā that went through changes in the 
decisions of the Fatwā Committee.  This is due to the need to analyze and understand 
the factors that effect the changes, and the legal considerations given by the committee 
that have caused its members to make changes or adjustments to a number of their 
fatāwā. 
 
 
5.1 Inheritance management and estate distribution 
As mentioned in earlier parts of this research, the preservation of man’s property has 
been unanimously accepted by jurists as one of the essential objectives of the sharī‘ah.  
Substantial sections of Islamic law have been allocated for the deliberation on rules and 
regulations of property ownership and transactions, which encompass properties that are 
not only owned or transferred during the lifetime of a person, but also those that are to 
be duly distributed to his heirs and beneficiaries upon his death.   
 
In conducting an analytical investigation into the fatāwā issued by the Singapore Fatwa 
Committee, this researcher places preference to highlight foremost the examples of 
fatāwā that deal with estate management and distribution.  This is due to the fact that 
the majority of questions posed to the Committee are on issues of such a nature.  By 
browsing through the minutes of the Committee’s meetings held in the Office of the 
Mufti, this researcher discovered that an average of about sixty percent of the issues 
deliberated by the Committee since its inception in 1968 have been on the distribution 
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of estates to their rightful heirs according to the Islamic law of farā’id or mawārīth, the 
validity of was iyyah (bequest or will), the legal status of properties jointly owned by 
two or more persons when one of the parties passes away, and the application of tools 
like hibah (gift), waqf (endowment) and nadhr (vow) in facilitating and managing 
transfer of properties. 
 
In the following section of this research, the researcher will present, first, the analysis 
on fatāwā issued with regards to the law of farā’id and the validity of was iyyah.  This 
will be subsequently followed by an analysis on fatāwā issued on another category of 
instrument, termed as nuzriah, which is devised to facilitate the management and 
transfer of wealth.      
 
5.1.1 Farā’id and Wasiyyah  
The Islamic Law of Inheritance, also known as Islamic Law of Succession, is called 
farā’id.  It deals with the distribution of the estate of a deceased Muslim according to 
certain formulae specified by the Qur’an and the Sunnah, after payment of legacies and 
debts are settled. 
 
In the 3 volume compilation of selected fatāwā published by the Islamic Religious 
Council of Singapore (Muis), a total of twenty five fatāwā on inheritance and estate 
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distribution are highlighted.298  Of these twenty five fatāwā, only two were on the issue 
of specific shares to be distributed to the respective heirs of a deceased person as 
allocated according to the law of farā’id.  This is consistent with the investigation 
conducted by this researcher on the files of minutes of the Fatwa Committee meetings, 
where it was discovered that almost none of the questions posed to the Fatwa 
Committee on estate distribution and management were on issues of farā’id.  On the 
contrary, most of the issues deliberated were in relation to the validity of was āyā, 
nadhr, hibah and waqf.  
 
This researcher is of the view that this is due to two possible reasons, the first of which 
is that the jurisdiction provided by the Administration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA) in 
issues of farā’id was allocated to the state’s Syariah Court.  Sections 112 and 115 of 
AMLA dictates that the Syariah Court has jurisdiction over the method of distribution 
of a deceased person's estate among his next of kin in accordance with Islamic law.299  
Section 115 in particular of the said AMLA provides for the Court to issue an 
inheritance certificate to any person to be a beneficiary of a deceased person, upon an 
application made by that beneficiary.  Questions on such a nature would have therefore 
been directed to the Syariah Court rather than to the Fatwa Committee due to the legal 
provision of the said AMLA. 
 
                                                 
298 Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura, Kumpulan Fatwa (Compilation of Fatāwā), Majlis Ugama Islam 
Singapura, Singapore, vol. 3, pp. 24-38.  
299 Sections 112 and 115, the Administration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA), Singapore. 
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The second reason is the degree of certainty and clarity of the rules on farā’id, as 
availably reflected in the legal writings of the jurists, based on the injunction 
specifically  delineated in the Qur’ān with considerable details.300  When posed with 
questions of such a nature, the expected answers to which are straightforward and do 
not deal beyond the calculation of shares due to each beneficiary, the Syariah Court 
would be in due position to efficiently provide the requested calculation by issuing a 
Certificate of Inheritance.  This is in contrast to questions on issues of was iyyah, hibah, 
nadhr and waqf, all of which are instruments devised with less rigidity in their specifics 
as compared to the rules of farā’id.  These instruments allow greater flexibility for 
muslims to effect transfer of properties to persons or parties they wish to, albeit with 
certain regulations and prerequisites stipulated to act as legal guidelines.  As a result, 
legal ambiguities exist in large number of wills made by members of the muslim 
community with regards to their validity according to the Islamic law, thus warrant the 
need to resort to the iftā’ institution for deliberation and decision on the validity of those 
wills. 
 
When occasionally there are questions on issues of farā’id brought up to the Fatwa 
Committee’s attention, they are specifically on areas that still carry ambiguities and thus 
need deliberation and decision by the Committee.  For example, one of the two fatāwā 
on farāid mentioned in the compilation published is about the share of inheritance to be 
assigned to a deceased’s mother when the deceased also left behind surviving siblings.  
                                                 
300 Surat al-Nisā’, 4:7-13. 
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As the deceased’s siblings are not allocated with any shares from the estate due to the 
existence of the deceased’s father301, a question arose as to whether the deceased’s 
mother should be allocated 1/3 or 1/6 of the estate.  It is also mentioned in the question 
that there are two different views on this, and thus a fatwā is sought. 
 
Upon deliberation, the Fatwa Committee agreed that the surviving mother should get 
1/6 of the estate due to the existence of the deceased’s siblings, regardless whether they 
too inherit or not.302  The fatwā mentions that this is based on the Qur’anic verse “ … 
for parents, a sixth share of the inheritance to each, if the deceased left children; if no 
children, and the parents are the (only) heirs, the mother has a third; if the deceased left 
brothers (or sisters) the mother has a sixth. “.303  
 
Another question on the rules of farāid mentioned in the compilation is about the 
inheritance of a deceased person who was an adherent of the Shī‘ah sect during his 
lifetime.  He was survived by his wife, who was also the sole heir to his estate.  The 
Fatwa Committee was asked on the method of distribution according to the Shī‘ah 
school of law. 
 
                                                 
301 In the farāi’d rules, the existence of the deceased’s surviving father at the point of his death causes the 
shares for the deceased’s siblings to be omitted.  This is termed as hajb, and an heir who is not allocated 
any share due to the existence of another heir, is called mahjūb.  
302 _____, Kumpulan Fatwa 3, Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura, 1998, pp. 33-34. 
303 Sūrat al-Nisā’, 4:11. 
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To this, the Fatwa Committee highlighted that the Administration of Muslim Law Act 
(AMLA) dictates that all fatāwā to be issued have to be based on legal views of the 
Shāfi‘ī school of law.  Based on this provision in the constitution, the Committee 
decided that according to the Shāfi‘ī madhhab, the deceased’s wife was to be given 1/4 
of the estate, and that the Bayt al-Māl was to receive the remaining 3/4 portion.  The 
fatwā however proceeded further to explain that although such was the legal opinion 
within the Shāfi‘ī madhhab, in was not in conflict with the views of the Shī‘ah school of 
law.  On this, the Committee quoted the view of Sheikh Muhammad ibn Hasan304 who 
wrote that in the case of a deceased man who is survived only by his wife, she would 
inherit 1/4 of his estate and the remaining portion is to be given to the Imām, or Bayt al-
Māl.305 
 
As mentioned earlier, the majority of the fatāwā deliberated and issued by the Fatwa 
Committee in the area of inheritance and estate management are those relating to legal 
instruments other than farā’id.  Many of the questions posed for the Committee’s 
deliberation are on the validity of was āyā, or wills.  Upon investigating the fatāwā 
issued on the validity of was āyā, it is discovered that there are two prerequisites utilized 
by the Committee as general guidelines in determining the validity of any was iyyah.  
The first of these prerequisites is that any mūs ā lahu, or beneficiary mentioned in a will 
and intended to be bequeathed with a portion of the estate, must not be a wārith to the 
                                                 
304 The title of the book by this Sheikh Muhammad ibn Hasan of the Shī‘ah school of law, referred to by 
the Fatwā Committee, was not mentioned in the text of the fatwā. 
305 _____, Kumpulan Fatwa 3, Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura, 1998, pp. 30-31. 
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deceased, that is one who is already an heir to the deceased, and whose share of the 
inheritance has already been allocated by the rules of farā’id.  The second prerequisite 
is that the total portion of the estate to be bequeathed to all the beneficiaries by way of 
was iyyah should not exceed one third (1/3) of the whole estate. 
 
These two prerequisites to the validity of a wasiyyah are widely mentioned in the 
writings on Islamic law by Jurists of the Shāfi‘ī madhhab.  In his al-‘Azīz Sharh al-
Wajīz, Al-Rāfi‘ī mentioned and supported al-Ghazzālī’s proposition on the first 
prerequisite that a wārith should not be bequeathed by way of was iyyah, and that if such 
a will is created it is considered as null and void.  However, it can be allowed and the 
bequest considered valid if all the other warathah agree to allow such a bequest to stand 
and put into effect.306  Similarly with the second prerequisite, al-Ghazzālī and al-Rāfi‘ī 
explicitly mentioned that any bequest by way of was iyyah designed to exceed 1/3 of the 
whole estate is invalid, unless agreed to by all the warathah.307 
 
Some examples of fatāwā issued by the Singapore Fatwa Committee on was iyyah with 
regards to these two prerequisites are as follows: 
 
 
                                                 
306 Al-Rāfi‘ī, ‘Abd al-Karīm ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Karīm, al-‘Azīz Sharh al-Wajīz, Dār al-Kutub 
al-‘Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 1997, vol. 7, pp. 21-25.  See also al-Bujayramī, Sulaymān, Tuhfah al-Habīb ‘alā  
Sharh al-Khatīb, Dār al-Fikr, Beirut, 1998, vol. 3, pp. 428-430. 
307 Ibid., vol. 7, pp. 33-40.  See also al-Bujayramī, Sulaymān, Tuhfah al-Habīb ‘alā  Sharh al-Khatīb, Dār 
al-Fikr, Beirut, 1998, vol. 3, pp. 423-427. 
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Example 1 
Question: A person made a will to bequeath 1/3 of his estate for the purpose of waqf.  Is 
his was iyyah valid? 
Answer: The Fatwa Committee is of the view that the person, in making his will, has 
resolved to make a continuous act of charity.  His wasiyyah was intended to purchase a 
house or a shop that would generate constant revenue.  His was iyyah therefore can not 
be changed, and must be complied with.  As such, a house or a shop is to be purchased 
from his estate, and it shall subsequently become a permanent waqf as intended by the 
person.308  
    
Example 2 
Question: A foreign citizen had made a will before he embraced Islam, that his 
properties in his country of origin were to be bequeathed to his children if he passes 
away.  After becoming a Muslim and having a Muslim wife, the man passed away 
without retracting his earlier will, and his children did not embrace Islam.  Is his will 
valid? 
Answer:  The Fatwa Committee agreed that the was iyyah is valid and applicable, with 
the condition that the portion to be bequeathed does not exceed 1/3 of the whole 
estate.309 
 
 
                                                 
308 _____, Kumpulan Fatwa 3, Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura, Singapore, p. 24. 
309 Ibid., p. 25. 
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Example 3 
Question: Is a Muslim allowed to devise a was iyyah where the beneficiary is a non-
Muslims? 
Answer: The Fatwa Committee decided that it is permissible for a Muslim to make a 
was iyyah for a non-Muslim beneficiary as long as the amount to be bequeathed does not 
exceed 1/3 of  his whole estate.310   
 
Example 4 
Question: A person made a was iyyah, wherein he intended to bequeath 1/5 of his estate 
to his adopted child.  Is his was iyyah valid or otherwise? 
Answer: The Fatwa Committee decided that the wasiyyah is valid in view of the fact 
that the intended portion to be bequeathed does not exceed 1/3 of his inheritance, and 
also because it is not intended to be bequeathed to any of his warathah (legal heirs).311 
 
Example 5 
Question: Is a was iyyah that dictates the following terms, valid?: First, that the 
deceased’s widow was to be appointed as the trustee to administer his estate.  Secondly, 
that 1/3 of the deceased’s business shares was to be bequeathed to his widow.  Thirdly, 
that the deceased’s widow was to be given absolute authority to make her decision as to 
whether she would choose to continue with the business dealings of her late husband, as 
though she now owns the business. 
                                                 
310 Ibid. 
311 Ibid., p. 26. 
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Answer: This was iyyah is not valid, except the part where it is mentioned that the 
deceased’s widow was to be appointed as the trustee to administer the estate.  This is 
because the deceased appears to be trying to have power over his properties after his 
death, whereas he did not have the right to do as such.  By his will, the deceased was 
also bequeathing a larger portion of his estate and a greater authorization to his widow, 
while the Prophet has asserted in a hadīth that a was iyyah to be bequeathed to a wārith 
is invalid.312   
 
These examples and many other fatāwā issued by the Fatwā Committee in relation to 
the issue of was iyyah reflect the stand taken by the Committee to stay true to the legal 
opinion held by jurists of the Shāfi‘ī madhhab, as provided by the Administration of 
Muslim Law Act (AMLA).  The questions posed in these five examples are 
straightforward, and as such the two general principles mentioned in earlier paragraphs, 
that a bequest can not be made for the benefit of a wārith and that the amount should 
not exceed 1/3 of the whole estate, have been effectively utilized by the Committee in 
its decisions.  Since there is no indication in these examples to suggest that special 
consideration is to be given in order to realize mas lahah or to prevent mafsadah, the 
ruling held by the Shāfi‘ī jurists as the most credible in the madhhab (al-qawl al-
mu‘tamad fī al-madhhab) was thus adopted as the basis for the fatāwā issued.  
 
                                                 
312 Ibid., pp. 27-28. 
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Having said this, it is however a fact of human life that every family is unique in term 
of the nature of inter-personal relationships among family members.  Challenges faced 
by families vary from one to another, and conflicts of interests within the family units 
more than often instigate legal disputes and disagreements.  This is especially true when 
it comes to issues of wealth management within families, as well as issues of property 
ownership and transactions. 
 
The rules of farā’id as clearly outlined in the Qur’an, and the guidelines provided in the 
area of was iyyah, are designed to ensure equity and fairness in the distribution of 
estates, so as to avoid discords that are detrimental to family life and relationships.  
Jurists of all madhāhib unanimously agree with the legality of farā’id and was iyyah in 
Islamic law as instruments for estate management and distribution.  Nonetheless, there 
can also be situations specific to certain families where the rules of farā’id and the 
general legal framework for applying wasiyyah may not cause the realization of 
mas lahah to take effect.   
 
As an example, there may be a family of a husband and wife with a child.  Supposedly 
the couple are already in their old age, both stricken with various illnesses, and no 
longer fit to work.  The only property that they together own could be their house and 
some savings that they live on.  Supposedly also, their only child, on the other hand, is 
an irresponsible person who was never willing to work in a proper decent job, and who 
repeatedly gets himself involved in countless criminal acts.  In such a scenario, the old 
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couple would naturally have grave concerns and worries as to what would happen to 
their partner in the event one of them dies.  If the management of their property is left 
unplanned, and the law of farā’id is to take its due course upon the death of one of the 
couple, their son would be given a majority share of the inheritance.  The farā’id rules 
dictate that he would get 3/4 of the inheritance if his mother was to pass away, or 7/8 of 
the inheritance if his father was to pass away.  Consequently, the welfare and livelihood 
of his surviving parent would be in jeopardy, for there is a great probability that the son 
would neglect his responsibility towards his parent. 
 
The application of was iyyah in this particular case is also not legally feasible in Islamic 
law.  As indicated earlier, one of the general rules in was iyyah is that it cannot be for the 
benefit of a wārith who already has a share in the inheritance allocated by the law of 
farā’id.  In this particular case, if either the old man or his wife resorts to devise a 
was iyyah to bequeath his/her property to his/her surviving spouse upon death, the 
was iyyah would eventually be invalid, and the intent, futile.   
 
This is one example from many more others, where special needs in specific contexts 
warrant a review of the standard legal tools normally applied, and where alternative 
solutions are explored, with the objective of realizing mas lahah, as enjoined by the 
sharī‘ah. 
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5.1.2 Nuzriah 
The Islamic principles of justice, compassion and equitability are inherent in farā’id.  
There is a always a need to educate Muslims to observe these principles.  Nevertheless, 
and in addition to education, Islam also allows the introduction of other alternative 
methods in the distribution of property or wealth to safeguard these principles which 
could be compromised by the changing socio-economic landscape in order to preserve 
maslahah.  Concepts like nuzriah provide a viable option to protect the interests, or 
mas ālih, of one’s loved ones who are in dire circumstances.  In fact, Islam is flexible 
even to the point of not adhering to the literal distribution of the shares as dictated by 
farā’id as long as the consent of all legal heirs, or warathah, is obtained, as previously 
mentioned. 
 
Singaporean Muslims have enjoyed a good level of social and economic development 
over the last few decades, making them better off materially.  However, in some cases, 
the increase in economic standing has not necessarily brought about a corresponding 
improvement in their social capital that is, in the bonds that exist among family 
members brought about by feelings of mutual trust and obligation.  This becomes 
clearly evident when it comes to the division of the estate of a Muslim following his 
death.  There were many instances where the legal heirs of the deceased (parents and 
siblings) insist on the immediate distribution of the estate according to farā’id without 
taking into account the conditions of the deceased’s immediate family (wife nad 
children). 
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 Nuzriah, as it is widely referred to by the Singapore Fatwa Committee and the Muslim 
community of the country, is a legal instrument approved by the Fatwa Committee to 
provide an alternative means to the distribution of estate in accordance with the Shāfi‘ī 
school of law.  The term nuzriah originates from the Arabic word nadhr313 (vow), a 
term rooted in the Qur’an and has legal basis in Islam.314  Nadhr is a widely recognized 
principle in Islamic jurisprudence and a subject matter within Islamic legal corpus.  
However, nuzriah, is not as widely used nor discussed.  The origins of the concept can 
be traced to the works of later Shāfi‘ī jurists such as al-Nawawī and al-Haytamī, 
although it appears that the term itself was not used except by the Muftī of Hadramawt, 
Sayyid ‘Abd al-Rahmān Bā‘alawī, in his compilation entitled Bughyat al-Mustarshidīn, 
and Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Shātirī in his al-Yāqūt al-Nafīs.  Nuzriah has also been a 
practice of some segments of the Shāfi‘ī school of law, notably in Hadramawt, Yemen.  
The use of nuzriah as a legal instrument in other Muslim jurisdictions is currently not 
known.    
 
Nuzriah is a form of nadhr that serves the need of some Muslims to transfer wealth 
before death due to some dire circumstances.  The Fatwa Committee has made a ruling 
to accept nuzriah on the authority of the position of a Shāfi‘ī jurist, Ibn Hajr al-
Haytamī.  According to al-Haytamī, the implementation of nuzriah can be deferred to a 
                                                 
313 As the Arabic root word is nadhr, its derivative should then be nudhriyyah.  However, as the term 
widely and officially used by the Fatwa Committee and the Singapore Muslim community is nuzriah, this 
researcher opts to retain the mention of nuzriah rather than nudhriyyah. 
314 See Sūrat al-Baqarah, 2:270; Sūrat al-Hajj, 22:29; and Sūrat al-Insān, 76:7. 
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date specified by the nādhir (vower), which can be anytime between the date the 
nuzriah is made, to a maximum of three days before death due to sickness or an hour 
before sudden death.315  
 
In the compilation of selected fatāwā published by the Islamic Religious Council of 
Singapore, three fatāwā on nuzriah were showcased.  The first was about a person who 
made a will instructing that his estate was to be distributed according to the Shāfi‘ī 
school of law.  He also made a nuzriah indicating that the portion of his estate that he 
had earlier inherited from his late father was to be given by way of nadhr to all his 
nephews and nieces on equal shares.  The Fatwa Committee was asked whether the will 
and the nuzriah were valid.  To this the Committee decided that both the will and the 
nuzriah were valid according to the Shafi‘ī school of law.316 
 
The second case was about a person who bought a 4-room Housing Development Board 
(HDB)317 flat using his parents’ names.  The reason why the house was purchased under 
his parents’ names is that he had already owned another HDB flat, and it has always 
been a HDB policy that a person is restricted from owning two flats at the same time.  
Apparently the flat was intended only as a place for his parents to stay, but not as his 
gift to them.  He was worried that in the event of his parents’ death, his siblings would 
                                                 
315 Al-Haytamī, Shihāb al-Dīn Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Hajar, Tuhfah al-Muhtāj bi Sharh al-Minhāj, 
Dār Sādir, Cairo, n.d., vol. 10, p. 77. 
316 ______ , Kumpulan Fatwa 3, Majlis Ugama Islam Singappura, Singapore, 1998, p. 28. 
317 The Housing Development Board (HDB) is a statutory board formed by the Singapore Government 
with the task of providing quality but affordable public housing for the general public.  About 80% of 
Singaporeans reside in HDB flats.   
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demand their share of inheritance from the said flat.  His question posed to the Fatwa 
Committee was thus on how to devise a will, or was iyyah, that would effect in him 
being the legal owner of the flat in accordance with Islamic law.  In its fatwā issued on 
this, the Committee expressed its view that the person can realize his intention by way 
of making a letter of nuzriah.318  
 
The third fatwā was about a widow who inherited property from the estate of her late 
husband.  She had the intention of giving away the inheritance to her two daughters, and 
proceeded to make a was iyyah to that effect.  The Fatwa Committee was then asked on 
how to make the was iyyah valid.  The Committee issued a brief fatwā suggesting that 
the was iyyah can be valid if the method of nuzriah is employed.  By utilizing nuzriah, 
the property is considered to have been given to her two daughters during her 
lifetime.319 
 
These three fatāwā on nuzriah are considerably brief.  There is no indication of how a 
nuzriah is defined, what does it entail, and the procedures to be put in place for it to 
operate and be legally valid.  There is also no illustration of how the text of the nuzriah 
refered to in these three fatāwā was, or should be, articulated.  A further investigation 
into the files of minutes of the Fatwa Committee meetings, however, revealed that 
generally a nuzriah is a vow made by a person to transfer the ownership of his 
property/properties to an intended party, and that the transfer of ownership is to take 
                                                 
318 ______ , Kumpulan Fatwa 3, Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura, Singapore, 1998, p. 28. 
319 ______, Kumpulan Fatwa 3, Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura, Singapore, 1998, p. 29. 
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place three days before the giver’s death if it is  due to illness, or one hour before his 
death if it is sudden.   
 
This researcher is of the view that although the Fatwa Committee has approved of 
nuzriah, there are several difficulties that may arise from its use.  The peculiar condition 
of its implementation before death raises the question of the exact timing of the transfer 
of ownership of the avowed property.  Furthermore, the stipulation of the peculiar 
condition of implementation such as “3 days before death due to sickness or an hour 
before sudden death” raises the spectre of a fiction or textual anachronism being created 
in order to make the nuzriah a “before death” transaction.  Moreover, the stated 
condition can be seen as absurd since no one could predict with any degree of certainty 
when the hour of death would take place. 
 
It is therefore not a position of consensus among jurists that nuzriah is a valid and 
recognized legal instrument in Islam.  In fact, nuzriah is seen in  this context as a tool to 
circumvent farā’id which has been laid down in the main sources of Islamic law; the 
Qur’an and the sunnah.  As such, nuzriah which is made to operate just before death, is 
seen to be in conflict with the principles and spirit of farā’id.  
 
Apparently, nuzriah is a contentious and controversial tool to be applied for transfer of 
property.  However, the issue of adopting a weaker legal opinion for the purpose of iftā’ 
in certain cases with the objective of realizing mas lahah and avoiding mafsadah has 
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been thoroughly addressed in earlier chapters of this research.  This researcher has 
pointed out that the general reservation among jurists of the Shāfi‘ī madhhab towards 
the application of istihsān, istislāh and mas ālih mursalah was more in the realm of us ūl 
al-fiqh, the purpose of which is to assist in the process of deducing rulings and legal 
opinions from the primary texts.  The reservation comes about also when the 
consideration of mas lahah is excessively and liberally utilized even in general 
situations.  In the realm of iftā’, however, the propositions offered by the jurists of the 
Shāfi‘ī madhhab, as reflected in their writings, highlighted the fact that the 
consideration of mas lahah is to be given prominence in the process of tanzīl al-hukm 
for specific cases with special needs and contexts. 
 
The application of nuzriah, albeit with all the legal controversies and complications 
surrounding it, is a tool accepted by some jurists, among whom is Ibn Hajr al-Haytamī.  
It is thus an acceptable practice for the Fatwa Committee, and for any muftī, to issue 
certain fatāwā allowing its application for certain individuals or groups within the 
Muslim community, when strict observance of the rules of farā’id and the prerequisites 
of was iyyah is likely to cause greater harm. 
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5.2 Joint Tenancy in Flat Ownership 
5.2.1 Background of problem 
Singapore is a country which aims to be the hub for open trading, international 
investments and global finances.  It is no surprise that many new schemes and plans are 
introduced to remain on par with the daily evolving trends and needs. 
 
Similarly, new policies involving financial management and transactions are applied in 
helping to safeguard the interests of the public and to ensure better implementation of 
other transactions.  Saving funds for working adults are governed in such a design that 
allows them to make purchases on indispensable necessities like housing, transport and 
medical facilities, while at the same time still ensure enough left to be enjoyed after 
retirement when they need it more. 
 
In line with the applications outlined above is the procedure of purchasing a house from 
the Housing and Development Board (HDB) of Singapore.  An applicant can purchase a 
flat as a sole owner of the flat.  If there are 2 or more owners, they can own the HDB 
flat either as joint tenants or tenants-in-common.  A maximum of four owners are 
allowed for each flat. 
 
The second mode of purchase is the topic of discussion at present.  A joint-tenancy is a 
form of ownership where all co-owners have equal interest in the flat, regardless of the 
individual owner’s contribution to buy the flat.  In joint-tenancy, there is a right of 
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survivorship.  This means that upon the death of a joint-tenant, his interest in the flat 
will automatically be passed to the remaining co-owner(s), regardless of whether the 
deceased joint-tenant has left behind a Will.320   
 
In understanding this contract from the civil law, this contract represents a shared 
ownership of the property between two or more co-owners.  The contract does not 
denote the shares owned by the co-owners, and it does not take into account the 
contributions made by each of the co-owners.  All co-owners have equal interest in the 
flat.  Any transaction thereof with regards to this property requires the consent and 
initials of each of the co-owners. 
 
The point of concern with this type of contract from the sharī‘ah perspective is the right 
of survivorship upon the demise of one of the co-owners.  Under joint-tenancy, if one of 
the flat owners passes away, the deceased joint-tenant’s share or interest in the flat will 
be passed on to the surviving joint-tenant(s).  For example: a husband and wife (both 
above 21 years old) are holding the flat under joint-tenancy.  If the husband passes 
away, the surviving wife can take over the flat as the sole lessee if she is a Singapore 
Citizen or a Singapore Permanent Resident.  If the lease had already been issued for the 
flat, a legal document known as the Notice of Death instrument will have to be 
prepared. 
 
                                                 
320 Housing Development Board.  Singapore.  Extracted on 12 May 2007. 
http://www.hdb.gov.sg/_4825703800256607.nsf/0/6233D1D7C31EDF9448257070001E17F6?Open  
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The above means that, according to HDB rules, once a co-owner dies, full ownership of 
the property will be granted to the surviving co-owner automatically.  No further legal 
proceeding which involves any court of law is needed.  Even if the deceased has left 
behind a Will wherein the flat is included, the inclusion of the flat as part of the Will is 
considered void.  It is different than tenancy-in-common, whereby each co-owner holds 
a separate and definite share in the flat.  However, all the co-owners are entitled to the 
enjoyment of the whole flat regardless of their share in the property. There is no right of 
survivorship in tenancy-in-common.  The deceased’s interest in the flat does not pass on 
automatically to the remaining co-owner(s).  Upon the death of a tenant-in-common, the 
deceased’s interest in the flat will be distributed according to his Will (if any), or 
according to the provisions of the Intestate Succession Act.321  In the case of Muslims, 
it is provisioned under AMLA Clause 106.322     
                                                
 
Viewing the Joint Tenancy contract in terms of the ownership rights, we can deduce 
that the property belongs to the co-owners, and each has equal rights in it. This means 
that if we were to indicate this right in percentage, owner A and owner B both have 
50% ownership of the property.  Only after the death of either one of them – according 
to HDB rules – will the surviving owner obtain 100% ownership of the property.  This 
signifies that prior to the demise, half of the property still belongs to the deceased. 
 
321 ____, “Related information – tenancy-in-common”, Housing Development Bard of Singapore, 
http://www.hdb.gov.sg/fi10/fi10206p.nsf/WPDis/Changing%20Of%20Owners%20And%20OccupiersRel
ated%20Information%20-%20Tenancy-in-Common?OpenDocument.  Accessed 2 January 2008. 
322 Republic of Singapore, Administration of Muslim Law Act, clause 106. –(1) In the case of any Muslim 
person domiciled in Singapore dying intestate, the estate and effects shall be distributed according to the 
Muslim law as modified, where applicable, by Malay custom.  
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 The big question now is, should this half be included in the inheritance left by the 
deceased upon his death, which should be spent accordingly for the burial needs and 
ceremony, paying his debts, carrying out his bequests, and afterwards distributed to his 
legal heirs?  Or does his agreement to undertake the purchasing of the house via Joint 
Tenancy indicate his intention to leave the house for the co-owner (in many cases the 
spouse or children) and not as part of the distributable inheritance? 
 
 
5.2.2 Fatwā issued on the problem         
With regards to the matter of the joint Tenancy contract administered by the HDB, two 
questions so far have been submitted to the Fatwa Committee and addressed. 
 
 1.  First fatwā issued in 1997 
“Question 1.  Does a flat – which was purchased by a man with his now 
divorced wife by Joint Tenancy contract - become full property of the 
ex-wife upon the demise of the man (her ex-husband)?    
 
Answer: After conducting a research on the position of the Joint Tenancy 
contract, the Fatwa Committee opines that the ex-wife of the deceased 
does not have full ownership of the flat.  The Fatwa Committee is of the 
view that she is only entitled to her share of half of the value of the flat.  
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This share is acquired by being the co-owner of the flat in accordance 
with the joint tenancy contract. 
 
The remaining half of the flat value is allocated to the legal heirs of the 
deceased.  The ex-wife has no right to this remaining share because they 
have been divorced prior to the deceased’s death.  Therefore she is not 
entitled to any portion of it as she no longer had any blood or family tie 
with the deceased at the time of his demise.”323  
 
 2.  Second fatwā issued in 1997 
“Question 2: A married couple purchased a HDB flat with both their 
names as joint tenants.  According to HD law, upon demise of either one 
of the co-owners, full ownership of the flat is given to the succeeding co-
owner.  What is the Islamic ruling in this matter? 
 
Answer: The Fatwa Committee has decided that a house left by a 
deceased, which was purchased by means of a Joint Tenancy contract, 
does not become fully owned by the surviving co-owner.  The share 
belonging to the deceased must be appraised according to the value, then 
distributed to the legal heirs according to farā’id rules.”324        
 
                                                 
323 _____, Kumpulan Fatwa 3, Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura, Singapore, 1998, p. 38. 
324 Ibid., p. 38. 
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5.2.3 Evaluation of fatwā 
The Qur’an provides a general guideline on the general concept of contracts in Islam, 
highlighted in the verse (O you who believe!  Fulfill your undertakings).325  Any 
agreement or contract undertaken by a Muslim must be fulfilled and carried out, with 
the condition that these contracts are certain and ratified, and do not contradict with 
established principles in Islamic contracts. 
 
To determine the certainty of this contract, consent and clarity of the contract have to be 
analyzed.  The fact that both owners agree to this contract, wherein the automatic 
transfer after death is clearly highlighted and is legally bound, shows their knowledge of 
and consent to the transfer.  Otherwise, the co-owners will not have opted for such a 
purchase scheme, as there are other means of purchasing available to them.   
 
However, the issue of clarity of the contract cannot be established.  According to the 
rules of wealth transfer in Islam, all means of transfer of monetary and property 
rights326 have to be made distinctly and unambiguously, to avoid disputes due to lack of 
clarity.  The ambiguity in this contract lies in the determining type of contract under 
Islamic commercial law the joint-tenancy contract falls into.  This is important, because 
                                                 
325 Sūrat al-Mā’idah, 5:1. 
326 Transfer of wealth can be made during the lifetime of a person, or after his death.  While alive, 
transfers can be made via hibah (gift), sadaqah (charity), zakāt and waqf (endowment/charitable bequest).  
Transfers after death include wasiyyah (will) and irth (inheritance according to farā’id).  Transactions 
such as hibah, waqf and wasiyyah has to be elucidated clearly, either verbally or in writing.  For more 
detailed reading, see Zuhaili, Wahbah, Financial Transactions in Islamic Jurisprudence, trans. El-Gamal, 
Mahmoud, Dār al-Fikr, Damascus, 2003.    
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only by ascertaining the type of contract it is categorized can we determine what the 
contract entails.     
 
i. Joint tenancy and sharikat al-milk (joint ownership) 
Some may venture to relate this contract to joint ownership, or association in property.  
In Islamic commercial law, joint ownership (sharikat al-milk) is of two types: 
 
1. involuntary partnership whence no action of approval from either partner is 
needed.  This is illustrated in the form of legal heirs who share in the inheritance 
of a property. 
2. voluntary partnership, in the form of joint purchase, or joint receivership of gift 
or bequest. 
 
The latter is undoubtedly similar to the Joint Tenancy.  In purview of the authority of 
transaction sanctioned to each of the sharing owners from the Sharī‘ah stand, however, 
both types bears the same ruling.  That is, none of the parties has the right to deal in the 
other’s share.327  Hence, if we were to view Joint-Tenancy in the same light as sharikat 
al-milk, a co-owner has no right or interest in the other co-owner’s share of the 
property. 
 
 
                                                 
327 Sarakhsī, Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Abī Sahl, Kitāb al-Mabsūt, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, ___, 
2001, vol. 11, p. 162. 
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ii. Joint Tenancy and hibah (gift) 
The closest form of valid transaction we can relate the Joint Tenancy to is the hibah 
(gift).  In this case, the condition of sīghah (expression) is not fulfilled.  Referring to 
earlier Islamic legal literature, this condition is required according to all the schools of 
fiqh; for the hibah to be stated in verbal form by the wāhib (giver).  However, consent 
of receipt from the recipient of the gift is not required.  The only point of dispute among 
the scholars is the means of this expression, whether to be made in the direct or indirect 
form.  This s īghah or verbal announcement of hibah can be dismissed if there is 
physical transfer of the gift, ta‘ātī.  Ta‘ātī is valid as long as there is delivery of 
possession to the intended recipient, with the knowledge and permission of the giver, 
and there has been established understanding between the two parties that the giver 
intends it as a hibah.328  Hibah also obliges the transfer of ownership from the giver to 
the recipient from the moment the expression of hibah is made.329 
 
The above-mentioned criteria are not found in Joint Tenancy in its full clarity.  Had the 
deceased owner made a written or verbal testimony of giving full ownership of the 
house to the joint-tenant(s) during his life, the matter can be acted upon as such.  Those 
who have this intention should opt for transfer of flat ownership instead.  This, which is 
done during the life of the deceased will prevent any ambiguity.  Transfer of flat 
ownership means change of flat ownership between family members without monetary 
consideration by way of gift on grounds of love and affection.  Generally, the procedure 
                                                 
328 Zuhaylī, Wahbah, al-Fiqh al-Islāmī wa Adillatuh, Dār al-Fikr, Damascus, 1989, vol. 5, p. 21. 
329 Ibid., vol. 5, p. 21. 
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consists of determining the proposed owner’s eligibility to take over the flat, and their 
eligibility to obtain and financing of the monthly installment.330  The eligibility criteria 
include having family relation with the original owner, and is 21 years and above.  
Assessment of income is not required if the proposed owner is an original occupier.331  
Eligibility of concessionary loan from HDB may also be granted, for those whose gross 
monthly household income is less than $8,000.332  Since the intended beneficiaries of 
this transfer scheme are family members, leniency is practiced in transfers for family 
members. 
 
The Joint Tenancy contract, therefore, does not fully serve the purpose of giving the 
interest of the property to the co-owner, since transfer of ownership better 
accommodates this purpose.  Hence it is inaccurate to conclude that the deceased has 
intended the house to be given to the co-owner.  The HDB rule of automatic 
survivorship, although binding by law, does not mitigate the Sharī‘ah rulings which 
should be carried out by a practising Muslim.  Hence the result remains that Joint 
Tenancy is not a form of hibah and the deceased’s share of property still remains as his 
                                                 
330 _____, “Policies – Transfer of Flat Ownership”, Housing Development Board of Singapore, 
<http://www.hdb.gov.sg/fi10/fi10206p.nsf/WPDis/Changing%20Of%20Owners%20And%20OccupiersP
olicies%20-%20Transfer%20of%20Flat%20Ownership?OpenDocument> (accessed 2 January 2008).  
331 _____, “Related Information – Eligibility Criteria”, Housing Development Board, Singapore, 
<http://www.hdb.gov.sg/fi10/fi10206p.nsf/WPDis/Changing%20Of%20Owners%20And%20OccupiersR
elated%20Information%20-%20Eligibility%20Criteria?OpenDocument> (accessed 2 January 2008). 
332 _____, “Related Information – Eligibility for HDB Loan”, Housing Development Board, Singapore, 
<http://www.hdb.gov.sg/fi10/fi10206p.nsf/WPDis/Changing%20Of%20Owners%20And%20OccupiersR
elated%20Information%20-%20Eligibility%20for%20HDB%20Loan?OpenDocument> (accessed 2 
January 2008). 
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possession upon his death, and therefore has to be treated as inheritance to be disbursed 
accordingly. 
 
 
iii. Joint Tenancy and Mas lahah 
A book, titled “Joint Tenancy in Muslim Law”333 has been published by a Singaporean 
who has had experience in wealth and estate management.  In the book, he contested the 
fatāwā issued pertaining the matter, and argues that Joint Tenancy is allowed in Islam 
and the property belongs fully to the surviving co-owner after the demise of the other.  
This argument is on the basis of mas lahah, and the author brought a sample case of a 
house purchased on Joint Tenancy by a married couple.  Detail of the case is as follows: 
 
A married couple (Kassim and Zaiton) purchased a HDB flat and named both of them 
as co-owners through Joint-Tenancy.  Kassim, as the only breadwinner of the family, 
solely paid for the monthly installments of the flat.  In addition to that, he took a Home 
Protection Scheme (HPS), a housing insurance plan which will settle any remaining 
portion of the home loan should anything happen to Kassim.  The husband then passed 
away, surviving his parents, wife, a son, a daughter and a foster-son.  In accordance to 
the rules of HDB, after Kassim’s death the house was transferred to Zaiton, and the 
home loan was cleared by the HPS.  A Certificate of Inheritance334 was released by the 
                                                 
333 Sadali Rasban, Joint Tenancy in Muslim Law, HTHT Advisory Services, Singapore, 2006.  
334 In Singapore, a Certificate of Inheritance is issued by the Shariah Court by request, to determine the 
shares of the legal heirs according to the farā’id rules.  This procedure is provisioned by the AMLA as 
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Shariah Court, allocating the portions of the heirs according to the farā’id rules.  The 
deceased’s total inheritance was to be divided into 72 shares. 
 
Several months later, the parents of the deceased came and made claims on the 
deceased’s estate, including the house which was then already legally owned by Zaiton.  
After consulting two religious bodies, she was advised to sell the house and share it 
with the parents and two children according to farā’id.  As a result, she received 12.5% 
from the sale of the house, the deceased’s parents received 16.7% each, and the rest 
went to the daughter (18%) and son (36.1%).335  
 
The focal point which the author aimed to highlight in his book is the difficulties faced 
by the wife, after having to sell off the house.  This is seen as more unreasonable since 
the house was supposed to belong to her fully. The ownership transfer has already been 
made by the HDB in concordance with the Joint Tenancy contract undertaken by the 
deceased.  The author based his argument on preserving the mas lahah of the widow and 
her children who were left with no shelter, and the fact that this alleged act of injustice 
is in contrast with the objectives of the Sharī‘ah.  He also ventured to relate the Joint 
Tenancy contract to the concept of ruqbā. 
                                                                                                                                               
follows: 109.(1) If in the course of any proceedings related to the administration or distribution of the 
estate of a deceased person whose estate is to be distributed according to the Muslim law any court or 
authority shall be under the duty of determining the persons entitled to share in such estate or the shares 
to which such persons are respectively entitled, the Shariah Court may, on a request by such court or 
authority or on the application of any person claiming to be a beneficiary and on payment of the 
prescribed fee, certify upon any set of facts its opinion as to the persons who are, assuming such facts, 
whether as found or hypothetical, entitled to share in such estate and as to the shares to which they are 
respectively entitled.  Administration of Muslim Law Act.       
335 Sadali Rasban, Joint Tenancy in Muslim Law, HTHT Advisory Services, Singapore, 2006, pp. 1-5. 
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What the researcher would first like to address in answer to the claims made by the 
author in his book is the division of the sale of the house.  Rightfully, if we maintain 
that half of the property belongs to the deceased’s estate, only 50% of the flat’s value 
needs to be distributed among the legal heirs, the other half remains the right of the 
wife.  This means that, on top of the 12.5% allocated to her from the farā’id, she also 
gets to keep 50% of the sale of the house.  Since she was entrusted as the trustee for the 
shares of her two children, the accumulated percentage from the total sale of the house 
belonging to her and her two children is 83.3%.336  Thus the deceased’s parents are only 
entitled to 8.35% each from the total sale of the flat.  Although this may seem to be a 
large amount to a housewife who is not working, it does not necessarily require her to 
sell the house.  In fact, she can withdraw the same amount of money from her late 
husband’s other inheritance which are in the form of cash, to be given to the parents.  
The author’s claim that the ruling issued by the Fatwa Committee was the main reason 
that caused Zaiton and her children to lose their shelter, is seen to be without strong 
basis, and exaggerating. 
 
It is undeniable that HDB flats owned by Joint Tenancy have caused many family 
disputes.  However, the alleged injustice falls upon not only the co-owner of the flat, but 
also on the rightful legal heirs who are denied their share from the deceased’s portion of 
the flat.  The latter is highlighted in some cases brought to light by reports made in the 
                                                 
336 83.3% is accumulated from the 50% owned by Zaiton as a joint tenant, plus 12.5% of the remaining 
half as Ziton’s portion of the inheritance (6.25%), plus 18% of the remaining half as the daughter’s 
portion of the inheritance (9%), plus 36.1% of the remaining half as the son’s portion of the inheritance 
(18.05%). 
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local newspaper.  It was reported that there are more cases of Muslims who ignore 
following farā’id rules to distribute inheritance.  Lawyers working in many such cases 
revealed that many choose to apply civil law in cases wherein civil law may overrule 
farā’id.  These instances include rules related to HDB, Central Provision Funds (CPF) 
and shared accounts.  An example is the HDB rule concerning ownership transfer after 
the death of a co-owner in joint-tenancy.  According to farā’id, the deceased share has 
to be distributed.  However, if such a case is brought to court, no law can force the co-
owner to give up his full right of the house.337       
 
A case brought to illustrate this is a flat purchased by a Mahadi Said.  The flat was paid 
for by cash, and named after him and one of his sons Abdul Rahman.  Mahadi passed 
away in 1980.  on 17th August 1996, the son, Abdul Rahman decided to sell the flat and 
distribute his father’s share to his 6 sisters according to farā’id.  2 days later, he 
changed his mind and stopped the bank from issuing the cheques to his sisters, except to 
one of them, Anisah.  The other 5 sisters brought the matter to court. However, the 
subordinate court ruled that under the HDB law, Abdul Rahman is automatically the full 
owner of the house after his father’s death.  Therefore, if he doesn’t wish any portion of 
it to be distributed, the court is in no position to take any action against him or force 
him to abide by farā’id rules.338  
 
                                                 
337 Mazlena A.Mazlan, “Kes abai hukum faraid bertambah” (Cases of disregarding farāid rules in the 
rise), p. 3, Berita Harian, 5 August 2000.   
338 Mazlena A. Mazlan, “Mahkamah sivil tak boleh paksa hukum faraid dipatuhi” (Civil courts not in 
position to compel farā’id to be complied with), p. 3, Berita Harian, 5 August 2000. 
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Another case was of a married couple Munirah and Mohamad Yusof.  The couple, who 
had 6 children, divorced in 1989.  Following the divorce, she received $600 alimony per 
month for the expenses of two of their children who were still schooling.  The husband 
then remarried to a Syarifa, but died in 1997.  With no alimony support to finance the 
children who were then still attending Secondary and Tertiary education, Munirah 
worked as a cleaner with only an income of $600 per month, which was not enough.  
Having the interests of her children at heart, she made a claim addressed to Syarifa on 
her children’s share from the deceased’s inheritance. 
 
Munirah’s lawyer estimated the deceased’s inheritance to amount to more than half a 
million Singapore dollars.  It includes the 4-room flat co-owned with Syarifa.  A fatwā 
was issued in 1999 stating that the above mentioned estates, including 50% of the co-
owned flat was to be distributed accordingly between Syarifa, her three children and the 
deceased’s other 6 children.  However, Syarifa refused to abide by the fatwā.339        
 
In the above cases, both parties – the co-owner in the first illustration and the legal heirs 
in the last two cases – seem to be denied of their rights and their interests (mas lahah) 
revoked.  Hence, the claim of the author that giving joint-tenancy full ownership 
reserves mas lahah and fulfills the objectives of the shariah is incorrect.  In these cases, 
the interests vary from case to case, and we cannot determine which party is more 
deserving and more in need of the share.  Therefore generalizing the ruling as proposed 
                                                 
339 Mazlena A. Mazlan, “Enggan agih harta walau fatwa dikeluarkan” (Refused to distribute inheritance 
although fatwā had been issued), p. 3, Berita Harian, 5 August 2000. 
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by the author is detrimental to the sanctity of the Sharī‘ah.  The key to this issue goes 
back to the nature of the contract undertaken. 
 
 
iv. Joint Tenancy and ruqbā (conditional gift) 
The argument that the joint tenancy contract is similar to the concept of ruqbā in 
Islamic commercial law is also subject to scrutiny.  In this matter, it is pertinent to refer 
to the original sources of earlier Shāfi‘ī literature wherein this concept was first 
expounded.  Ruqbā is described as the giver (wāhib) saying the following: “This 
property is yours by  ruqbā; such that if you die before me the property is returned to 
me, and if I die before you the property belongs to you”.340  The word ruqbā originates 
from the verb form ra-qa-ba which bears the meaning of observing and monitoring.  
Hence this concept requires both parties to observe which of them dies first, as the 
ownership of the property depends on it.   
   
With regards to the views of the jurists on ruqbā, the later view from the Shāfi‘ī school 
of law is to accept it as a valid hibah – provided that there has been delivery of 
possession (qabd) – but the condition (observance of death) is considered as void.  In 
other words, if the wāhib pronounces it as such, the property has become a gift to the 
recipient and is fully owned by him/her.  The specified condition does not carry any 
                                                 
340 Al-Nawawī, Abū Zakariyyā Yahyā ibn Sharaf, Rawdat al-T ālibīn, ed. ‘Ādil Ahmad ‘Abd al-Mawjūd, 
Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 1992, vol. 4, p. 433.    
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influence on the transaction.341  The jurists of the Hanbalī madhhab, and Abū Yūsuf 
from the Hanafī madhhab are also of this opinion.342  This view is also transmitted from 
Ibn ‘Umar, Ibn ‘Abbās, ‘Alī, Shurayh, Mujāhid, Tāwūs and Sufyān al-Thawrī.343  Abū 
Hanīfah and Muhammad from the Hanafī madhhab however, differ slightly from their 
counterparts in this issue, and view the transaction and the gift as invalid totally.344  
According to them, this form of hibah, best described as contingent gift, is invalid 
because it is conditional on a contingency or possibility which may or may not occur.  It 
implies that no present interest exists and that whether such right or interest will ever 
exist depends upon a future uncertain event.  Hence, this transaction is seen as in 
conflict with the principles in property, therefore the whole transaction is void.345  
Nonetheless, they consider ruqbā as a valid ‘āriah, another transaction which means: 
“granting the right of usufruct/benefit from an item with no monetary charges”.346  With 
regards to the ownership of the item, it still belongs to the first owner (giver) but the 
                                                 
341 Ibid., vol. 4, p. 434. 
342 Zuhaylī, Wahbah, al-Fiqh al-Islāmī wa Adillatuh, vol. 5, pp. 9-10; Sarakhsī, al-Mabsūt, vol. 12, pp. 
104-105. 
343 Mālik ibn Anas, al-Muwatta’, ed. al-Nadawī, Taqiyyuddīn, Dār al-Qalam, Damascus, 1992, vol. 3, p. 
233. 
344 Sarakhsī, al-Mabsūt, vol. 6, p.184.  The reason for the differing of opinions is the many ahādīth 
narrated with regards to ruqbā.  Some of the narrations allow, while some disallow.  This calls for an 
effort to reach to a middle ground between these two views.  What can be concluded is that in most of the 
narrations ruqbā is linked to a similar transaction, ‘umrā.  This transaction can be best described as a 
temporary gift, whereby upon the death of the recipient, it should be returned to the giver.  The scholars 
are of the opinion that in this transaction, the hibah is valid but the condition is void.  Likewise with 
ruqbā.  However, those from the second camp argue the dissimilarity between the two, in that ruqbā 
ownership is not transferred during the transaction but is dependant on a future uncertain stipulation.  In 
contrary to ‘umrā wherein the transfer was made complete.    
345 Al-Kāsānī, Abū Bakr ibn Mas‘ūd, Badāi‘ al-Sanāi‘ fī Tartīb al-Sharāi‘, 3rd ed., Dār Ihyā’ al-Turāth al-
‘Arabī, Beirut, 2000, vol. 5, p. 165.  
346 Sarakhsī, al-Mabsūt, vol. 11, p. 142. 
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second party can benefit from it.  The owner, however, can withdraw the grant and take 
the property at any time he wishes. 
 
In essence, we can verify the difference between the concept of ruqbā and joint tenancy.  
Nothing stated in the contract indicates the flat as a gift from either party.  Only aspects 
of “equal interest in the flat” and “right of survivorship” are given emphasis.  Hence, 
the contest of comparing the two is inaccurate (qiyās ma‘a al-fāriq). 
 
 
v. Joint tenancy ruling in Bombay, India 
The final argument put forth by the author was the Bombay Court ruling that the Joint 
Tenancy is not in conflict with the Sharī‘ah.  Going back to the source of reference, the 
literature written by an Asaf Fyzee reads: 
English law, as we have seen, has had a considerable influence in 
modifying certain applications – if not principles – of Muhammadan law 
in India … The question arises whether, by gift or otherwise, a tenancy-
in-common and a joint-tenancy can be created.  It has been held in 
Bombay that where a gift is made to two persons jointly, without 
specifying their individual shares, the donors took as tenants-in common, 
for the court leans heavily against joint-tenancy.  But in another case, not 
involving a gift, the same High Court has laid down that there is nothing 
in Muhammadan law against the creation of a joint-tenancy, with benefit 
of survivorship.  It would, therefore, seem that both a tenancy-in-
common and a joint-tenancy can be created by appropriate means.347 
 
                                                 
347 Fyzee, Asaf A. A., Outlines of Muhammadan Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 4th ed., 1974, pp. 
227-228.   
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If we study the above text closely, it does not include a detailed account of the grounds 
on which tenancy-in-common and joint-tenancy are held as permissible.  Secondly, it 
can be noticed that the High Court has held two different positions in the same matter, 
one in favour of joint-tenancy and another against.  This bears in mind the 
establishment of different rulings according to the different situations it is subject to.  
Since two cases pertaining the same matter in the same Court can differ in the verdict, 
more so the difference in treatment towards the issue in a different country and 
environment which is governed by a different set of rules and serves interests unlike 
those in Bombay.  It is also mentioned that the Islamic law in India is heavily 
influenced by English Law.  The same cannot be said of Singapore.  Hence, comparing 
the Bombay ruling to the practice in Singapore opposes the underlying principle of 
change of ruling due to the change of place. 
 
Above all, let us not forget the Qur’ānic verses which have systematically and clearly 
outlined the farā’id rules, with the main objective of avoiding exactly these kinds of 
disputes.  (Your parents or your children: You know not which of them is nearer to you 
in usefulness.  It is an injunction from God.  Lo!  God is Knower, Wise)348  The 
Lawmaker, all Knowing of His servants, knows of the clouding evil that money can 
cause, hence the need to set such rules.  Basing the distribution of inheritance to mere 
reason will unequivocally create conflict among the legal heirs, and indefinitely cause 
family rifts. 
                                                 
348 Sūrat al-Nisā’, 4:11 
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5.2.4 Conclusion 
The researcher is in favour of the fatwā issued by the Fatwa Committee, as it is 
incontestable – as has been expounded extensively – that half of the house belongs to 
the deceased at the time of his death, and the Joint-Tenancy contract is void.  This 
reinstates what was written in the previous chapter that any rule of law – either 
customary or legal – which contradicts a Sharī‘ah rule, comes secondary and the 
Sharī‘ah ruling must be given precedence.  Especially in this case, wherein it is 
associated with the privileges of other human beings and may lead to denying others 
their due right. 
 
However, the researcher does not deny that the Fatwa Committee, as the governing 
body entrusted with providing guidelines to Muslims of the country, should have 
provided a more concise and comprehensive explanation on the position of joint-
tenancy in the Sharī‘ah.  This is to provide a better understanding of the issue to the 
community.  The fatwā issued concerning the matter is too short, hence do not fully 
address the concerns that many have in their minds.  In today’s context when there is an 
increasingly thin line between the permissible and the prohibited, Muslims in Singapore 
are more aware of each of their daily transactions in ensuring it is in line with the 
Sharī‘ah.349  At the same time, Muslims in Singapore, due to the increasing education 
                                                 
349 In Singapore, it can be said that Muslims are more conscious with adhering to religious demands in 
recent times as compared to the past.  A good example is in ensuring the consumption of halāl food.  As 
Muslims become more concerned that the food products – prepared food in restaurants as well as 
ingredients in supermarkets – they buy are halāl, the halāl market has increased as more restaurants and 
consumer brands have applied for the halāl certificate from Muis.  More halāl beef counters are also 
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they have attained, are more aware of managing their wealth and assets, during life and 
after death.  With such contracts offered to the public, as well as other public schemes, 
the Fatwa Committee should be alert to address these issues in their entirety.      
 
 
5.3 Human Organ Transplant 
The question of the permissibility of organ transplant from a muslim has a been a topic 
of debate by muslim scholars since its first introduction.  Developments in the surgical 
procedures and the rising number of diseases and patients who are in need of transplant 
add up to the necessity of this question being addressed adequately.  Likewise in 
Singapore similar concern has been raised, and fatāwa have been issued in light of the 
different circumstances encircling this matter. 
 
 
5.3.1 Background of the problem 
The National Kidney Foundation (NKF) is the pioneering organ donation advocacy in 
Singapore which undertook extensive educational campaigns to generate public 
awareness and support for kidney pledging since 1969.  Since 1969, as many as 200 
people were dying each year because of kidney failure.  Not only was dialysis an 
expensive method of treatment, kidneys available for transplants were also scarce.  
                                                                                                                                               
opened in general supermarkets.  The demand for halāl (Islamic) banking is also on the rise as the first 
Islamic bank, the Islamic Bank of Asia was officially launched in Singapore in 2007.  See Norhaiza 
Hashim, “Bank Islam pertama di sini dilancar” (First Islamic bank was launched here), p. 1, Berita 
Harian, 8 May 2007. 
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Before 1973, there was no law institutionalizing a person’s wish to be a kidney donor.  
After much effort, the Medical (Therapy, Education and Research) Act of 1972 was 
passed, legislating the process of organ donation through the opting-in350 system.  This 
Act also preserves an organ pledger’s wishes to remain sacrosanct.  Prior to this, his 
family could render a donor’s pledge invalid after his death. 
 
From 1973 to 1986, intensive public education campaigns reaching religious groups, 
community and grassroots organizations, and educational institutions were conducted.  
In 1987, the Parliament of Singapore passed the bill for the Human Organ Transplant 
Act (HOTA).  This Act presumes that Non-Muslim Singaporeans and Permanent 
Residents between 21and 60 (age-wise), who die in accident, have pledged to donate 
their kidneys upon death, unless they opt-out in their lifetime. Since then, the average 
number of pledges (through HOTA) increased consequently from 200 to 4000 
annually.351 
 
As mentioned earlier, and as explained to the masses in those education campaigns, 
dialysis is not a cure for kidney patients.  Besides being a tedious and painful process, 
dialysis (particularly non-subsidized dialysis) is expensive and quickly drains the 
                                                 
350 There are two systems implemented by countries internationally to regulate a person’s wish to donate 
an organ; opting-in and opting-out.  In Singapore, the opting-in system requires the donor to pledge his 
donation via donation card, signed by him and witnessed by one or two witnesses.  As long as he has not 
filled any pledge card during his life, he is not considered as a donor.  The opting-out system, also known 
as presumed consent, assumes that those who do not submit an objection, via opt-out card, are automatic 
organ donors.  It means that as long as he has not filled any opt-out card, he is considered as a donor.  
351 NKF, “Organ Donation Initiatives”, NKF Singapore, http://www.nkfs.org/organ.php (accessed 11 
November, 2007). 
 214
financial resources of the kidney patient and his family.  This adds to the emotional 
stress and family problems of kidney patients.  They will have to bear this burden 
indefinitely.  A kidney transplant is therefore the best option.352         
 
The first cadaver renal (kidney) transplant was performed in 1972 and the first live 
transplant in 1976.  To date over 850 cadaver and over 600 live transplants have been 
performed in Singapore.  The ten year graft survival rates for the transplants have been 
excellent with 75% for cadaver transplants and 85% for live transplants.  The average 
waiting time for a transplant is 7 years.353   
 
Table 3.1 
Renal (kidney) Transplants in Singapore354 
Year Number of Transplants 
Cadaveric Live 
2002 30 44 
2003 18 26 
2004 32 52 
2005 43 53 
 
                                                 
352 MKAC, “Proposal for inclusion of Muslims in the Human Organ Transplant Act”, 2. 
353 National Organ Transplant Unit (NOTU), “Renal Transplant”, Ministry of  Health Singapore, 
http://www.moh.gov.sg/mohcorp/programmes.aspx?id=2042 (accessed 11 November, 2007). 
354 Ibid. 
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The first heart transplant in Singapore was carried out in July 1990 and 31 transplants 
have since been successfully performed by the National Heart Centre.  Since the advent 
of medications to control rejection, survival of transplant patients has improved 
significantly.  About 80 percent of heart transplant patients survive 1 year or more.  The 
quality of life improves dramatically after a heart transplant and patients are able to lead 
more active lifestyle, including returning to work.355  The increase in the number of 
organ transplant programmes in Singapore led to the establishment of the Ministry of 
Health National Organ Transplant Unit (NOTU), to tailor organ procurement activities 
to meet the needs of the various transplant teams. 
 
Table 3.2 
Heart and Lung Transplants in Singapore356 
Year Number of Transplants 
Heart Lung 
2002 2 1 
2003 0 0 
2004 4 2 
2005 3 1 
2006 6 1 
 
                                                 
355 NOTU, “Heart Transplant”, Ministry of Health Singapore, 
http://www.moh.gov.sg/mohcorp/programme.aspx?id=12486 (accessed 11 November,2007). 
356 Ibid. 
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 In 2003, the Ministry of Health announced plans to extend the HOTA to include livers, 
corneas, and organs taken from non-accidental deaths, and regulate living donor 
transplants.  Another public education campaign was launched to educate Singaporeans 
on the misconceptions of organ donation in support of the proposed extension.  The 
revised law took effect on July 1, 2004.357  It did not bear a great significance on 
Muslims, since the procedure for Muslims organ donation was still through pledging. 
 
Following this amendment, more transplants have been carried out in Singapore 
hospitals. As at the end of 2006, 1778 patients have undergone cadaver and live kidney 
transplants,358 7 lung transplants, and 204 liver transplants.359  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
357 NKF, “Organ Donation Initiatives”, NKF Singapore, http://www.nkfs.org/organ.php (accessed 15 
November, 2007). 
358 Puad Ibrahim, “Lebih ramai pesakit dapat manfaat” (More patients gained benefit), Berita Harian, 
Singapore, 1 March, 2007. 
359 NOTU, “Statistics”, Ministry of Health Singapore, 
http://www.moh.gov.sg/mohcorp/programmes.spx?id=12494 (accessed 15 November, 2007). 
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Table 3.3 
Liver Transplants in Singapore360 
Year Number of Liver Transplants 
Cadaveric Live 
2002 5 18 
2003 2 17 
2004 8 13 
2005 2 32 
2006 7 25 
 
 
In short, as of present, there are two acts constituting matters related to the donation and 
transplant of organs.  These acts are: 
1. Medical (Therapy, Education and Research) Act 1972 (MTERA).  This Act is in 
the form of opt-in system, through the process of pledging to donate any organ 
following death. 
 
2. Human Organ Transplant Act 1987 (HOTA).  This Act is in the form of an opt-
out system, wherein those who are unwilling to donate their organs after death, 
                                                 
360 NOTU, “Liver Transplant”, Ministry of Health Singapore, 
http://www.moh.gov.sg/mohcorp/programmes.aspx?id=12494 (accessed 15 November, 2007).  
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are required to declare his disapproval.  Otherwise, he will be deemed as having 
given his consent ( presumed consent).  This Act, encompass these situations: 
i) organ transplant can only be conducted in the event of sudden death 
caused by an accident. 
ii) Organ transplant limited only to kidney. 
iii) Enforced on all Singaporeans and Permanent Residents aged between 21 
and 60 years, with the exclusion of Muslims. 
 
The amendment of HOTA in 2004 constitutes the following expansions: 
i) to broaden the scope of HOTA to include death which are not caused by 
accidents (natural death, death by sickness). 
ii) To broaden the scope of HOTA to include the heart, liver and cornea. 
iii) To legislate existing regulations for organ transplants from living donors. 
 
 
5.3.2 Muslims’ involvement in the issue 
Many of Singaporean Muslims also suffer from kidney failure, forming 18% of all 
kidney patients by the early 1990s.  As a result, many Muslim kidney patients died from 
waiting for kidney donors. 
 
In 1990, the Muslim Kidney Action Committee (MKAC) was formed under the 
auspices of MUIS.  The committee, together with NKF, has been actively involved in 
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promoting awareness amongst Muslims on issues relating to kidney disease, dialysis 
and transplant.  The MKAC also encouraged Muslims - through platforms like 
seminars, forums and talks, radio programmes and exhibition - to pledge their kidneys 
so that, in the event of their death, they can be used to save lives of kidney failure 
patients.361          
 
The first kidneys from a Muslim cadaver was removed and transplanted  into kidney 
patients at end of 1991.  During that period of time, the standing ruling regarding 
Muslims donating kidneys was based on the 1986 fatwa issued by the Fatwa Committee 
which requires the endorsement of two male heirs (waris)362 of the donor as witnesses 
to the pledge made by the donor.  This means that a potential kidney pledger must first 
get the endorsement of his or her 2 waris on the pledge card.  However, the process to 
get the endorsement of the heirs proved to be a great difficulty, especially if they are 
unwilling to give their consent.  As of 2000, records show that more than 12,000 pledge 
cards were rejected because there was no endorsement by waris.363  This resulted in 
some Muslims failing to pledge their kidney(s) even when they wish to. 
 
In the light of this, in 1999, MKAC submitted a proposal of amendment to MUIS, to 
include Muslims in HOTA, so that Muslims, like any other Singaporeans between the 
                                                 
361 MKAC, “Proposal for inclusion of Muslims in the Human Organ Transplant Act” (unpublished), 1.  
This working paper was submitted to MUIS in November, 2000. 
362 A Malay word widely used in the issue of organ transplant among Singaporean Muslims, and is also 
officially used in pledge cards. 
363 MKAC, “Proposal for inclusion of Muslims in the Human Organ Transplant Act”, p. 7. 
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age of 21-60 are deemed to be pledgers (presumed consent).  However, a special 
provision would be included in the case of Muslims for the consent of the waris to be 
sought and obtained prior to the removal of the kidney.  If the consent of the waris is 
not obtained, the kidneys would not be removed.  Muslims who do not wish to be 
kidney pledgers may opt out by writing to the Ministry of Health, just like other 
Singaporeans.  This proposal was in view of the increasing number of Muslim kidney 
patients whereby majority of them are from low-income families.  On top of that, most 
of them did not pledge their kidneys not because they are not willing to, but because of 
refusal from legal heirs.364       
 
This proposal was not approved by the Fatwa Committee.  However, they issued an 
amendment to the 1986 fatwā, and removed the condition of consent from 2 waris, 
instead the pledge can be done with any 2 male witnesses.  In 2007, another proposal 
was submitted to the Fatwa Committee to review this fatwā. 
 
The cause of all these concerns was the rising number of kidney patients in Singapore, 
including Muslims.  Until the month of July 2007, there were 3565365 kidney patients 
who were suffering from End Stage Renal Disease (ESRD), 20% of them 
Malay/Muslims.  More cases are expected to be diagnosed in the future as the two 
leading causes of kidney failure in Singapore, which are diabetes and hypertension, are 
                                                 
364 Suhaimi, “Fatwa dan fungsinya sebagai komunikasi hukum masyarakat Islam Singapura”, p. 27.  
365 Hisham Hambari, “Panggilan ke unit derma organ meningkat” (Number of calls to the Organ 
Transplant Unit in the rise), Berita Harian, 14 July, 2007, p. 7. 
 221
on the rise.  This trend - the increase of diabetic and hypertension patients - is prevalent 
among Muslims.  Increase in kidney disease will result in a corresponding increase in 
dialysis and the waiting period for kidney transplants.  By the end of 2006, 557 patients 
were in the waiting list for a cadaver renal transplant, 20% of them Malay/Muslims.366 
 
5.3.3 The development of MUIS fatwā in the issue 
Since the concept of organ transplant was founded, it has been widely discussed, 
particularly kidney donation.  Many believed that organ donation went against the 
teachings of Islam.  This resulted in many questions submitted to the Fatwa Committee 
on the matter.  It is interesting to note that the fatāwā issued have been going through an 
evolving process in dealing with this question.  This will be clearly elucidated in the 
coming pages. 
 
1) Fatwā issued in 1973 
In 1973, a question was submitted to the Fatwa Committee of Singapore, regarding the 
will of a Muslim who wanted his kidney to be bequeathed to the hospital and donated to 
kidney patients. 
 
After analyzing and studying the above-mentioned question, the Fatwa Committee 
declared that “the deceased Muslim’s organ donation pledge was not valid and 
considered void.  This is on the basis that he (the deceased) doesn’t have full right on 
                                                 
366 Hisham Hambari, “Panggilan ke unit derma organ meningkat”, Berita Harian, 14 July, 2007, p. 7.   
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his physical body including his kidney.  Therefore he has no right to transfer ownership 
to others.  On top of that, the extent of danger of this disease (kidney failure), and 
whether there are means of treatment is not known.  The success of kidney transplants is 
also not at a convincing level.”367 
 
2) Fatwā issued in 1986 
In 1986, the Singapore Government introduced HOTA.  This Act was to be imposed on 
all Singaporeans, including Muslims.  Its main purpose was to help kidney patients who 
have no other options of treatment except transplant. 
 
In relation to that, the Ministry of Health posed a question to the Fatwa Committee 
regarding the permissibility of kidney transplant for a Muslim. 
 
Members of the Fatwa Committee discussed this matter thoroughly among themselves, 
as well as referring to acknowledged fatāwā issued by other Muslim countries and 
international Islamic scholars, such as the Majma‘ al-Buhūth al-Islāmiyyah of Al-Azhar 
in Cairo, and Majma‘ al-Fiqh al-Islāmī of the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) 
in Jeddah. 
 
They thus concluded that such a transplant is prohibited if it is done in cases of non-
emergency, even if the donor is still alive.  This prohibition is made on the grounds that 
                                                 
367 Minutes of the Fatwa Committee meeting, 31 July 1973.    
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it will endanger the life of the donor.  If the transplant is done after the donor’s death, it 
is also prohibited, based mainly on the injunction to respect the body of the dead.  
Numerous Qur’ānic verses and Prophetic traditions are quoted in line with the 
prohibition of harming a dead body. 
 
However, in cases of emergency (darūrah) to save human lives, they allowed if it 
fulfills certain conditions, for both live and cadaveric donors.  The conditions are as 
follows: 
“If the donor is still alive, the donation is subject to the following conditions: 
- The donor must be a mukallaf (accountable) 
- The donor must be willing and free from any form of coercion              
- Success of the transplant surgery has to be ascertained 
- The surgery must not harm the donor in any way 
 
If the kidney is taken from a dead person, the additional conditions are: 
- Consent from the heirs of the deceased 
- Consent from the deceased prior to his death declaring his willingness to 
donate his kidney 
 
The pledge from the deceased to donate his kidney(s) must be accompanied with the 
consent of his heirs during his life.  The pledge will only be considered valid with 
consent from both the donor and his heir, as long as the donor has not withdrawn his 
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pledge.  To avoid the decomposing of the kidney after the death of the donor, the 
consent of the heirs need not be asked for the second time.”368     
 
Organ transplant in cases of emergency was thus allowed by the Fatwa Committee 
based on darūrah, and fulfilling the needs of the patients who are in much need of 
transplants.  This is in view of the religion’s general command to preserve the interest 
of human beings.  A number of legal maxims related to darūrah are expounded to 
support this view. 
 
In addition to issuing this fatwā, the Fatwa Committee also gave two suggestions to the 
Singapore Government with relation to organ transplants.  They are: (1) to request the 
Government that Muslims are exempted from HOTA, and (2) to provide the alternative 
that Muslims can declare to donate their organs by way of opting-in and not opting-out. 
 
These suggestions were made solely to sustain the religious principle of maintaining the 
rights of the heirs of the deceased more than the deceased himself.  The above-
mentioned suggestions have been approved by the government and Muslims have thus 
been exempted from HOTA. 
 
 
 
                                                 
368 _____, Kumpulan Fatwa 1, Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura, Singapore, 1987, p. 32. 
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3) Fatwā issued in 2004 
In 1999, a delegate from NKF – which comprised of the Chief Executive of NKF and 
other members of the Muslim Kidney Action Committee (MKAC) – on 9th April 1999 
asked the opinion of MUIS on an intended proposal to include Muslims under HOTA.  
Following this enquiry, the Fatwa Committee reviewed the 1986 fatwā, based on the 
principles of the Sharī‘ah and the guidelines provided therein.  Predominant conditions 
of the kidney failure rate among Singaporeans were also put into consideration.  Not 
only members of the Fatwa Committee were involved in the discussion, but local 
religious teachers (asātidhah) were also involved to share their views on the issue 
through a briefing and discussion session with members of the Fatwa Committee, which 
was focused on the topic of the issue of legal heirs’ consent and their sacrosanct right 
over the body of the deceased.369 
 
Finally, an agreement was reached and amendments were made to the previous fatwā.  
The changes endorsed are: 
- “If the deceased had, during his life, pledged his kidney, the heirs are obliged to 
carry out his bequest and have no right to nullify this pledge after the deceased’s 
death.  If the deceased has made no such bequest during his life, then the heirs 
have the right to donate the kidney if they wish. 
 
                                                 
369 The session was organized by the Office of the Mufti on the 9th March 2004. 
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- The consent of two male heirs when the donor made his pledge – as was 
required based on the 1986 fatwā – is no longer required.  Instead, it is sufficient 
for the donor to produce any two male Muslims to endorse his pledge, even 
though they are not his heirs.”370 
 
In the same Fatwa Committee meeting, the Committee was of the opinion that the 
organs of heart and liver can be compared to kidney in their role to save the life of the 
patient. Therefore, the Committee decided that the transplant of heart and liver are seen 
as a necessity to preserve human’s life (darūrah), hence are permitted on the same 
grounds as kidney transplants.  As for cornea transplants, although seen as a means to 
only improve eyesight or regain lost of eyesight, the Fatwa Committee nonetheless 
decided to also allow on the basis of eradicating a difficulty (dar’ mafsadah). 
 
4) Fatwā issued in 2007 
In July 2007, the Fatwa Committee declared the issuance of a new fatwā which allows 
Muslims to be included in the HOTA.371  This decision was made after studying the 
report presented by the Office of Mufti regarding the issue of organ donation in 
Singapore, based on the latest report from MKAC which include: (1) the problems and 
difficulties faced by Muslim kidney patients, (2) the effectiveness of the campaigns held 
to increase the Muslim community’s awareness to help and pledge their organs, (3) the 
                                                 
370 Minutes of meeting for Fatwa Committee, approved on 13th July 2004 (MJF 30 2001-2004). 
371 ____, “Muslim boleh sertai HOTA” (Muslims can be included under HOTA), Berita Harian, 
Singapore, 27 July, 2007, p. 1. 
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present number of pledgers, and (4) whether the problems of kidney patients can be 
overcome with the available number of pledgers in the future, and the report from the 
Ministry of Health on the process, number and status of Muslim kidney patients 
compared to other ethnic groups in Singapore. 
 
This decision was reached after considering many factors.  Among them are: 
i) Many resolutions have been issued by the majority of Muslim jurists on the 
permissibility of organ transplant and donation from a dead person. 
ii) The objective of the Sharī‘ah which asserts the importance to preserve the life 
of man, as stated in the Qur’ānic verse: “… and if any one saved a life, it would 
be as if he saved the life of the whole people”.372  
 
iii) The unsuccessfulness of the prevailing fatwā and the opt-in system (MTERA) in 
solving the problems of kidney patients.  Although a fatwā was already issued in 
2004 to make the process of pledging easier, the number of pledgers are still 
insufficient and unable to help the waiting patients.  At the same time, the 
difficulties faced by the patients are increasing and are also afflicting the 
families.  Therefore, the hardship (mafsadah) that they are experiencing should 
be overcome with a viable solution, based on the legal maxims “When an issue 
becomes constricted, it may be expanded” and “A difficulty should be 
alleviated”. 
                                                 
372 Sūrat al-Mā’idah, 5:32. 
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iv) The concept of presumed consent in HOTA can be described as an advanced 
consent sought from the donors.  They still have the choice of not donating by 
opting out of the system during life.”373  
 
This latest fatwā, however, does not mean Muslims are now automatically included in 
HOTA.  Changes have to be made to HOTA first before the inclusion can take place.  
Meanwhile, the Ministry of Health will study the fatwā in detail with MUIS and also 
consult the Muslim public on it. 
 
 
5.3.4 Response of the Muslim community towards these fatāwā 
In the midst of all these developments, the response of the Muslim community has been 
varying, since the first issue of organ transplant was raised.  Following the 1973 fatwā 
prohibiting organ donation, a book by a prominent Singaporean academic Prof. Syed 
Hussein Alattas was produced.  This book, among others, questioned the position taken 
by the Fatwa Committee, on the basis that it did not consider the needs of the people.  It 
further contested that looking for a cure (tadāwī) is recommended in Islam, and organ 
transplant is one of the means of medication.374  
  
                                                 
373 _____, “Fatwa beri jalan rawatan lebih sempurna” (Fatwā paves way for improved treatment), Berita 
Harian, Singapore, 27 July, 2007, p. 6.    
374 Al-Attas, Syed Hussein, Biarkan buta, Pustaka Nasional, Singapore, 1974. 
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Following the 1987 fatwā which permitted organ transplants if it fulfills the conditions 
defined by the Fatwa Committee, many have voiced their concerns, some in relief as 
they are able to help those in need, and some in doubt as they still have unresolved 
questions regarding the issue.  Many steps have been taken  to disseminate a correct 
understanding of the permissibility of organ donation, and its evidences.  Amongst these 
steps is a seminar held which was aimed to explain the reasons organ donation and 
transplant are allowed in Islam.375  The participants of this seminar were grassroots and 
Islamic organization leaders. 
 
When MKAC launched the extensive campaign to gain support for the inclusion of 
Muslims under HOTA in 2000, many concerns were raised regarding the permissibility 
of donation on the basis of automatic or presumed consent.  Questions were also raised 
with regards to the organs being donated to non-Muslims in fearing that the donor may 
bear the sins committed by the recipient after receiving the transplant.  The Mufti stated 
that this reservation should be given only to non-Muslims who are at war with Muslims.  
In democratic Singapore, where non-Muslims live in peace with Muslims, such 
concerns are not founded.  In fact, in matters relating to general interest and rendering 
assistance to others, the religion maintains equality between Muslims and non-Muslims, 
as Islam is a blessing for all of mankind (rahmatan li al-‘ālamīn).  An illustration is 
given; on giving money to a beggar who then used it to buy liquor.  In no way is the 
donor accountable for the beggar’s action, likewise in this case.  Although some 
                                                 
375 _____, Pemindahan ginjal: sebab-sebab Islam membenarkan (Kidney transplant: Reasons why Islam 
allows), Jamiyah, Singapore, 1994. 
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scholars still view organ transplant as prohibited, the Mufti stated that the number is 
small, and they base their arguments solely on the basis of precaution (ihtiyāt).  In 
practising our five kulliyyāt (general necessities), preserving self and health is very 
important.  He further asserted that helping others to preserve their life and regain their 
health is undoubtedly a commendable thing to do in the religion.376  
 
Prior to the issuance of the latest 2007 fatwā, many reports in the newspaper highlighted 
the plight of Muslim patients, who have to wait for transplant longer than non-Muslims 
who are included in HOTA.  In the process of waiting, their organ continues to 
deteriorate and they have to consume large doses of medication daily.377  Following this 
report, surveys have been made on the community’s acceptance of the inclusion of 
Muslims in HOTA,378 and the issue was discussed frequently in local forums.  MKAC 
has also received an increasing number of enquiries on the procedures of pledging.379  
An informal campaign has been launched in mosques by addressing this issue in Friday 
                                                 
376 Noor A. Rahman, “Ikrar ginjal automatik tak bercanggah dengan fatwa” (Automatic kidney pledge is 
not in conflict with fatwā) & “Izin waris masih tetap diperlukan” (Permission by waris is still needed), 
Berita Harian, Singapore, 7 August, 2000, p. 1 & p. 4.  
377 ___, “Menanti dengan hati terbuka” (Waiting with an open heart), Berita Harian, Singapore, 7 June, 
2007, p. 1. 
378 Of the 50 people asked in this informal survey conducted by the local newspaper, 32% do not agree of 
the inclusion, 6.4% are not sure, and the rest agreeable.  Hisham Hambari & Halifi Hussin, “Ramai 
sokong derma ginjal” (Many support kidney donation), Berita Harian, Singapore, 14 July, 2007, p. 1.  
Among the reasons given by those who are unsure or opposed to the notion are lack of publicity and 
public education on the issue, vagueness in the processes of the transplant after the event of death, and 
uncertainty in its permissibility from the Islamic perspective.  See Halifi Hussin, “Masih ramai yang 
keliru” (Many are still confused), Berita Harian, Singapore, 14 July, 2007, p. 6.  
379 Hisham Hambari, “Panggilan ke unit derma organ meningkat”, Berita Harian, 14 July, 2007, p. 7. 
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sermons and disseminating booklets on organ donation from the Islamic perspective and 
its application in Singapore.380        
 
Following the issuance of this fatwā and the inclusion of Muslims in HOTA, discussion 
sessions with asātidhah, or religious teachers, and press conferences have been made.  
The responses were largely positive, where many welcomed this fatwā, including 
ministers and health officials.  In general, the Muslim community is supportive of organ 
donation, but are still varied in their response to this fatwā.  They put forth many 
concerns, which are more directed towards the procedures involved rather than the 
religious ruling on it.381 
 
 
5.3.5 Evaluation of fatwā 
The assessment of these fatāwā, no doubt, calls for a detailed study and thorough 
understanding and analysis of the prevailing conditions and developments of organ 
donation, and the responses given by both the government, religious authority (Fatwa 
Committee) and the general public. 
 
The permissibility of organ donation has been established by majority of contemporary 
Islamic scholars, and numerous resolutions by International Islamic conferences have 
                                                 
380 Office of Mufti, Organ transplant in Islam, Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura, Singapore, 2007. 
381 ___, “Prihatin perihal prosedur, bukan hukum” (Concerns about procedures, not ruling), Berita 
Harian, Singapore, 27 July, 2007, p. 7. 
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been made on this issue.382  Hence, the second fatwā which permits organ donation and 
transplant, abrogating the first fatwā, is called for.  The evidences brought forth in the 
second fatwā are also well-argued, based on revealed texts from the Qur’ān and hadīth, 
as well as established legal maxims.  The problem that Muslims in Singapore are 
subject to, however, is different from those in other countries, due to the complications 
arising from the legislations of HOTA. 
 
This Act was put in effect not for commercial or economical interest on the part of the 
Government, but to accommodate the needs of the people, due to the alarming rising 
number of patients, the fatality of renal failure and the large percentage of patients who 
have died due to this disease.  Although medical researches have been conducted to 
define the causes of renal failure, its ascent is caused by the increase of other diseases.  
Due to the worrying general health conditions of Singaporeans, induced by soaring 
stress level owing to living and economic demands, the rise of renal failure is hard to 
contain and takes a long time to overcome by means of public health awareness 
programs.   
 
                                                 
382 Amongst these is the resolution made by the Majma‘ Fiqh Islāmī in its fourth conference dated 6-11 
February 1988, with the condition of legal heirs’ consent.  See ____, Qarārāt Majma‘ al-Fiqh al-Islāmī, 
4th conference, Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC), Jeddah, 1408/1988, vol. 1, p. 510.  See also 
Albar, Mohammad Ali, “Islamic ethics of organ transplantation and brain death”, Ismail Ibrahim(ed.) 
Islam dan pemindahan organ, Institut Kefahaman Islam Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 1999, pp. 106-107, for 
an extensive list of fatāwā issued by jurists and resolutions made by religious bodies on this issue, dating 
from 1952 to 1990.     
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This being said, the ruling on organ transplant and its application in Singapore should 
be viewed in a different light than those issued in other countries.  The above conditions 
and statistics are subjected specifically in Singapore, hence the religious stance on the 
issue must bear these characteristics in mind.  The researcher applauds the Fatwa 
Committee on their approach to this matter, and their consideration of the surrounding 
factors and grave necessity that leads to the development of the fatāwā.  The changes do 
not signify the lack of adherence to established rulings, rather they show the dynamicity 
of the Sharī‘ah in such a way that it continues to succeed to solve the challenges 
Muslims face.  However, let us analyze each of the main components of this issue to 
assess the contributing factors in these fatāwā:- 
 
i. Consent to donate organs 
Concern has to be directed to the amendment in 2004, which only endorsed the change 
of procedure of pledging from requiring the consent of two heirs to only two male 
Muslim witnesses.  However, the fatwā did not approve the proposal made in 2000 to 
include Muslims in HOTA.  This could be owing to the fact that the practice of seeking 
consent of waris prior to the transplant was not able to be determined.  Although the 
Fatwa Committee exercised flexibility in the pledging process, it did not compromise 
the ground rule of consent, either from the donor himself or from waris. 
 
However, doubts on the issue of presumed consent have been overcome in the new 
fatwā issued in 2007.  The Deputy Mufti has shared that in 2004, the members of the 
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Fatwa Committee had doubts on the concept of presumed consent, and have insisted 
that explicit intention has to be made by the donor.  However, based on the insufficient 
number of pledgers, the current pledging system is unable to support the rising number 
of patients.  Although live transplant is a good alternative to overcome the problem of 
consent, since the donor is still alive to proclaim his consent beyond reasonable doubt, 
the number of live donors is considerably low as not many are brave to come forward as 
live transplant donors.  These facts have led the Committee to re-evaluate the fatwā and 
reconsider the concept of presumed consent. 
 
As those who do not wish to donate their organs may do so by opting-out of HOTA, the 
issue of force and lack of consent are unfounded in the opt-out system.  Extensive steps 
are also currently carried out by MUIS to disseminate this news, so that all Muslims are 
aware of the current situation and the choice that they have.  Some may view this step 
as a form of ‘penalty’ for the failure of Muslims to pledge organs since the past 20 
years.  However, the aspect of necessity should also be born in mind, as will be 
discussed next. 
 
ii.  Necessity (darūrah) of organ transplant and donation 
The re-evaluation of the fatwā conducted in 2007 was based on the rising number of 
kidney patients, and is seen as necessary.  On one hand, organ transplant is a definite 
necessity for those who suffer from kidney disease.  The difficulties faced by those who 
have to undergo dialysis, both economically and emotionally, are enormous.  Hence, a 
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transplant is the best option, although patients still have to rely on medication and 
cannot fully resume normal activities after transplant.  Due to legal definitions 
entrenched in the provisions of HOTA, those who did not pledge their organs during 
health, will not be given priority to have an organ transplant if they contract kidney 
disease.  In other words, they will be placed in the end of the waiting list, and literally 
have a slim chance of the possibility of a transplant.  Hence, pledging can be 
categorized as a potential necessity even for the healthy. 
 
On the other hand, the percentage of kidney patients to the overall Singapore population 
is not significant.  Renal failure (nephritis and nephrosis) is listed as the 10th principal 
cause of death (1.6%) in Singapore as opposed to cancer (26.4%) and ischaemic heart 
disease (18.1%).383  However, it can be argued that kidney disease does not bring 
certain death since it is a long term disease.  Unless transplant is done, the suffering of 
the patient will continue until transplant, or death.  Other diseases, like cancer, require 
other forms of treatment and the contribution of others does not play a role in the 
necessary surgery.  In Islam seeking remedy and treatment for a sickness or disease is 
not compulsory.  However, helping others within one’s capacity is required as 
provisioned in many Qur’ānic verses definitively. 
 
                                                 
383 ___, “Statistics- principal causes of death”, Ministry of Health Singapore, 
http://www.moh.gov.sg/mohcorp/statistics.aspx?id=5526 (accessed 11 November, 2007). 
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An important aspect regarding cases which rely on necessity or darūrah is that the 
“necessity is evaluated based on the extent of the necessity”.384  This means that when a 
situation is allowed, or a prohibition is removed due to a necessary need, this provision 
is given based on the level of necessity, such that if the necessity ceases to exist, the 
provision should also be removed.  In this case, organ donation should only be allowed 
on necessary organs only, and not on others.  In the event that kidney disease patients 
have reduced considerably, or other means of treatment are found, this provision should 
be removed. 
 
 
iii.  Management and treatment of organs 
The possibility of these organs being used for trading is not realized, since the 
Government has legislated strict rules against this act, due to ethical issues.  Provisioned 
in the statutory act of HOTA, Part IV, it reads: 
 
14. – (1) Subject to this section, a contract or arrangement under which a person agrees, 
for valuable consideration, whether given or to be given to himself or to another person, 
to the sale or supply of any organ or blood from his body or from the body of another 
person, whether before or after his death or the death of the other person, as the case 
may be, shall be void. 
 
                                                 
384 Al-Suyūti, Jalāl al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Rahmān ibn Abī Bakr ibn Muhammad, al-Ashbāh wa al-Nazā’ir, Dār 
al-Salām, Cairo, 2006, vol. 1, p. 214. 
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(2) A person who enters into a contract or arrangement of the kind referred to in 
subsection (1) and to which that subsection applies shall be guilty of an offence and 
shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding $10,000 or to imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding 12 months or to both.385    
 
 
iv.  Procuring organs from brain-dead patients 
The question of brain-stem death is also among the prominent concerns in the 
discussions of this issue.  Many of the families of the deceased found it difficult to 
accept the request made by hospitals for the deceased’s organs to be procured at this 
stage.  Such a case was recounted by the Health Minister Khaw Boon Wan, of a brain-
dead man.  The family members of the man were involved in a disagreement on when 
the organs could be transplanted.  The family members requested 24 hours to perform 
Taoist rituals on the man.  This delay meant that the liver could not be used in a planned 
transplant.  Seeing that the condition of the other organs is deteriorating, the hospital 
refused concession for further delay requested by the family.386   
 
From the Islamic legal perspective, brain-death has been maintained as one of the ways 
to ascertain death.  The Fatwa Committee of Singapore has issued a fatwā permitting 
                                                 
385 Republic of Singapore, Human Organ Transplant Act (Singapore, 1987), Part IV, clause 14.  This Act 
constitutes Chapter 131A of the Singapore constitution , and first put into effect in 1987, with amendment 
in 2004. 
386 Lin, Keith, “More than one life saved every week after changes to law”, The Straits Time, Singapore, 1 
March, 2007, H7. 
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the disabling of a life supporting system when 3 qualified medical doctors have 
ascertained the patient to be brain-dead and has no chance of recovery.387  This is 
congruent to the resolutions made during the “Seminar on Human Life: its Inception 
and End as viewed by Islam” held in Kuwait in 1985, and by the Majma‘ al-Fiqh al-
Islāmī of OIC on its 3rd session held in Amman, October 1986.  However, the issue of 
retrieving vital organs from brainstem dead patients remained unresolved in these 
International conferences.  On top of that, the Council of Islamic Fiqh Academy of 
Rābitat al-‘Ālam al-Islāmī in its 10th session resolved that a person who is diagnosed as 
brain-dead can only be pronounced dead when respiration and heart beat cease after 
switching off the life-support apparatus.  Hence, we may deduce that this resolution 
implies that retrieving vital organs from brainstem dead patients is not permissible 
within the dictates of the Shari’ah.388  
 
In the case of conflict between different resolutions such as this – which are themselves 
ijtihād and are not definitive in nature – preference has to be made based on the 
comparison (muwāzanah) between the different benefits (masālih) to be realized and 
the different harms (mafāsid) to be avoided.  Although the need of the organ patients are 
incumbent, thorough consideration and a detailed study has to be made before we 
alleviate this harm by incurring another harm of hastening the death of another patient. 
 
                                                 
387 Unpublished fatwā issued on 20/9/94.  
388 Abul Fadl, Mohsin Ebrahim, Organ Transplantation: contemporary Islamic legal and ethical 
perspectives, A.S. Noordeen, Kuala Lumpur, 1998, pp. 100-105.  
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In our attempt to apply muwāzanah between two lives, an issue discussed in earlier 
Islamic legal literature has addressed the issue of retrieving organs from criminals who 
have been convicted and are on death row.  These criminals, whose status can be 
categorized as confirmed death, can be likened to those who are brain dead.  However, 
most earlier jurists view that consent from these criminals is still required, as their 
physical body and organs are not to be disposed unduly.389  This implies that consent 
must be sought, before death from the person himself, or after death from his heirs, 
through direct consent or presumed consent. 
 
 
v.  Availability of organs for transplant    
Finally, the researcher would like to mention the main factor that has contributed to the 
issuance of the fourth fatwā, which is the decreasing number of Muslim pledgers.  
According to the table appended below, the decrease rate is indeed startling, especially 
when compared to the large number of patients in need of transplant.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
389 ‘Ārif, ‘Alī ‘Ārif, “Madā i‘tidād bi ridā al-mahkūm ‘alaihi bi al-i‘dām fī naql al-a‘dā’ minhu”, al-
Dirāsāt al-Islāmiyyah, Islamic Research Centre of the International Islamic University Islamabad, 
Pakistan, 2003, Volume 38, No.2.  
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Table 3.4 
Number of Muslim Pledgers in Singapore390 
Year  Number of Pledgers  Year  Number of Pledgers 
1999  1130  2004  924 
2000  1752  2005  496 
2001  496  2006  87 
2003  367  2007 until 30 June  75 
 
 
The cause of this decline cannot be clearly founded, but it could be due to lack of 
publicity and campaigns on organ donation pledging, as well as prevalent 
misunderstandings on organ donation and the treatment of organ donors. 
 
 
 
5.3.6 Conclusion 
To conclude, the researcher views that this recent fatwā is called for to solve the 
difficulties.  However, the Fatwa Committee has to put in more effort in defining the 
definitive aspects in this issue, and be aware of any changes made to HOTA, in 
ensuring that these future changes are not in conflict with the principles of the Sharī‘ah.  
For example, in the event that the Government decides to amend the laws and allows 
                                                 
390 Hisham Hambari, “Panggilan ke unit derma organ meningkat”, Berita Harian, 7 
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the sale of these procured organs, Muslims must be exempted again from HOTA as sale 
of organs is clearly prohibited in the Sharī‘ah under any circumstance.  The same 
applies if HOTA is extended to include organs which are prohibited to be donated, like 
organs of the reproductive system.  Another issue is in the event of extending HOTA to 
other bodily parts which do not fall under the category of confirmed necessity, or 
darūrah; in such an instance Muslims should be exempted as there are other means to 
alleviate this difficulty.  Also, if there are reasons to suspect that a person’s withdrawal 
from HOTA can be overruled by certain authorities, this issue also needs further 
evaluation.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
In finalizing this research that the researcher has embarked on, the following 
conclusions are hereby proposed: 
 
  
THE LEGAL THEORIES OF IFTĀ’ AMONG SCHOLARS OF THE SHĀFI‘Ī 
MADHHAB 
 
1. There are generally two definitions of iftā’ utilized by the jurists of the Shafi‘ī 
school of law, the first of which is synonymous to ijtihād.  It is based on this 
first definition that the set of preconditions suggested by jurists of the madhhab 
to qualify a person to issue fatāwā are the very same preconditions of a 
mujtahid.  Only after about three centuries after al-Shāfi‘ī, did al-Ghazzālī begin 
to introduce the notion of partial ijtihād (tajazzu’ al-ijtihād) and other 
concessions to the preconditions mentioned, due to the increasing dearth of fully 
qualified and independent mujtahidūn. 
 
2. This has led the subsequent jurists of the al-Shāfi‘ī school of law to adopt a 
second definition of iftā’, which is closer to its literal meaning, and that is 
answering religious questions.  If by the earlier definition, only fully qualified 
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mujtahidūn were permitted to issue fatāwā by way of employing the standard 
processes of ijithād, this second definition however allows a knowledgeable 
person to answer questions pertaining Islamic law even if he has yet to reach the 
echelon of a fully qualified mujtahid.  By this second definition of iftā’ also, a 
muftī may issue a fatwā by way of taqlīd, or reporting a mujtahid’s legal opinion 
that the muftī subscribes to. 
 
3. Discussions offered by jurists of the Shāfi‘ī school of law on iftā’, muftūn and 
fatāwā generally address the etiquettes of a muftī in issuing fatwās.  No 
significant attention was given to provide or to allocate a dedicated legal 
framework for iftā’.  This is due to the fact that the standard definition of iftā’ 
widely accepted within the Shāfi‘ī school of law is one that is parallel to ijtihād, 
and that the whole body of us ūl al-fiqh is already intended to operate as the 
guiding principles for ijtihād in Islamic jurisprudence. 
 
4. The absence of a dedicated framework for iftā‘ in the Shāfi‘ī madhhab, 
however, may cause a considerable degree of setback to muftūn of the madhhab 
in discharging their duties of answering questions.  This is because the 
discussions and writings of us ūl al-fiqh are intended for the purpose of ijtihād, 
either in the form of deducing rulings from the primary texts, or in other 
secondary forms when there is no textual evidence in existence for novel cases 
of law.  In other words, us ūl al-fiqh and ijtihād are both general in nature, 
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whereas in many instances iftā’ addresses specific questions and needs of 
individuals or groups in their specific time, space and environment.  In 
addressing questions that are specific in nature, the realization and preservation 
of human interest, or mas lahah, is to be given significant consideration similar 
to, if not greater than, the importance of observing the implied general 
injunction of the primary texts.   
 
5. The consideration of mas lahah in formulating Islamic legal rulings does exist in 
various sections of usūl al-fiqh books of the Shāfi‘ī madhhab, especially in the 
extensive discussions on qiyās.  However, there has been an apparent lack of 
consolidated and methodical deliberations on the application of mas lahah in the 
realm of iftā’ in particular, where the specific conditions that a mustaftī is in 
may cause the muftī to give prominence to an initially weaker legal opinion.  
This is highly probable, as well as legally acceptable, when the muftī finds that 
choosing a stronger and standard ruling as his fatwā will only expose the 
mustaftī to harm or grave difficulties.  It is thus understandable if the jurists of 
the Shāfi‘ī school of law commonly show a considerable degree of reservation 
in accepting mas lahah liberally in the processes of general ijtihād, the evidence 
of which is their widely perceived rejection of istihsān, istislāh and mas ālih 
mursalah, but their willingness to utilise mas lahah in addressing specific cases 
for iftā’ purposes has to be highlighted and further developed into a systematic 
legal theory on its own. 
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 THE SINGAPORE FATWA COMMITTEE AND THE FATĀWĀ IT ISSUED 
1. The Fatwa Committee of Singapore has played an important role in providing 
religious guidelines for the Singapore muslim community and in answering their 
religious questions since the Committee’s inception in 1968.  The Committee 
members have stayed true to their constitutional obligations as allocated under 
the state’s Administration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA), where fatāwā issued by 
the Committee are generally according to the standard legal rulings opined by 
established jurists of the Shāf‘ī school of law.   
 
2. In cases where certain standard legal opinions of the madhhab are perceived to 
have the potentials of implicating harm or difficulties to the mustaftī if these 
opinions were to be issued as fatāwā, the Fatwa Committee has never failed to 
take mas lahah as the principal factor of consideration.  This research has shown 
that such an approach does not only comply with the requirement of the state 
law, through AMLA, it is also in accordance with the legal theories of iftā’ in 
the Shāfi‘ī school of law.  The multiple changes that the Fatwā Committee 
introduced to their fatwā on human organ transplant within a time span of 35 
years is a clear manifestation of such.  Although there still exist voices of 
suspicion and skepticism within the Muslim community, while some are still 
held back by confusion due to the number of changes that were made to the 
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fatāwā over time, the Fatwa Committee held true to their duty to put preference 
to the larger good of the general public.  
 
3. A similar approach is apparently reflected in the fatāwā issued in areas of wealth 
management and inheritance.  While truthfully adhering to the standard legal 
opinion of the Shāfi‘ī madhhab in issuing fatāwā on cases that are 
straightforward and general in nature, like in the issue of farā’id, the Fatwā 
Committee has also shown that it did not have any hesitation to employ 
alternative views, like the fatāwā on nuzriah, controversial they may seem to be, 
in order to provide solutions to difficulties faced by Muslims of the country.  
This can also be seen in the fatāwā on joint tenancy of home ownership, where 
the maslahah for the muslim public plays a central role in effecting the fatwā 
issued, and the adjustments made to its clauses over time. 
 
 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1. There must be continuous efforts to address the common assumption that the 
consideration of mas lahah is of no significance in the legal thoughts within the 
Shāfi‘ī school of law.  It should be highlighted that al-Shāfi‘ī’s inclination to 
reject istihsān, and also the reported reservation of scholars of the madhhab 
against the utilization of istislāh, mas ālih mursalah, and the like, is not without 
 247
qualification.  A fact that needs to be further reiterated is that these rejections are 
actually directed against unscrupulous utilization of the legal tools mentioned. 
 
2. In societies where there exists a general expectation that fatāwā for them are to 
be based on a particular madhhab, the muftūn and iftā’ institutions of these 
societies have to go beyond the standard fiqh opinions within the madhhab, or 
al-qawl al-mu‘tamad fī al-madhhab, for iftā’ is a task of identifying the most 
suitable ruling for specific person/s according to their specific needs and 
situations.  Awareness has to be created that in iftā’, realizing a mas lahah 
recognized by the sharī‘ah for the mustaftī is to be given superiority over the 
strongest fiqh opinion of any madhhab, when there are contradiction between 
the two.  
 
3. More research has to be done to identify the need for, and further develop, a 
comprehensive legal framework for iftā’, similar to the framework vastly 
available in us ūl al-fiqh which has long been effectively applied for the purpose 
of fiqh and the process of deducing rulings from the primary texts.  Continuous 
research in this area is critical, for the process of tanzīl al-hukm is significantly 
inevitable in the realm of iftā’, but lacking in the intellectual body of usūl al-
fiqh.  
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